concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Because the trial court’s determination at permanent orders that husband has waived maintenance is a final order that has been affirmed on appeal, I would not reach the merits of husband’s new maintenance argument.
An order for an initial award of maintenance may be requested in three alternative contexts: (1) at the permanent orders hearing of a dissolution proceeding; or (2) subsequent to the entry of a decree of dissolution if the court has deferred the remaining issues in the best interests of the parties; or (3) when personal jurisdiction has been obtained following an in rem proceeding dissolving the marriage. Section 14-10-106(l)(b), C.R.S.2004; see also § 14-10-114, C.R.S.2004. The second alternative provides the context here.
Here, the parties’ decree of dissolution was entered in 1986, but the permanent orders hearing was deferred until 1999. At the 1999 hearing, the property was divided, neither party requested maintenance, and the trial court did not reserve jurisdiction over the issue of maintenance or award a nominal amount. Husband appealed the property division and the denial of maintenance, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court erred in failing to award him maintenance. A majority of a division of this court determined, as relevant here, that maintenance had been waived. In re Marriage of Ebel, 2002 WL 1773338 (Colo.App. No. 00CA0170, Feb. 14, 2002)(not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)){Ebel II). Husband’s petition for cer-tiorari was denied.
In this appeal, husband argues that he is entitled to maintenance “after permanent orders” because he did not believe that he would need maintenance until the trial court awarded all the marital property to wife. However, absent allegations of fraud or similar theory not alleged here, see C.R.C.P. 60(b), once an appellate court has affirmed the final order of the dissolution court determining that maintenance is waived, a new request is precluded. Thus, when, as here, maintenance has been waived at permanent orders, whether a request for maintenance “after permanent orders” may be allowed pursuant to § 14-10-114 or any other statute under different circumstances, is beside the point.
It is well settled that once maintenance has been waived, it can no longer be sought in the same or separate proceeding. In re Marriage of Seewald, 725 P.2d 1171, 1172 (Colo.App.1986)(maintenance must be sought or it is waived); In re Marriage of Boyd, 643 P.2d 804, 805 (Colo.App.1982)(same); see Hall v. Hall, 105 Colo. 227, 97 P.2d 415 (1939)(to maintain jurisdiction over maintenance after a final judgment, court must enter an award of maintenance at the time of permanent orders); In re Marriage of Caufman, 829 P.2d 501 (Colo.App.1992)(discuss-ing conditions in which court can reserve jurisdiction to change maintenance award); In re Marriage of Fernstrum, 820 P.2d 1149 (Colo.App.1991)(discussing practice of awarding nominal maintenance to preserve jurisdiction over the issue).
Furthermore, under principles of law of the case, the conclusions of an appellate court on issues presented to it, as well as rulings logically necessary to sustain such conclusions, become the law of the case and generally must be followed in subsequent proceedings in that case. See In re Marriage of Burford, 26 P.3d 550 (Colo.App.2001). Thus, I conclude, the trial court is bound by the division’s determination in Ebel II that maintenance has been waived. Therefore, the trial court correctly determined that it lacked authority to consider any new request from husband for maintenance.
I would grant wife’s request for an award of attorney fees against husband for this appeal. In his appellate briefs, husband’s argument is that the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act does not preclude a court from hearing a motion for an award of mainte*1260nance “where the Decree was silent as to maintenance.” He maintains that, because no maintenance was requested at the permanent orders hearing in 1999, “the issue is still viable.” He states that the 1999 permanent orders “only [divided] the marital property” and that “maintenance has yet to be determined and has never been waived.” Accordingly, he asserts, “since no maintenance was ever awarded, [§ 14^10-114(3), C.R.S.2004] permits a separate proceeding for maintenance at any time after a Dissolution of Marriage.” In the procedural posture here, this argument is without substantial justification. See, e.g., Bilawsky v. Faseehudin, 916 P.2d 586 (Colo.App.1995)(test for groundlessness assumes a valid legal theory with little or no evidence to support it). Moreover, and most unfortunate, it has perpetuated the duration and expense of this nineteen-year dissolution proceeding.