dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would uphold the sanction striking the Defendant-Petitioners', answer as justified under the facts and circumstances of this case. Accordingly, I would discharge the rule to show cause.
As the majority correctly states, maj. op.. at 702, sanctions under C.R.C.P. 37 "should be applied in a manner that effectuates proportionality between the sanction imposed and the culpability of the disobedient party." Kwik Way Stores, Inc. v. Caldwell, 745 P.2d 672, 677 (Colo.1987). Importantly, the trial court has discretion to impose sanctions under C.R.C.P. 87. Id. at 677. A ruling by the *706trial court in an area where it has discretionary power will not be disturbed on review, unless it is clearly shown that there was an. abuse of such discretionary power. Colo. Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Friedman, 846 P.2d 159, 166-67 (Colo.1993). In this case, the trial court's determination to strike the Defendant-Petitioners' answer was not manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable or unfair and should therefore not be overturned by this court.
Marcia Pinkstaff brought suit under the Wage Claim Act, §§ 8-4-101 through -123, C.R.S. (2008), against Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc. and Baldwin Hardware Corporation, seeking compensation for a bonus she alleg> edly earned in 2006 plus penalties and interest.5 Pinkstaff was an account executive who was paid a base salary and earned a bonus if her sales exceeded a set quota. The majority estimates the claimed compensation at $23,000. Maj. op. at 700.
In their answer, Defendant-Petitioners admitted that Pinkstaff was employed by Baldwin during the relevant time period, her employment terms included the bonus plan at issue, and they paid Pinkstaff a bonus of $9,536 during 2006. Defendant-Petitioners denied that Pinkstaff was employed by Black & Decker and denied they owed her any additional compensation under the terms of the bonus plan. They also asserted various affirmative defenses. Based on the amended complaint and the amended answer, there were two issues at stake: whether Pinkstaff was entitled to any additional compensation for 2006 and whether Black & Decker was properly named as a defendant. Discovery disputes broke out between the parties over Pinkstaffs requests for discovery related to both contested issues.
The case was heard by two judges. The first is a sitting member of the Denver District Court. The second is a senior judge who provided assistance after the first judge became ill. It is evident from the record before us that the judges tried various methods to resolve the discovery dispute, eventually coming to the conclusion that lesser sanctions would be ineffective in this case. The record also discloses that the court became impatient with counsel and sometimes used intemperate language that I do not approve. However, I support the decision to impose the sanction because it was only reached after a long discovery process involving. multiple status conferences and pleas from the judges that the Defendant-Petitioners .comply with the court's orders.
Pinkstaff submitted her initial disclosures pursuant to C.R.C.P. 26(a) on April 29, 2008. Defendants submitted initial and amended disclosures listing seventeen people with knowledge of discoverable information. Pinkstaff then submitted a Motion for Disputed Modified Case Management Order asserting that Defendant-Petitioners refused to conduct informal discovery or to allow her counsel to interview any of the seventeen people. Accordingly, Pinkstaff asked the court to permit her to depose all seventeen individuals, a request the judge rejected as unacceptable at a case management conference on August 1, 2008. At that conference, the judge expressed frustration with both counsel and ordered Defendant-Petitioners to provide information concerning Baldwin's relationship to Black & Decker as well as its financial status. After much discussion and in an attempt to avoid imposing sanctions on the parties, the court urged Defendant-Petitioners' attorney to "comply with the letter and spirit of his professional responsibilities."
On August 6, Pinkstaff alleged continuing discovery violations claiming Defendant-Petitioners failed to provide adequate disclosures, including documents relating to the bonus plan, thereby inhibiting her ability to depose Baldwin's representative. Defendant-Petitioners responded, admitting some errors in disclosure but denying other allegations, particularly the assertion that Pink-staff should be allowed discovery from Black & Decker. On September 10, the court held a hearing to resolve the discovery disputes and granted Pinkstaff the right to take a new *707deposition of Baldwin, to be concluded by the end of September. Although the judge expressed concern that Black & Decker was not a proper party to the case, he found that Pinkstaff was entitled to discover information regarding Black & Decker's role in the case. Representatives of Baldwin and Black & Decker were ordered to appear at every further hearing in order to help resolve some of the ongoing problems. Finally, the court issued a written order providing discovery requirements moving forward, including a deposition of a fully informed Black & Decker representative and organizational charts of Black & Decker and Baldwin four days prior to the depositions.
Additional discovery disputes continued, however. On September 16, Pinkstaff filed a Motion to Enforce the court's September 10 order, alleging that Defendant-Petitioners had failed to comply with the requirements set forth therein. Soon after, the judge expressed his belief that Defendant-Petitioners were resisting discovery by all possible means without regard to costs and pushing the ethical and professional envelope. Moreover, the court added that while it did not agree with Pinkstaff's counsel's strategic decisions, she was proceeding with the case in a way that she was entitled to and Defendant, Petitioners' counsel was not. Nevertheless, discovery disputes continued into October and November, 2008.
A senior judge was assigned to assist the first judge after he became ill. On December 19, the second judge granted Pinkstaff's Motion for Sanctions, finding that "Defendants have had ample time to fully respond to discovery, and have failed to do so." The second judge also entered the Order that is the subject of this proceeding, in which Defendant-Petitioners' Answers and Affirmative Defenses were stricken and Defendant, Petitioners were ordered to pay attorney's fees and costs. Although the December 19 Order adopted much of the proposed order submitted by Pinkstaff on September 16, it also discussed the ongoing discovery disputes that occurred throughout October and November. In general, the December 19 Order found that although Defendant-Petitioners had been repeatedly warned to cooperate with the court in order to move the case forward, they had willfully disobeyed two court orders and continued with unacceptable conduct despite the warnings.
Overall, the trial court in the person of two different judges tried a number'of measures over an extended period of time to resolve the discovery disputes. They held frequent status conferences to address particular discovery issues. They lectured the lawyers about the acrimony that had arisen between them and reminded the lawyers of their professional obligations. They ordered the clients to appear with their attorneys at court hearings. None of these methods seemed to work. Although the majority finds that the sanction imposed was "not commensurate 'with the culpability of Baldwin and Black & Decker," maj. op. at 703, it appears there were few, if any, options remaining for the court to pursue in order to facilitate discovery. As the trial court stated at the December 19 hearing, notwithstanding the court's previous efforts to obtain compliance, Defendant-Petitioners had "effectively failed to meaningfully participate in discovery since this action was filed." It is clear from the record that the judges came to the conclusion that in light of all the cireum-stances, striking the answer was the only way to resolve the procedural impasse. In fact, the December 19 Order specifically noted that under the cireumstances, the less drastic option of a monetary sanction would be ineffective due to the David and Goliath disparity between the resources of the parties. In my view, therefore, the trial court's discretionary decision to strike Defendant, Petitioners' answer was not manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable or unfair.
My conclusion is bolstered by the underlying nature of the case and the absence of a real divide between liability and damages. Although the majority's conclusion that striking Defendant-Petitioners' answer was tantamount to entry of a default judgment appears correct, maj. op. at 702, it does not automatically follow that the entering of a default judgment is as harsh a sanction in this case as it sometimes may be. Admitting the complaint in its entirety and striking the answer is not a "death sentence" for Defendant-Petitioners. This is because De*708fendant-Petitioners admitted that Pinkstaff was an employee of Baldwin during the relevant time and that the bonus plan under consideration exists. Therefore, there were really only two main issues actually in contention: whether Black & Decker was a proper party and how much money, if any, Defendant-Petitioners owed Pinkstaff under the bonus plan. Striking the answer eliminates Defendant-Petitioners' ability to contend that Black & Decker is not a proper party, but the trial court specifically held that Defendant-Petitioners are still allowed to present evidence to rebut Pinkstaffs claims for damages under the Wage Claim Act. While it seems Defendant-Petitioners can no longer assert they owe Pinkstaff no damages, they are free to present evidence showing they owe her anywhere from a nominal amount to the full amount Pink-. staff's claims. Therefore, striking the answer in this case, while certainly a weighty sanction, still allows Defendant-Petitioners to present arguments concerning the main issue being litigated. Because Defendant-Petitioners can still present evidence to rebut Pinkstaff's claim that they owe her additional wages, the sanctions effectively move the trial along to the substantive question at issue, what damages are owed to Pinkstaff for improper calculation of her bonus under the bonus plan.
In my opinion, therefore, striking the answer in this case was not as harsh a sanction as it may appear at first glance. The judges did not choose sides throughout the various discovery disputes and were evenhanded in their attempts to overcome the procedural impediments stalling the case. They imposed this sanction only as a last resort when other means had failed and, after dealing with both parties for over nine months, they determined that Defendant-Petitioners were the party at fault for the continuing discovery problems. This was not an abuse of discretion, and the trial court's order should be upheld. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state Justice BENDER joins in this dissent.
. The Wage Claim Act expressly covers a bonus as a form of wages or compensation. § 8-4-101(8)(a){II), C.R.S. (2008). The Act requires prompt payment of all wages or compensation. See § B-4-103, CRS. (2008). The employer may be subject to penalties if it fails to timely pay after receiving a written demand from the employee. § 8-4-109(3), C.R:S. (2008).