CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY
FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.:I agree with my esteemed colleagues in the majority that the probation condition permitting suspicionless searches of Alexander’s residence is unconstitutional and must be vacated. However, for the reasons described in my concurrence in Commonwealth v. Wilson, 11 A.3d 519 (Pa.Super.2010) (en banc), I must respectfully disagree that the issue implicates the legality, rather than the discretionary aspects, of Alexander’s sentence. See id. at 532 n. 5 (“even issues of constitutional dimensions can be waived.”) (citation omitted). While the trial court committed legal error by authorizing random searches for firearms, this did not render Alexander’s sentence “illegal” as that term is narrowly defined by the relevant case law. Rather, I would find that imposition of a random searches condition represents an abuse of discretion and is unenforceable.
Unlike the defendant in Wilson, Alexander has preserved the issue by filing post-sentence motions challenging the condition. Therefore, the matter is not waived and we may address it. I also note that with respect to Alexander’s parole, I agree that application of the random searches condition goes to the legality of the sentence. This is because, as explained by the majority, the trial court is statutorily unauthorized to set any conditions of parole where the defendant is sentenced to a maximum term of incarceration of two or more years, and the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole is solely authorized to set the conditions of parole.
For these reasons, I must respectfully dissent with regard to that part of the majority Opinion holding that Alexander’s challenge to the condition of probation at issue goes to the legality of his sentence, but I join in all other respects.