dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I believe that the Majority’s analysis misses the real issue here, which is whether the College owed Appellants a duty. I conclude that it did, as it took affirmative steps that created a foreseeable risk of harm to Appellant David Beil.
*300Construing the evidence in Appellants’ favor, as verdict-winners, and making all reasonable inferences in Appellants’ favor, the College plainly owed a duty to David Beil. The College refused to let the roofers use the stairs or the elevator, which resulted in the roofers using the scaffolding, including the ladder without fall protection. Although the College initially barred only workers with dirty shoes from entering the building, it soon banned all roofers from the stairs and elevator. The College’s employee, Andrew Roth, who frequented the work site, was well aware that the ladder had no fall protection and that the roofers would have to use the scaffolding if they could not use the stairs or elevator. As a result of having to use the ladder, David Beil fell and suffered grave injuries.
Instead of following those facts to the obvious conclusion that the College created the risk that ultimately materialized in David Beil’s accident, the Majority concentrates on whether the College retained control over the subcontracted work itself. Despite opining at length over that consideration, the Majority never offers a cogent rationale as to why the right to control the subcontracted work should be the deciding factor over whether the property owner can be held liable. Although the College’s motivation in barring use of the elevator and stairs appears to have been to keep the building’s interior clean and to protect students from harassment after complaints about one of the workers, the College could have addressed those concerns without requiring David Beil to use the ladder without fall protection. The College could have easily protected the flooring with a tarp and could have banned the offending worker from the work site. Because the College exercised control over the workplace by directing how roofers accessed the roof, it seems plain that it should be subject to liability. The Majority’s conclusion that these facts do not support the jury’s imposition of liability upon the College runs counter to our observation in Farabaugh that “the inquiry regarding what level of review and inspection the parties intended should be left to the factfinder who [had] the opportunity to consider the testimony of the parties and the *301parties’ experts.” Farabaugh v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 590 Pa. 46, 911 A.2d 1264, 1282 (2006).
In the end, the Majority holds that unless the property owner has the right to direct how an independent contractor does the specific task for which it was hired, the owner is absolved of all tort liability to an independent contractor’s employees, no matter what else the owner might do. Such a ruling defies common sense, and I cannot join it.