dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the evidence presented was insufficient to support a finding the structure was adapted for overnight accommodation. While there is reason to agree with the majority’s conclusion in this factually-specific case, the question on appeal is simply whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, support the finding made by those who actually heard and saw the evidence. I believe they do.
In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, “[t]he critical inquiry ... does not require a court to ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 594 Pa. 176, 934 A.2d 1233, 1235 (2007) (emphasis in original) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). Rather, the court “must determine simply whether the evidence believed by the fact-finder was sufficient to support the verdict.” Id., at 1236. In doing so, “all of the evidence and any inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (2000)).
Mr. Prato, a carpenter by trade, testified that at the time of the fire, the exterior of the house was completed, including all windows, doors, and corresponding locks. N.T. Trial, 6/27/05, at 81, 122. On the interior, Mr. Prato stated he was nearly finished with the insulation, and drywall was placed throughout the house, ready to be installed. Id., at 81-82. After the drywall was hung, only trim-work and painting remained to be completed, as well as final flooring, cabinets, and installation of fixtures. The house was wired for electricity and had two working receptacles used for construction tools and lighting, including a series of lights hanging in the basement and a large mercury-vapor light on a timer. The house was connect*596ed to the public water system, and the plumbing was completed, though the plumbing fixtures were not installed. A permanent furnace was also installed. An outdoor wood burner was connected to the heating system, as was an air conditioning system. Numerous appliances and fixtures, including a pedestal sink, two refrigerators, a dishwasher, double oven, cook-top, microwave, and oven hood, were stored in the basement.
While some work had yet to be performed, the question for the jury was not whether the structure was finished, nor whether it was ready for occupancy — the question was whether it was “adapted for overnight accommodation.” The record, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, provides sufficient support for a finding that, at the time of the fire, the house was adapted for overnight accommodation.
The jury could have returned a guilty verdict if it found the structure to be either a “building” or an “occupied structure.” The majority suggests it is more likely the jury found the structure to merely be a building, as it convicted Appellant of arson of an unoccupied structure, not an occupied structure. This is not an unreasonable interpretation, but there never was a suggestion the structure was occupied — the jury could not reasonably find there was arson of an occupied structure, since no one was there. This is not an inconsistent verdict, as the burglary question is whether the structure was made to be occupied, not whether it was actually occupied.
The majority also quotes the following testimony to support its determination that the structure was not adapted for overnight accommodation:
Q: [Is it] [f]air to say that you didn’t get the house to the point where you could live in it yet, correct?
A: That’s fair to say, yes.
N.T., 6/27/05, at 142 (emphasis added). However, the statute does not require permanent, continuous occupancy as commonly associated with “living” in a residence. Rather, the statute merely requires the structure be adapted for overnight accommodation. Indeed, by citing Commonwealth v. Nixon, *597801 A.2d 1241 (Pa.Super.2002), the majority acknowledges a structure does not need to be “lived in” in order for it to be considered adapted for overnight accommodation.1 This was a house, a residence built specifically for the purpose of overnight accommodation — that the interior work was unfinished does not change the manifest purpose of the building nor its essential and obvious nature.
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, there is sufficient evidence to support the conviction of burglary as a first degree felony. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
. Although as the majority notes, the Nixon holding is not before us, it states "a finding of adaptation is substantially more reasonable in circumstances in which an already adapted structure lacks features supporting continuous overnight accommodation for some temporary period, than in a situation in which the structure has not yet been adapted for overnight accommodation....” Majority Op., at 594, 9 A.3d at 204. If the majority acknowledges a building without necessary utilities can be adapted for overnight accommodation, how is it that a fully-enclosed building with water, heat, and electricity cannot be found to be so? While a bright-line rule is inappropriate in this situation, it is not unreasonable for a fact-finder to conclude a building with four walls, a roof, windows, doors, and utilities is adapted for overnight accommodation, even though no one has yet moved in.