CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY
SHOGAN, J.:While I agree with the Majority in all other respects, I am constrained to disagree with the Majority’s finding of waiver as it concerns hearsay and the trial court’s failure to give a limiting instruction. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Appellants challenge the admissibility of the Continuous Quality Improvement System (“CQIS”)1 reports and the Master Owner Relations System (“MORS”) reports generated by Ford and/or its dealers. In the second issue, Appellants argue that the trial court erred in admitting the reports because the earlier incidents were not substantially similar. In the third issue, Appellants argue that the reports constituted hearsay and, even if they were admissible for the non-hearsay purpose of notice, a limiting instruction should have been given.
*1234Prior to trial, Appellants filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of other lawsuits, as well as the CQIS and MORS reports. The trial court granted the motion as to the exclusion of evidence of other lawsuits, but not as to the exclusion of the CQIS and MORS reports. Instead, the court ruled that it would decide the admissibility of the reports “as they come.” N.T., 3/09/09, at 51. During trial, Appellees submitted 41 CQIS and MORS reports to the trial court for review. The court reviewed the reports in chambers, permitted argument on the overall issue of their admissibility but not on each report individually, and determined that 28 of the prior incidents were substantially similar to the failure in the instant case. N.T., 3/11/09, at 521-524; Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/09, at 7-8. As stated by the trial court:
‘In its naked sense, [t]hose claims in those documents are identical to the claim here. We’re on an incline ... it stopped ... we get out ... it rolls backwards. That’s what we have here.’ [N.T. 3/11/09, at 521-527].
In response to Appellants’ argument regarding lack of substantial similarity, the trial court further stated:
Had they done some testing or done some investigation here, maybe we would know that this wasn’t a defective product. This was driver error. This was whatever. We don’t. They opted not to look into this further. So, consequently, we have these reports about similar incidents which people were told “Go talk to your liability carrier.”
Okay. So I’m going to admit them for what they’re worth.
N.T., 3/11/09, at 530.
Appellants then requested that the trial court instruct the jury that the reports only be considered for the issue of notice to Ford and not be used to establish causation or defect. N.T., 3/12/09, at 536-542. The trial court initially agreed the reports would be admissible for the purpose of notice and that the court would give the jury such an instruction. Id. at 541; 544. However, after Appellee objected, the trial court decided not to give such an instruction and admitted the 28 CQIS and MORS reports into evidence without limitation. Id. at 613-625. Instead, the following instruction was given:
[Plaintiffs counsel] are going to put into evidence reports of what they maintain are 28 similar incidents. You’re to determine the weight, if any, that are to be given to these incidents.
Id. at 613-614.
Appellants claim that the trial court’s failure to give an appropriate limiting instruction was prejudicial error. I agree.
For some time in Pennsylvania, evidence of other substantially similar occurrences involving an allegedly defective product has been, subject to the court’s discretion, admissible in the plaintiffs case in chief to show (1) the existence of a defective condition, (2) causation, or (3) notice of the defect. See, e.g., DiFrancesco v. Excam, Inc., 434 Pa.Super. 173, 642 A.2d 529, 535 (1994) (stating that evidence of other similar incidents is admissible only when the evidence concerns incidents that are sufficiently similar to the incident at issue).2 Here, the reports indicated that there were nearly identical instances of other model year 1999-2004 Ford F350 trucks that experienced parking brake failure while parked on an incline. The incidents need not be exactly alike. Id. Accordingly, I concur with the Majority’s decision that *1235there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that the reports of the twenty-five prior accidents were substantially similar.
However, I am compelled to write separately because, even if the events were substantially similar, the information had to be introduced in an admissible form. As noted, Appellants claim that the reports were inadmissible hearsay and that a limiting instruction should have been given.
“ ‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Pa.R.E. 801(c). Certain hearsay statements, though, which would be hearsay for one purpose may be admitted for non-hearsay purposes. See McCormick on Evidence, § 249, at 733-734 (3rd. ed.1984) (stating that a writing introduced to show that a party has been put on notice of a condition rather than to show the truth of matters asserted therein is not hearsay); Packel & Poulin, Pennsylvania Evidence, 2nd ed. § 801-802 p. 726 (same). Additionally, “[w]hen evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court upon request shall, or on its own initiative may, restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.” Pa.R.E. 105.
Initially, I note that the Majority concludes the hearsay issue was not preserved and agrees with Appellee’s assertion that Appellants never raised hearsay at trial and that the issue is waived on appeal. Op. at 1232; Appellee’s Brief at 38. The record reveals that Appellants alleged hearsay in the motion in limine as to evidence of other accidents. Motion in Limine, 2/20/09. The record further reveals that the motion in limine was granted as to the exclusion of evidence of other lawsuits, but not as to the CQIS and MORS reports. Order, 3/9/09. There is no indication that Appellants objected to this ruling at trial or re-raised this issue. However, I point out that renewing the objection was not required. Miller v. Peter J. Schmitt & Co., Inc., 405 Pa.Super. 502, 592 A.2d 1324, 1329 (1991). Furthermore, Appellants, while not conceding admissibility, requested a limiting instruction that the reports could be admissible limited solely to show notice. N.T., 3/12/09, at 538, 540. Accordingly, I conclude that Appellants have preserved the challenge to the admissibility of the reports of other accidents as hearsay.3
Moreover, because I conclude that the issue was properly preserved, I would grant Appellants relief on this issue. The record reveals that the CQIS reports are created and recorded when Ford Technicians call the Ford help phone number regarding problems they encounter with a vehicle. N.T., 3/12/09, at 554-558. The MORS reports are created and recorded when owners or an owner’s representative contact Ford regarding an issue with a vehicle. Id. at 557. As such, these reports are out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted and constitute hearsay. Moreover, because the hearsay reports contain hearsay statements by third parties, the reports are examples of hearsay within hearsay. Pa.R.E. 805.
Despite the conclusion that the reports at issue are hearsay, the reports arguably fall within the business record exception. *1236The exception to the rule against hearsay, commonly known as the business records exception, provides as follows:
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, or conditions, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term “business” as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
Pa.R.E. 803(6).
The justification for this exception [Rule 803(6) ] is that business records have a high degree of accuracy because the nation’s business demands it, because the records are customarily checked for correctness, and because record keepers are trained in habits of precision. McCormick, Evidence, § 306 at 720 (2d Ed.1972). Double hearsay exists when a business record is prepared by one employee from information supplied by another employee. If both the source and the records of the information, as well as every other participant in the chain producing the record, are acting in the regular course of business, the multiple hearsay is excused by Rule 803(6). HOWEVER, IF THE SOURCE OF THE INFORMATION IS AN OUTSIDER, RULE 803(6) DOES NOT, BY ITSELF, PERMIT THE ADMISSION OF THE BUSINESS RECORD. The outsider’s statement must fall within another hearsay exception to be admissible because it does not have the presumption of accuracy that statements made during the regular course of business have. See: United States v. Davis, 571 F.2d 1354 (5th Cir.1978); 4 D. Louisell and C. Mueller, Federal Evidence, § 448 (1980); McCormick, Evidence § 310 at 725-726 (2d Ed.1972); 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 803(6)[04] (1981).
U.S. v. Baker, 693 F.2d 183, 188 (D.C.Cir.1982) (emphasis supplied).
Papach v. Mercy Suburban Hospital, 887 A.2d 233, 246 (Pa.Super.2005) (reversed on other grounds).
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that there is a need for trustworthiness in applying the business record exception. See, e.g., Birt v. Firstenergy Corp., 891 A.2d 1281 (Pa.Super.2006). “Merely characterizing a document as a business record is insufficient to justify its admission because a business record which contains multiple levels of hearsay is admissible only if each level falls within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. at 1291 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Commonwealth Financial Systems, Inc. v. Smith, 15 A.3d 492, 2011 PA Super 30 (2011) (“Rule 803(6) requires the proponent of documentary evidence to establish circumstantial trustworthiness”).
Here, the trial court never delved into these requirements. There is no indication on the record as to the trustworthiness of the CQIS or MORS reports, and no findings as to hearsay, double hearsay, or legally supported conclusion as to whether the reports satisfy an exception to *1237the hearsay rules.4 As such, I would vacate the judgment in this matter and remand for a new trial.
. We note that the record reflects that these reports are also referred to as Control Quality Indicator System reports.
. I also note that our Supreme Court has held that evidence of the absence of prior incidents may be admissible in the defendant's case in chief, if relevant. See Spino v. John S. Tilley Ladder Co., 548 Pa. 286, 696 A.2d 1169 (1997) (emphasis added).
. The Majority reaches the opposite conclusion but bases its decision on an interpretation of the F.R.E. 103 Advisory Committee Notes to the 2000 Amendments, an unpublished 10th Circuit case, and a 5th Circuit case from 1980 that does not mention Rule 103. Op. at 1232.
. Appellants acknowledge that, even if otherwise hearsay, the reports would be admissible to establish notice to Ford. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 876 A.2d 978, 985 (Pa.Super.2005) (stating that the substantial similarity test applies where the evidence of other accidents is offered to prove the existence of a defect, the cause of the accident or notice). In fact, Appellants point out that they objected to the use of the reports for any purpose other than notice after the trial court decided they were admissible, and that the trial court initially agreed to give a limiting instruction but subsequently opted not to give the instruction. N.T., 3/12/09, at 536-544.