(dissenting in part):
[ 15 I agree with sections I and II of the main opinion. I disagree, however, with seetion III because I do not believe the trial court needs to redetermine whether this sexual conduct occurred "in a place open to public view."
116 Although Utah courts have not interpreted this particular ordinance, we have had significant experience in assessing what is open to public view. In the search and sei*794zure context, for example, we have consistently allowed officers to seize evidence when the evidence is " 'in open view from a position lawfully accessible to the public'" State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 321 (Utah Ct.App.), cert. denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1998) (quoting State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1981)); see also State v. Belgard, 840 P.2d 819, 823 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (stating that onee officer is in a place "lawfully accessible to the public," officer is "free to observe whatever was in his open view that might have been observed by any other member of the general public").
1 17 It is undisputed that the officer in the instant case saw defendant kiss the exposed breasts of the woman he was with and he saw defendant's exposed genitals. It is also undisputed that the officer witnessed this sexual conduct from a place lawfully accessible to any member of the general public-as he stood in a public parking lot. Given the well-accepted standard in Utah case law regarding what it means to be in a place open to public view, I see no need to look to the case law of foreign jurisdictions. My conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the foreign jurisdictions cited in the main opinion would import a "likely [to bel seen by a casual passerby" standard, which is required neither by the plain language of the instant ordinance nor by the relevant Utah case law.
118 Accordingly, I would affirm outright the judgment of the trial court.