concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the result in Parts II.A and B. I do so not because I disagree with the reasoning, but because the issues addressed were not properly raised on appeal. I agree that Respondent did not properly request attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) because he did not contend that this was a commercial transaction. However, because I believe he is entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121, I respectfully dissent as to that portion of Part II.C.
Attorney fees on appeal are awardable under Idaho Code § 12-121 if the appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Gustaves v. Gustaves, 138 Idaho 64, 57 P.3d 775 (2002). The appeal in this ease certainly qualifies.
We have consistently held that issues on appeal must be raised in the opening brief. Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 982 P.2d 940 (1999). “In order to be considered by this Court, the appellant is required to identify legal issues and provide authorities supporting the arguments in the opening brief. A reviewing court looks to the initial brief on appeal for the issues presented on appeal.” Myers v. Workmen’s Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 508, 95 P.3d 977, 990 (2004) (citations omitted). This Court will not address an issue raised only in the reply brief. Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 130 P.3d 1087 (2006); Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 117 P.3d 120 (2005); Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 685, 905 P.2d 86 (1995); State v. Killinger, 126 *311Idaho 737, 890 P.2d 323 (1995); State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 763, 864 P.2d 596, 601 (1993).
In their opening brief, the Appellants did not list any issues on appeal. They did not dispute that the contract they signed was a lease with an option to purchase. In fact, that is what they repeatedly stated it was.1 They presented argument on only two issues: (1) the district court should have considered the doctrine of quasi-estoppel and (2) the district court should have found that the Appellants exercised their option to purchase the property. The first issue was not raised in the trial court, and therefore the majority rightfully did not address it on appeal. Interestingly, that is the only issue on which the Appellants provided any authority in their briefing.
With respect to the second issue, the Appellants entire argument in their opening brief was as follows:
Further under the facts, the court should have found with respect to the lease/option which respondent had appellant Pastor sign, that the appellants had exercised the option to purchase, the respondent having received $5,000 on the transaction for which he never gave any credit in writing, or orally informed the appellants that was consideration for his having leased the Darigold property to appellants with the option to purchase. (Opening brief, pp. 17-18)
In arguing that the district court should have found that they had exercised the option to purchase, the Appellants did not even address the contractual requirements for doing so. The contract states, “The tenant is to exercise the purchase option between May 18th 2001 and May 28th 2001 by paying $550.00 and entering into the long term purchase agreements.” The Appellants totally ignored the additional requirement that they enter into a long-term purchase agreement. The agreement also states, “The closing agency is to be Alliance Title of Caldwell, Id.” The Appellants also ignore the fact that there was no closing.
In their reply brief, the Appellants responded to Respondent’s argument that they had not exercised their option to purchase. In doing so, they simply reiterated that they had paid the $550. They did not address the other requirement that they also execute a long-term purchase agreement, nor did they mention the lack of any closing. Their entire argument was as follows:
Was the option exercised? It is Appellants’ contention that it was. By the terms of the option to exercise it, the payment of $550.00 was to have been made between May 18, 2001 and May 28, 2001. Actually, the $550.009 had already been paid. The payment was acknowledged when the agreement was executed. Reference is *312made to paragraph 6 — “EARNEST MONEY”. As much as the receipt of July 5, 2000 acknowledges the payment of $2,500.00 on the building, why was such payment required of Appellants if it did not apply to the purchase of the building and, certainly, many times over exceeded the $550.00 payment to exercise the option in 2001.
It was only in their reply brief that the Appellants made a half-hearted effort to argue that the agreement may be ambiguous, and they did so only in response to the Respondent’s argument that it was unambiguous. The Appellants admit, “This Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement form was converted into a lease option by a realtor employed by Mr. Paz.” (Reply brief, p. 4) They then argued that the document’s heading, without reading its contents, could cause one to believe it was a purchase contract. “The agreement of June 22, 2000 upon examination without study gives the impression that it was a ‘Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement’, as it is identified and not a lease.” (Reply brief, p. 5; emphasis added) Even then, the Appellants admitted it was a lease. They continued, “Mr. Paz could have explained to Mr. Pastor that it was not a purchase and sale agreement as it appeared, but a lease with an option to purchase.” (Reply brief, p. 5)
The only issue properly raised by Appellants on appeal was whether they had exercised their option to purchase. In arguing that issue, they do not even address the contractual requirements for doing so. In my opinion, this appeal was brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation.
Chief Justice SCHROEDER concurs.. For example, they stated:
Respondent did not tell appellant Pastor that the agreement was a lease/option and not an agreement selling the property with a down payment and monthly installments as stated before. (Opening brief, p. 5)
An examination of the agreement shows appellants were to have exercised the option by making an additional payment of $550 between May 18, 2001 and May 28, 2001. (Opening brief, p. 7)
The discovery by the appellants that the agreement signed by appellant Pastor was not an agreement for sale and purchase, but a lease/option, did not occur until appellants had arranged to pay the balance of the purchase price owed respondent. (Opening brief, p. 12)
It appears the reason respondent, instead of having prepared an agreement for purchase and sale, had the agreement of lease and option prepared because he wanted to defer the income taxes he would have to pay by reason of his sale of property to the City of Caldwell.
Under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code relating to the exchange of properties, and the income tax advantages for respondent, he knew he could not immediately sell the property to the church, which he thought was for one year, and which he provided in the lease/option agreement he had appellant Pastor sign. (Opening brief, p. 13)
In this case respondent to the disadvantage of appellants by making the agreement between the parties a lease/option was inconsistent with the position he had taken that he was purchasing the Darigold property and selling it to appellant church. (Opening brief, p. 16)
In this case, the respondent reaped an unconscionable advantage and appellants suffered an unconscionable disadvantage by respondent’s changing his position from selling to the appellant church the Darigold property and having appellant Pastor sign a lease with an option to purchase. (Opening brief, p. 17)