dissenting.
The majority recites the legal standard that we apply in resolving a custody dispute under ORS 109.119 (1997) between a parent and a nonparent in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville, 530 US 57, 120 S Ct 2054, 147 L Ed 2d 49 (2000).1 *539The focus of my disagreement with the majority is its application of the standard to the facts of this case. Accordingly, I dissent.
In our recent decision in Wilson and Wilson, 184 Or App 212, 218-19, 55 P3d 1106 (2002), we described the rebuttable presumption in favor of a parent in custody disputes between a parent and a nonparent:
“Troxel, Harrington [v. Daum, 172 Or App 188, 18 P3d 456 (2001)], and Newton [v. Thomas, 177 Or App 670, 33 P3d 1056 (2001)], then, alter the interpretation of ORS 109.119 [(1997)] in Sleeper [and Sleeper, 328 Or 504, 982 P2d 1126 (1999)]. Instead of basing custody or visitation decisions on a “best interest of the child subject to supervening parental right’ analysis, we now give ‘significant weight’ in that calculus to a fit biological parent’s fundamental right to determine the care, custody, and control of his or her children. As the Troxel plurality phrased that idea, we give force to ‘the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child.’ Troxel, 530 US at 69. The presumption approaches in strength the one we adopted in Shofner [and Shofner, 137 Or App 543, 905 P2d 268 (1995), rev den, 322 Or 644 (1996)], which could be overcome only for compelling reasons. Thus, a fit biological parent’s right is ‘supervening” not in the sense that it always and necessarily ‘supervenes’ or trumps the outcome of a pure Taest interest of the child’ inquiry, but in the sense that the right ‘supervenes’ the pure “best interest’ analysis itself, replacing it with one in which a fit biological parent will presumptively prevail over a nonparent unless the non-parent presents compelling reasons to overcome that presumption, for example by showing that a ruling in favor of the biological parent will harm the child.”
We further explained in O’Donnell-Lamont and Lamont, 184 Or App 249, 256-57, 56 P3d 929 (2002), that, to rebut the presumption in favor of a parent, the nonparent
“must establish that the evidence as a whole preponderates in [his or her] favor, that is, that [the parent] cannot or will *540not provide adequate love and care for the children or that placement of the children in [the parent’s] custody will cause them undue physical or psychological harm. Said another way, for a nonparent to prevail on those issues, the weight of the evidence in favor of the nonparent, when considered in light of the evidence in favor of the parent, must be such as to overcome the weight of the presumption. That means that the court must find by a preponderance of the evidence either that the parent cannot or will not provide adequate love and care or that the children will face an undue risk of physical or psychological harm in the parent’s custody.”
(Emphasis added.) See also Moran v. Weldon, 184 Or App 269, 274-75, 57 P3d 898 (2002) (stating that, under the rule derived from Troxel, “there must be proof that the biological parent cannot or will not provide adequate love and care for the child or that the child will be at an undue risk of harm in the parent’s custody” (emphasis added)).
Similarly, in State v. Wooden, 184 Or App 537, 551-52, 57 P3d 583 (2002), we elaborated on the manner in which a nonparent can rebut the presumption in favor of a parent:
“[The parent’s] rights create a rebuttable presumption, and we must now determine whether [the nonparents] have rebutted it. In doing so, we take some guidance from Hruby and Hruby, 304 Or 500, 748 P2d 57 (1987), which governed custody disputes between biological parents and qualifying nonparents before Sleeper and established a standard not unlike the one we have adopted in response to Troxel. In Hruby, after a thorough review of Oregon custody cases involving parents and nonparents, the court concluded:
“ ‘[A] natural parent has the right to the custody of his or her children, absent a compelling reason for placing the children in the custody of another; the “best interests of the child” standard applicable to custody disputes between natural parents in a marriage dissolution proceeding is not applicable to custody disputes between natural parents and other persons.’
“Hruby, 304 Or at 510. The court noted expressly that non-parents could establish compelling reasons to obtain custody without proving that the parent was unfit. Rather, the proper inquiry was whether custody with the parent would be ‘ “highly detrimental” to the child’s welfare, regardless of *541the parent’s fitness,’ id. at 508; whether custody with the nonparent was necessary ‘to protect the children from some compelling threat to their present or future well-being,’ id. at 509; and whether there was ‘good cause’ or ‘cogent’ reasons, to place the child with the nonparent, id. at 510. Summarizing, the court explained:
“ “We use “compelling” to emphasize that in a custody dispute between a natural parent and some other person, a court should not be concerned with attempting to maximize a child’s welfare, but with determining whether the child will receive adequate care and love from its natural parent and whether the child will be otherwise unduly harmed, physically or psychologically, by giving custody to the natural parent.’
“Id. at 511. Applying that standard, the court concluded that the child’s aunt had not presented sufficiently compelling reasons to acquire custody:
“ ‘The child has an emotional attachment to the father and wishes to be with him (though also with the aunt). In addition, the child stayed at the father’s home in San Diego for six weeks without experiencing any apparent psychological or emotional difficulties. Given these facts * * *, we conclude that there is no compelling reason to deny custody to the father. There has been no showing that the child would not receive adequate care and love from the father or that the child would be otherwise unduly harmed, physically or psychologically, by giving custody to him.’
“Id. at 517-18. See also Fenimore v. Smith, 145 Or App 501, 509-11, 930 P2d 892 (1996), rev den, 326 Or 389 (1998) (applying Hruby; stepfather of adolescent daughter who has suffered ‘traumatic loss’ overcame parental presumption because removing her from stepfather’s house would cause ‘undue psychological harm’ despite natural parent’s fitness); Cerda and Cerda, 136 Or App 104, 109, 901 P2d 263 (1995), rev den, 322 Or 598 (1996) (applying Hruby; father’s uncontrolled anger and abusive behavior constitute compelling reasons to place children with grandparents).”
(Third set. of brackets and omission in original; footnote omitted; emphasis added.)
Wilson, O’Donnell-Lamont, and Wooden establish that, although a fit parent is entitled to a presumption that *542he or she will act in the best interest of his or her child, a non-parent may rebut that presumption. To rebut the presumption, the nonparent does not need to demonstrate that the parent is unfit. Instead, the nonparent may rebut the presumption by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that compelling circumstances exist such that it would be detrimental to the child if the parent were to obtain custody. In other words, the nonparent must demonstrate that the parent will not provide adequate love and care or that the child will face an undue risk of physical or psychological harm in the parent’s custody. With those principles in mind, I turn to the facts of this case.
In my opinion, applying the above standard to the facts of this case, grandmother has presented sufficient evidence and has overcome the presumption in favor of father. I agree with the majority that, at the time of trial, father was a fit parent and is entitled to the presumption. As discussed above, however, the fact that he is presently a fit parent is not the end of the inquiry. We must also decide whether grandmother has overcome the presumption that father will act in the best interests of the children. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, I do not compare father’s home with grandmother’s home. Instead, I focus on whether grandmother has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that father cannot or will not provide adequate care and love or that giving custody to him will cause the children to face an undue risk of physical or psychological harm.
Before discussing the details of the evidence that establish that father cannot or will not provide adequate care and love or that the children face an undue risk of physical or psychological harm, I address a fundamental disagreement that I have regarding the majority’s assessment of the evidence. In concluding that grandmother’s evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption in father’s favor, the majority focuses primarily on father’s performance as a parent during the 10-month period of the children’s lives when father cared for them. The majority acknowledges and discusses some of father’s difficulties and his complete inadequacy as a parent before August 1999, when the children began living with him.2 However, it then goes on to hold, in a *543conclusory fashion, that father’s display of adequate parenting during the 10-month period that he cared for the children before the June 2000 hearing overcomes or essentially trumps his past inadequacies. The majority’s holding is problematic because it is based on an expert’s report and testimony that are not highly persuasive and it focuses almost exclusively on father’s behavior during the 10-month period before the hearing.
In concluding that father’s past deficiencies as a parent have been overcome, the majority relies heavily on the testimony of and an evaluation prepared by Joseph Mazza. Before the custody hearing, the parties stipulated that Dr. Catherine Bolstad should perform a custody evaluation. Apparently, father hired Mazza to perform another evaluation after Bolstad issued her custody study in which she recommended that grandmother should be given custody. Mazza concluded that, at the time of his evaluation, father was successfully parenting the children. There are a number of factors, however, that limit the persuasiveness of Mazza’s evaluation. First, in conducting his evaluation, Mazza talked primarily to individuals to whom father directed him to talk. Consequently, most of the information that Mazza obtained regarding father’s behaviors before the move to Roseburg was obtained from father, Chism, and one sister whom father told Mazza to interview. Although Mazza did review Bolstad’s written report, he did not talk to grandmother or any of the other family members who had been extensively involved in father’s life or the children’s lives before the 10 months that they lived in Roseburg. Consequently, Mazza’s evaluation of that 10-month period was made with little firsthand knowledge of the context of father’s overall behavior as a parent.
Second, as the trial court noted, Mazza’s conclusion that father has fundamentally changed his behavior is less than compelling. Mazza explained that his conclusion was based, in part, on the premise that, from 28 to 32 years of age, young adults may make fundamental changes in their lives. *544Further, Mazza himself did not appear to be strongly convinced that father’s change would last. In assessing whether that change would last, Mazza explained:
“I see this as somewhat of a belated emancipation of sorts. Whether it will stick or not, I don’t know. I think he has made a fundamental change. Our best predictor for future behavior is past behavior. And we have a track record of some adolescent type past behavior and then we have nine months where we’ve seen some responsible behavior.”
(Emphasis added.) Whether there is a risk that father will return to his past behavior is a critical issue in this case. It is imperative in making such a determination that the most accurate and complete information be obtained. That information should include some contact with the many family members and other persons who have first-hand knowledge about father’s past behavior. That critical determination should not be based primarily on 18 hours of observation, only part of which included observation of the children. Further, the persuasiveness of that evidence is diminished by the fact that the observations were made in father’s home during a time that father knew that his parenting skills were being evaluated.
The trial court also did not find Mazza’s report highly persuasive. The court explained that Mazza’s
“report was really not very helpful to this [c]ourt because it was a one-sided report in that he only contacted the people that were favorable to [father]. * * * Mazza was unable to tell the [c]ourt if the alleged improvement in [father’s] behavior with the children would last.”
In contrast, the court found Bolstad’s report to be far more helpful:
“Dr. Bolstad, a licensed psychologist, and acknowledged by [father’s] expert as a respected expert in her field, performed a custody evaluation pursuant to stipulations to the party. Dr. Bolstad strongly recommends that custody of the children be awarded to [grandmother]. She testified it would be more harmful to the children to leave them with [father] than return them to [grandmother].
*545“Dr. Bolstad — and these are findings I’m making by this — Dr. Bolstad based her opinion on careful considerations of the evidence that she had gathered. Her evidence included contact with both of the parties and their household members [,] observing parent-child interaction, contact with references, psychological testing and review, [and] the written materials submitted by the parties.
“I adopt Dr. Bolstad’s report into my findings of fact. Not only [are] her findings complete in themselves but the witnesses that I heard support her findings. And I find her conclusions not only credible, but compelling as well.”3
Moreover, the majority’s holding depends in large part on the proposition that father’s reasonably successful performance during the 10-month period that he had the children in Roseburg is almost conclusive evidence that he has changed and has overcome his past deficiencies:
“Here, each concern is ameliorated by the fact that father exercised his parenting responsibilities in exemplary fashion for the 10 months that he had custody. That performance tends to render our concerns about the future speculative. Because of the speculative nature of those concerns, we conclude that we cannot give efficacy to the * * * presumption and at the same time award grandmother custody on this record.”
185 Or App at 535. In other words, the majority reasons that the presumption is not overcome here because father’s good performance for the 10-month period prior to trial “render[s] our concerns about the future speculative.” 185 Or App at 535.1 do not understand why that is so.
Certainly a parent’s performance during the time period immediately before a custody hearing must be given significant consideration. However, I do not agree that the fact that a person has been an effective parent for a short *546period of time before a custody hearing necessarily means that that behavior completely ameliorates prior periods of inadequacy as a parent. We are obligated to determine whether father will provide adequate love and care and whether the children will face an undue risk of physical or psychological harm. In other words, we are obligated to make a determination about father’s future performance as a parent and the future risks that the children will face in his custody. That determination must include not only father’s most recent performance as a parent but also father’s long-term histoiy as a parent. That is particularly so where the parent’s past behavior includes conduct that would unquestionably pose a serious risk to his or her children, as is the case here.
With that in mind, I turn to the evidence in this case. Although the evidence indicates that father engaged in some positive parenting behaviors during the 10-month period that the children lived with him in Roseburg, grandmother presented additional evidence concerning father’s parenting before and during the 10-month period. Specifically, the evidence bearing on whether the presumption has been overcome concerns (1) father’s past inadequate parenting, (2) the particular psychological vulnerabilities of these children, (3) father’s anger management issues, (4) father’s manipulation of the children and disruption of their relationship with grandmother, and (5) the role of substance abuse in father’s life.
The first area of concern is father’s complete inadequacy as a parent before the 10-month period in Roseburg. As discussed above, in deciding whether the presumption has been overcome, we must evaluate father’s entire history as a parent. As Mazza stated in assessing father’s chances of maintaining the apparent changes in his life,
“I see this as somewhat of a belated emancipation of sorts. Whether it will stick or not, I don’t know. I think he has made a fundamental change. Our best predictor for future behavior is past behavior. And we have a track record of some adolescent type past behavior and then we have nine months where we’ve seen some responsible behavior.”
*547Bolstad also expressed the view that a person’s past behavior is a very valid predictor of future behavior.
There are a number of areas of very serious concern regarding father’s past behavior. This is not a case of a parent who has merely had some deficiencies in his or her parenting skills over the years. There is really no dispute that father’s parenting before the 10-month period in Roseburg was completely inadequate. The children were 10,8, and 6 at the time of trial in June 2000. During much of the period from 1990 to 1999, father’s behavior as a parent amounted to neglect. Early in these children’s lives, father essentially abandoned them to their mother, his ex-wife. According to the record in this case, mother was involved in drugs and neglected the children in numerous ways, including exposing at least one of the children to sexual activities. During that time period, father was working at a bar in Portland and engaging in prostitution in exchange for money and drugs. One of father’s sisters testified that father had told her that he was aware of mother’s drug activities. There is no evidence that father made any effort to care for or protect the children during that five-year time period. As the trial court found, father was simply not part of the children’s lives during the time that they were with mother. Father eventually obtained legal custody of the children. The evidence indicates that he immediately turned over responsibility for the children to grandmother who, with the assistance of other family members, provided financial, physical, and emotional care for the children, who at that time were physically and emotionally distressed.
Father lived with grandmother and the children during most of the time from 1995 until early 1999 when he moved to Roseburg to be with his domestic partner. During that time, despite living in the same home and being unemployed most of the time, father provided little or no financial support and minimal care for the children. He apparently had occasional computer jobs, some for grandmother. He often stayed up all night on the computer and slept during the day. His involvement with the children during that time was minimal. He had almost no involvement with the children’s schools. The evidence simply does not support the *548majority’s assertion that father’s involvement with his children during that time period was “significant.” 185 Or App at 533. Moreover, the majority’s assertion that father’s involvement was significant conflicts with its determination that, during that time period, “his role as a parent was clearly inadequate.” 185 Or App at 533.
The second area of concern in this case is the psychological vulnerabilities of the children. In evaluating whether the children face an undue risk of psychological harm, it is important to understand their background. Of particular concern is the effect of their experiences before grandmother assumed their care in the fall of 1994. In Bolstad’s custody evaluation, she concluded, after talking to all of the affected parties, that, because of the children’s early life experiences, they were “significantly at risk children.” She testified:
“Q After meeting with them and the other interviewing you did in this case how important do you feel that it is for the children’s home to be stable?
“A Very.
“Q And why is that?
“A Because I think these little girls are children who are at risk because of their history.
“Q And can you tell us why you think they are at risk?
“A What I understand about their history is obtained from both [father] and [grandmother]. And that basically was that for the first — until 1995 — so it was until the girls were varying ages. I think [¶] was under a a year and [B] was just about five. They lived in an extraordinarily upset, unstable, unpredictable environment.
“Both [father] and [grandmother] told me that [the children’s] mother was a drug user. Both of them told me that their mother had engaged in sexual relations in front of at least [B] and they thought perhaps in front of [E]. Both of them indicated to me that [B] had been involved in some of the sexual behavior with the adults. Both of them said that the girls had been neglected, unfed, dirty. Both of them told me that the little girls had basically been taking care of themselves, i.e., [B] took care of the two younger ones.
*549“And with the drug use, the exposure to adult sexuality, the erratic nurturance, you have children at significant risk for development of later pathology. Those are risk factors that are recognized in our field.
“There is a man in London called Michael Rudder who is an expert on this. And those fulfill three of the main five risk factors that he speaks about in terms of prediction of later difficulty for children. I take them very seriously.”
In her report, Bolstad also stated:
“ [A]ccording to numerous sources, their early years were spent with a parent whose drug use and alternative lifestyle ensured that there would be a paucity of nurturance and care given to them. There were indications from [one of the children] that she had been sexually molested while in her mother’s care. During these early years, their father was only sporadically present; what consistency and predictability could be found in their young lives was provided by their grandmother and several of their aunts and an uncle. Lest it be thought that all traces of these earlier difficulties have been removed, an incident of sexuafized play among all three girls and their cousin occurred prior to [father’s] move to Roseburg.”
It is clear that continuing stability is critical in the children’s lives. Unquestionably, grandmother has played a significant role in establishing such stability. As Bolstad testified, grandmother and other family members in Bend have been the only source of stability in the children’s lives. It is apparent that the children have a strong bond with grandmother and those other family members. As both Bolstad and Mazza apparently concluded, it would be harmful to the children if those important relationships are not maintained. The trial court agreed:
“Whether we do this by a preponderance, substantial and compelling, or beyond a reasonable doubt, there is not any doubt in my mind that [grandmother] is a psychological parent in this case.
“And I further find, based on the fact of what she has done with these children, it would be harmful to the children if she were not to continue the relationship with these children. It would be harmful.
*550“Again, let me repeat this. It would be harmful to the children if she were not to continue her relationship with the children.”
The trial court also found that the evidence demonstrates that grandmother would work to continue the relationship between father and the children but that father would not work to continue the relationship between grandmother and the children. The trial court stated that, “when we look at who is going to foster the relationship with the other parent, it is absolutely overwhelming [grandmother] is going to do it and that [father] is not.” Father admits that he told the children that their grandmother was “the enemy” and that he might have told them that she stole them from him and that he could not love her or be friends with her. The evidence demonstrates clearly that the children are in particular need of stability and that, if the children are removed from grandmother’s custody, they will face an undue risk of psychological harm.
The third area of concern is father’s problems with anger. The evidence establishes that, during the time that he lived with grandmother, father had serious difficulties with anger. He was at times verbally abusive to the children, calling them ‘little fucking cunts” and “fucking bitch[es].” There is also evidence that he threatened to bum grandmother’s home down and threatened a number of times to kill all of the family members. Father’s brother, a physician who lives in California, testified that father had asked for his support in obtaining custody of his children but that he had refused to assist father because of father’s verbal abuse of the children. He described father’s behavior as “[v]ery erratic, quite a bit of emotional lability. He seemed out of control, as if he was distressed about something. There were a lot of — there were temper tantrums.” The brother described father’s living situation at grandmother’s as a “reign of terror.” He also testified that father’s behavior towards his children was “very disturbing,” and that father “referred to them frequently as ‘cunts’ and was quite dismissive. Openly talked very negatively and in hurtful ways about them.” As the trial court found, during the time that he lived at grandmother’s house, father’s “angry behavior was such that all family members were required to walk on eggshells around him.” There was *551testimony from numerous family members, including father’s brother and sisters, that father has had a continuing and serious problem with anger management. Bolstad testified that she believed that father’s verbal abuse of his children has had a harmful and long-lasting effect on the children. Father testified that he has realized the error of his ways, but there is little in the record, aside from father’s own testimony, that reveals whether this long-term problem, which poses a serious risk of psychological harm to his children, has been overcome.
The fourth area of concern is father’s apparent manipulation of the children to achieve his goal of obtaining custody. Avery telling piece of evidence in this case is a transcript of a tape recording of a conversation between father and his children.4 The conversation occurred in July 1999 during the time that grandmother had regained custody of the children. In it, father discussed with the three young children the court proceedings regarding their custody, and at least some of the discussion seems quite inappropriate. For example, in the conversation, he tells the children that one of the judges who has been involved in the case has been unfair and that she is dragging her feet in getting off the case. He also talked to the children about matters that were going to come up at the hearing, such as his abusive language toward them. During the conversation, father also discouraged one of the children from seeking counseling and he characterized grandmother as the “enemy.”5 The trial court was also disturbed by father’s manipulative behavior. It stated:
*552“I spent a great amount of time of going over the transcript of the phone call. That was on 7-1-99. And quite frankly, I was dismayed when I saw what kind of pressures were being placed on these children, and I so find. And based on that and what I’ve heard, I disregard what the children are telling me. I think they have been subjected to pressure. And quite frankly, some of the comments they— [one of the children] made, were not the comments of children. They were the — as far as I’m concerned, the words of an adult. And — a perfect house, things of that nature.”
The described evidence is disturbing not only because the nature of father’s discussion of the court proceedings is inappropriate and particularly harmful to the children but also because it demonstrates father’s objective of obtaining custody of the children at all costs, including disrupting the children’s attachment to grandmother and other family members. The trial court found that father “has done nothing but undermine the relationship that [grandmother] has with her granddaughters.”
*553The final area of serious concern is the role that substance abuse has played in father’s life. Father has a long history of drug and alcohol use. Father was involved with drugs and alcohol during the time that mother was caring for the children. There was also evidence that he used drugs during the time that he lived with grandmother and his children. In fact, grandmother testified that, as late as 1999, she found father in the house with a transient and suspected that they had been doing drugs. Grandmother testified that, when that happened, she took the children to a hotel so that they would not be exposed to such circumstances. Of particular concern is father’s minimization and attempted deception regarding that problem. He, in fact, told the court that he had not used drugs since his marriage in 1989. The trial court rejected his testimony:
“[Father’s] testimony that he has not used controlled substance [s] since his marriage in ’89 is not credible. [Grandmother’s] witnesses — based on [father’s] admissions or on personal observations — testified he had used drugs since May of ’89 up until May of ’99. And certainly I find that he did use those.”
I agree with the trial court’s assessment of father’s credibility on that issue.
Additionally, of very serious concern is the continuing role of alcohol in father’s life during the 10-month period before the hearing. In Roseburg, father and the children were living in the home of his domestic partner, Chism, who, by all accounts, including his own admission, has a serious alcohol problem. Of particular significance here is that father often used Chism as his daycare provider. Apparently, during the time that Chism was providing daycare, the youngest of father’s children found Chism on the floor, talking incoherently and bleeding. Apparently, she was home alone with Chism at the time. In addition, not too long before trial, Chism went on an alcoholic binge and left the home for three or four weeks to attend a treatment program.6 Those circumstances raise serious questions about father’s willingness *554and ability to provide a safe environment for his children that does not create an undue risk of physical or psychological harm to the children.
In sum, the record here demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that grandmother has overcome the presumption that father will act in the best interests of the children. The evidence shows that, during the time period from the birth of the children until 1999, father did not provide adequate care and love and engaged in behavior that caused the children to face undue risks of physical and psychological harm. Father’s parenting certainly did improve during the time he had the children in Roseburg. Nevertheless, in view of all of the factors discussed above, including the children’s particular need for stability, the uncertainty of the permanence of father’s dramatic change from his very serious and long-term behaviors, and the role that substance abuse has played in father’s life, I conclude that giving father custody would cause the children to face an undue risk of psychological harm. Accordingly, I would hold that grandmother has overcome the presumption that father, as a fit parent, will act in the best interest of his children.7 After having had the opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses, the trial court, in a thoughtful and articulate opinion, awarded custody to grandmother. I agree with the trial court’s decision. For all of the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Haselton, Linder, and Brewer, JJ., join in this dissent.ORS 109.119 (1997) provides, in part:
“(1) Any person, including but not limited to a related or nonrelated foster parent, stepparent or relative by blood or marriage who has established emotional ties creating a child-parent relationship or an ongoing personal relationship with a child, or any legal grandparent may petition or file a motion for intervention with the court having jurisdiction over the custody, placement, guardianship or wardship of that child, or if no such proceedings are pending, may petition the court for the county in which the minor child resides for an order providing for relief under subsection (2) of this section.
“(2)(a) If the court determines that a child-parent relationship exists and if the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that custody, guardianship, right of visitation, or other generally recognized right of a parent or *539person in loco parentis, is appropriate in the case, the court shall grant such custody, guardianship, right ofvisitation or other right to the person, if to do so is in the best interest of the child. The court may determine temporary custody of the child or temporary visitation rights under this paragraph pending a final order.”
The majority states that “[i]t is of some significance that[, in August 1999,] the trial judge in this case, acting as a juvenile court judge, returned the children *543to father rather than placing them with grandmother.” 185 Or App at 529. The trial judge, however, specifically noted, in making the decision in this case, that the juvenile case involved a different standard of proof.
Bolstad’s evaluation of the parties was a custody evaluation in which ultimately she made a determination of what was in the best interest of the children. That, of course, is not the applicable standard here. The majority asserts that use of the best interest standard renders Bolstad’s evaluation of the parties essentially meaningless. I strongly disagree. Bolstad’s thorough observations regarding the children, father, and grandmother and her findings regarding their strengths, weaknesses, needs, and limitations are still quite pertinent to our assessment of whether grandmother has overcome the presumption that father, as a fit parent, will act in the best interests of his children.
The majority reasons that, “[b] ecause the tape was a year old at the time of trial, involved a different hearing, and came before the time period that father had custody, we do not give it the weight that the trial court did or the dissent does” and that “[w]hat we find more persuasive is the uncontradicted evidence of father’s healthy and extensive involvement with the children in the 10 months preceding the trial in this case.” 185 Or App at 530 n 4. Even though the tape involved an earlier hearing, it provides insight into father’s judgment and his apparent willingness to pressure the children to achieve his goals. The fact that father demonstrated greater involvement with the children during the 10 months before trial is unrelated to father’s apparent manipulation of the children to obtain custody and does not negate the weight of that evidence.
The majority states that
“[w]itnesses who had no interest in the outcome of the case (their teachers and school counselor) uniformly stated that the children were doing well and that they demonstrated no indicators of needing counseling; thus, neither the *552negative effects that they may have experienced with their mother nor any negative effects from their removal from grandmother’s custody are apparent from their current behavior. Indeed, as the school counselor pointed out, it is often better for children to move on with their lives than to focus on things that happened previously.”
185 Or App at 536.
First, to the extent that the majority implies that the children were not performing well in Bend, the evidence does not support that implication. It is also interesting to note that one of the teachers was under the impression that, when the children lived in Bend, father provided the parenting with assistance from grandmother.
Second, the record indicates that the teachers had training in spotting child abuse and neglect but does not indicate that they had training in determining whether the children would benefit from counseling. With regard to B’s school counselor, she testified that she taught in B’s classroom, she had lunch in her office “for fun” with a group including B, and she met with B “a couple of times.” One interaction concerned a friendship problem. The second interaction concerned this court case. Specifically, the counselor testified, in part:
“You know, sometimes we make assumptions that things have gone on in kids’ past or things are going on right now in their lives that perhaps they need counseling. Well, my job is really — is to check in. And I was available for her and I checked in with her about the court case. She said I’m okay, you know, I’m fine. And I said, well, I’ll just check in with you once in [a while] and see how you are doing. And so that is what I did. And she didn’t require counseling, ongoing counseling with me. And when I checked in with her she would give the thumbs up, you know.”
The counselor’s testimony indicates that her opinion is based on “checking in” with B once in a while and relying on B’s self-report about her needs.
The majority is correct that we read the record differently. My understanding is that there were two separate incidents. My concern, however, is the role that substance abuse has played in father’s life over a long period of time. For example, despite father’s knowledge of Chism’s problems with alcohol, father generally *554continued to use him as a daycare provider throughout their relationship. Thus, I view Chism’s admitted alcoholism in that context.
In the final analysis, according to the majority, this is a close case, and, for that reason, “it must be the presumption that becomes the determining factor.” 185 Or App at 538 n 10.1 agree that the presumption must be given significant weight in determining whether a nonparent has met his or her burden to overcome it. However, the presumption is not an instrument for deciding a “close” case. It is not an instrument that allows us to abdicate our responsibility to evaluate all of the evidence to determine whether a nonparent has overcome the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. In accordance with that understanding, with recognition that people change, and after examining all of the evidence in this case, I would hold that grandmother has overcome the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence.