concurring.
I am writing separately to address the State’s contention that we should revisit and overrule Comeau v. State, 758 P.2d 108 (Alaska App.1988).
In Comeau, a majority of this Court held that reckless driving is a lesser included offense of driving while intoxicated if (1) the defendant is charged under the “under the influence” theory codified in AS 28.35.030(a)(1), and (2) the defendant disputes being under the influence, and (3), to prove the defendant’s impairment, the State relies on evidence that the defendant drove erratically or dangerously.1 Judge Singleton dissented from this decision, arguing that the majority had misapplied Alaska’s cognate approach to lesser included offenses.
Judge Singleton pointed out that, even though the same evidence may often be sufficient to prove both driving while intoxicated and reckless driving, a person may be found guilty of driving under the influence of intoxicants even though the person did not drive “in a manner which createfd] substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm to a person or to property” — a necessary element of reckless driving as defined in AS 28.35.040(a). Thus, *187reckless driving is not necessarily included within the act of driving while intoxicated.2
I believe that Judge Singleton’s dissent is correct: this Court misapplied the cognate approach in Comeau. However, this by itself is not a sufficient reason to overrule Comeau. As this Court explained in Erickson v. State, when a litigant attacks a rule of law established in one of our prior decisions, the doctrine of stare decisis requires the litigant to convincingly demonstrate not only “[that] the existing rule was originally erroneous” but also “that more good than harm would result from a departure from precedent”.3
The State does not assert that the Comeau decision has led to injustice or that it otherwise frustrates the proper working of the criminal justice system. As Judge Singleton pointed out in his dissent, the Comeau rule affects only a small proportion of DWI cases — cases in which the defendant is prosecuted solely under the “under the influence” theory (and not the “blood-alcohol” theory codified in AS 28.35.030(a)(2)), and in which the defendant disputes being under the influence and the State relies on evidence that the defendant drove erratically or dangerously as circumstantial- evidence of the defendant’s impairment.4 Because the State has not shown (or even argued) that the Comeau rule has led to harmful results, I join my colleagues in rejecting the State’s request to revisit and overrule Comeau.
. Comeau, 758 P.2d at 114.
. Id. at 121-23 (Singleton, J., dissenting).
. Erickson, 950 P.2d 580, 587 (Alaska App.1997).
. Comeau, 758 P.2d at 118 & n. 1 (Singleton, J., dissenting).