concurring: I agree that the judgment of the district court must be reversed, but I would base this result solely on the district court’s misinterpretation of the statute. As acknowledged by the majority, K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 22-4904(a)(5) does not include among the sheriff s duties any requirement to tell an offender of his or her obligations to report. The offender’s reporting obligations are set forth in subsection (d) of tire statute, and these obligations are not included in sheriff s duties to inform the offender of registration obligations set forth in subsection (a)(5). As expressly provided in the statute, the sheriff s duties are limited to those requirements provided “in this subsection” or those listed in subsection (a)(5). There is simply no statutory obligation for the sheriff to explain an offender’s reporting requirements under K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 22-4904(d).
It appears that the district court may not have appreciated the distinction between registration requirements to be explained by the sheriff under subsection (a)(5) and reporting requirements under subsection (d) that need not be explained to the offender. Be*74cause the sheriff had no statutory obligation to inform Anderson of his reporting requirements, his failure to do so was certainly no basis for the district court’s dismissal of the charges. With due respect for my colleagues, I do not believe this analysis is merely “parsing” the statute, but rather constitutes the more sound and concise basis for reversal under these circumstances.
An apparent error in statutory construction and application requires that the district court be reversed. I agree with the majority on the issue of our jurisdiction, but I would base a reversal of the district court’s dismissal solely on this error of statutory construction and therefore respectfully depart from my colleagues on the balance of their opinion.