I concur with the majority’s conclusion but write separately because, in my view, courts should no longer treat insurance coverage as the third rail of trial practice such that it can neither be mentioned, even incidentally, nor be the basis of appropriate inquiry as to possible bias, as in the ruling here. It is routine—even statutory—that jurors be asked if they are “a shareholder, stockholder, director, officer or employee ... in any insurance company issuing policies for protection against liability for damages for injury to person or property” (CPLR 4110 [a]). The reason for the question is obvious. Someone who is so situated may have a tendency to find for a defendant even though, according to the way we conduct our trials, insurance may never be mentioned again.
Enter the defendant in this case who, by way of a motion in limine, sought to prevent the jury from learning that defendant’s expert suffers the very disability that would have subjected them to a challenge to the favor—that he owns stock in a company that writes liability insurance. In fact, he owns stock in the very insurance company that will be required to pay any judgment rendered against the defendant in this case. The jury should be made aware of that fact. To keep this information from them means they are arriving at a verdict without all the material facts before them—something every court seeks to prevent.
It is common knowledge that most defendants carry insurance. Indeed, most prospective jurors are cognizant of the significant role in litigation that liability insurance plays, be it business, homeowner’s or automobile insurance (see e.g. Oltarsh v Aetna Ins. Co., 15 NY2d 111, 118 [1965] [“it is the rare individual who today does not know that ‘defendants in negligence cases are insured and that an insurance company and its lawyer are defending’ ” (citation omitted)]).
This is not to say that evidence of insurance should be admitted as a matter of course; there must always be a legitimate basis for its admission. However, in my view, there are appropriate instances when insurance evidence should be admitted to establish a party’s or a witness’s bias or interest, and trial courts should not shy away from admitting it if, after conducting the appropriate balancing test, they think that its admission is relevant under the circumstances. The admission of such evidence can be accompanied by a limiting instruction if the court believes it appropriate. Moreover, because trial courts have the discretion to place limitations on the scope of the questioning relative to such evidence, defendants can be assured that the *820admission of such evidence will serve its intended, relevant purpose of showing potential bias or interest without undue prejudice to the defendant.
Ordinarily, in a case such as the one before us, a court should reserve decision on the motion until the expert takes the stand and can be questioned, outside the presence of the jury, about his interest in defendant’s insurance company and any possible bias. Then a reasoned ruling could be made. Because plaintiff did not request such an opportunity, under these facts, I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm.
Judges Graffeo, Read, Smith and Jones concur; Judge Pigott concurs in result in an opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman and Judge Ciparick concur.
Order affirmed, with costs, in a memorandum.