dissenting.
The majority concludes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to continue the trial in her case so that she could be represented by an attorney at trial. The court denied the continuance because the state objected that continuing the trial would inconvenience one of its witnesses who had traveled a long way to testify. I believe that the balance that the court struck between requiring defendant to be unrepresented at trial and imposing on a state witness was outside the range of permissible discretion. I therefore dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion. I agree, however, with its disposition of defendant’s other assignments of error.
The state sought and received two continuances of the trial in this case. It received the second continuance when a subpoenaed witness failed to appear at trial. Defendant had changed attorneys just before the trial date, but she was prepared to try the case and objected to the continuance:
“This case has been pending since June 27th of this year and for the D.A. to only realize yesterday that they had a problem with their subpoena is to realize it at a very late date. My client has already been through a lot of time, and trouble and expense as a result of this case. I’ve come down from La Grande today in order to represent her here today and our position is that if they can’t produce their witness [then] this case should go forward or should be dismissed if they cannot complete their case without their witness.”
Just before the next trial date, defendant and her attorney had a falling out that led her attorney to believe that she had been discharged. The attorney promptly filed motions to withdraw as defendant’s attorney and to continue the trial. At the hearing on the motions, the court determined that defendant had discharged her attorney, so it granted the motion to withdraw. However, the court denied defendant’s motion to continue the trial. The court did so on the mistaken understanding that defendant had received a continuance when she had changed attorneys on the eve of the preceding trial date. It also did so even though defendant made clear that she could not represent herself and that she wanted to *578rehire her attorney (an alternative to which her former attorney objected) if the court did not grant the continuance.
Defendant renewed her motion for a continuance when she appeared two days later for trial. The court decided at that point to grant the motion because it realized that it had been mistaken about the circumstances of the prior continuance:
“THE COURT: [W]hen I was making my decision on Friday, looking at the register, it appeared to me as I stated and I think you all understand what I stated, it had appeared to me that when Mr. Rock had withdrawn the continuance was granted at your [defendant’s] request. And I felt that you had received a continuance once.
“[DEFENDANT]: Oh.
“THE COURT: And my concern was that you had received a continuance one time, [now] we’re ready for trial and suddenly you’re changing [attorneys again and — and I was not going to allow that to occur. But, Ms. Mowder, basically the way I’m looking at this is the State’s had two continuances. [Defendant], though she had requested one— apparently verbally because I have no copy in my file of a continuance from Ms. Morrison, I do not see a continuance asked for before this very last one. Okay? And I didn’t have that file when I made my decision, what, two days ago, three days ago. I’m going to go ahead and continue this. I’m going to ask that it be set right away. I’ll be glad to come back and try the case. I’m sorry for the delay, but it’s happened before at the request of the State. I do believe that [defendant] needs to be able to be entitled to have a continuance at this point because she has not had one before.”
The court ultimately denied defendant’s motion, however, when the state objected that one of its witnesses had expended significant time and money to appear at trial.
In upholding the trial court’s decision, the majority focuses on the fact that defendant twice changed attorneys on the eve of trial and that she did so the second time after being advised by her attorney that the court might deny her a continuance and require her to appear unrepresented at trial. It also says that she had two months between the two trial settings to hire an attorney with whom she was satisfied.
*579As to the last point, the disagreement between defendant and her last attorney arose after the court had denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the contempt charge on which defendant was to be tried, which occurred four days before trial. There is no reason to believe that defendant had any reason to be dissatisfied with her attorney before that time. Furthermore, no one told the court anything about the disagreement, so the court had no basis on which to evaluate defendant’s role in it.
The majority’s other points also provide no support for its position. Defendant had changed attorneys on the eve of a previous trial setting, but that change was not part of a stratagem to delay or avoid trial. She was prepared to try the case at that point and opposed the state’s motion to continue it. Her last attorney did warn her that the court might deny her a continuance and require her to represent herself at trial, but that warning has no bearing on whether the court should have granted the continuance, which necessarily turns on factors other than whether defendant was aware that the court could deny her motion.
At bottom, this case turns on the propriety of the choice that the court actually made, which was to require defendant to represent herself in the criminal contempt proceeding, something that defendant had made quite clear she was not qualified to do, in order to avoid requiring a state witness to incur additional time and expense to appear at a later trial. I believe that the trial court struck a balance that was outside the range of choices available to it on this record and, hence, that it abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s contrary conclusion.