with whom HARGRAVE, J., joins, concurring in result:
T1 The constitutionality of 48 O.S. Supp. 2002, § 112.3 was clearly raised,1 and because the question of the constitutionality of the statute is a recurring problem of great public concern, the Court should address it. As a general rule, when a matter would evade review because it is rendered moot, abstract, or hypothetical by a dispositive an*956swer, the Court can address the issue if; 1) the appeal presents a question of broad public interest; and 2) the challenged event is capable of repetition, yet evading review.2 This cause meets both exceptions.
12 It has long been recognized that because a child whose custody must be adjudicated is, in some respects a ward of the court, the public has strong interest in child custody.3 This Court has also acknowledged that the State of Oklahoma "possesses a right, in the role of parens patriae,"4 to preserve and promote the welfare of children.5 This question is ripe for determination. As recently as January and February this year, this Court dealt with the application of the new relocation statute when the parties to a custody dispute sought applications to stay the proceedings of the trial court and for a writ of prohibition.6 The fact that this issue was brought before the court twice in the last few months is evidence of a recurring problem. Because the issue involves a question of broad public interest and the challenge to the statute is capable of repetition, yet evading review, I would address the constitutionality of the relocation statute.
. The trial court's order of September 3, 2004, reflects that it ruled that the relocation statute, 43 O.S. Supp.2002 § 112.3 is constitutional and applicable in this case. The petition in error filed on September 15, 2004, asserts that one of the issues raised on appeal is whether the statute *956is constitutional or infringes on a constitutional right. The appellant's brief, filed March 1, 2005, also argues that the relocation statute unconstitutionally infringes upon the appellant's federally protected constitutional freedom of travel.
. Morton v. Adair County Excise Board, 1989 OK 174, ¶10, 780 P.2d 707; Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Grand River Dam Authority, 1986 OK 20, ¶21, 720 P.2d 713; Lawrence v. Cleveland County Home Loan Authority, 1981 OK 28, ¶9, 626 P.2d 314.
. See, Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 83 S.Ct. 273, 9 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962) [Public interest is strong in controversies involving the custody of children.]; In re the Marriage of Ryall, 154 Cal.App.3d 743, 748, 201 Cal.Rptr. 504 (1984) [Issue of whether Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act authorized a change in visitation was not moot notwithstanding that time period in which custody had been ordered had passed as situation was capable of repetition yet evading review and issue was one of great public interest.]; Woodard v. Texas Dept. of Human Resources, 573 S.W.2d 596, 597 (Tex.Civ.App.1978) [Interest of public is affected when custody of child is at issue.]; Daily v. Daily, 175 Ark. 161, 298 S.W. 1012 (1927) [The public has an interest in the custody of children, and the interest of the child is a paramount consideration of the court.].
. The doctrine of parens patriae "may be defined as the inherent power and authority of the Legislature of a state to provide protection of the person ... non sui juris, such as minors, insane, and incompetent persons." McIntosh v. Dill, 1922 OK 35, ¶28, 205 P. 917, cert. denied, 260 U.S. 721, 43 S.Ct 12, 67 L.Ed. 480 (1922).
. Gowin v. Julius, 1954 OK 359, ¶11, 279 P.2d 954 [The state's power then is based on its position as parens patriae, which inheres in its sovereignty to protect its infant citizens.]. Accord, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) [The State has a parens patri-ae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of children.].
. See, Roark v. Denny, appeal No. 104,239 and Reece v. Roark, appeal No. 103,994.