dissenting.
[¶40] I do not agree with the legal authority and reasoning as applied by the majority to the facts of this case and, therefore, I respectfully dissent.
[T41] The majority's reliance on Matter of Estate of Roosa, 753 P.2d 1028 (Wyo.1988), exceeds the limited bounds of that case, which I would restrict solely to the issue of testamentary capacity. That issue remains to be determined by the district court in this case, and I trust it will be decided in accordance with governing law, including the guidance available in Roosa.
[T42] At a minimum, I would shift the burden of proof from requiring Andrews and the guardian to show incompetence at the time the deed in controversy was signed, to requiring the Appellants to demonstrate Andrews' competence. See Home Town Finance Corporation v. Frank, 13 Utah 2d 26, 368 P.2d 72, 76 (1962); 77 Am.Jur.2d Veterans and Veterans' Laws § 50 (1997). Anything less renders meaningless the purpose of the statutes which afford special protection to incompetent veterans.
[¶43] Because I do see those statutes as providing significant protections to veterans, especially in circumstances such as those present in this case, I would also favor the additional step of fully affirming the district court for the reason that the Appellants clearly had actual notice of Andrews' incompetence and were not bona fide purchasers. See Grose v. Sauvageau, 942 P.2d 398, 402 *1033(Wyo.1997). Appellants did not act in good faith vis-a-vis this transaction, did not pay valuable consideration to Andrews or his guardian, had actual notice of Andrews' infirmities and the role of the guardian in his business and financial affairs, and would not be prejudiced by cancellation or reformation of the disputed deed (except they would have nothing, which is what they paid). How Andrews chooses to structure his last will and testament would then be decided, but his estate (including his home) would be available to provide care for Andrews during the remainder of his life.
[¶44] Although the case is not directly in point with respect to the wording of the governing statutes, I find enough similarity in the case of Rymer v. Smith, 38 Tenn.App. 414, 274 S.W.2d 643, 646-48 (1954), to accord it the status of persuasive precedent for the propositions set out above. In Rymer, the court held that establishment of a UVGA guardianship, in the manner provided for in the statute, was constructive notice to all, and financial transactions with a protected veteran were void. In this case, we need not sweep quite so broadly because the facts establish that the Appellants had actual notice of Andrews' incompetence. I also conclude that Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-6-110(b)1 and 3-6-1132 (LexisNexis 2001) (emphasis added) contemplate a more robust role for a *1034veteran's guardian appointed under the UVGA than that espoused by the majority, at least under such cireumstances as those evident in this case. I disagree with the majority's determination that these Appellants may use alleged due process violations in the establishment of the UVGA guardianship as a sword to defeat the protections provided by the UVGA. Andrews and his guardian, on the other hand, should be able to use those statutes as a shield against a deed prepared by Appellants, to their sole advantage, and contrary to Andrews' interests. For these reasons, I would affirm the order of the district court.
. § 3-6-110. Annual accounting copy of accounts and pleadings to be filed with bureau; notice of hearing; administration of property from other sources.
(a) Every guardian, who has received or shall receive on account of his ward, any moneys from the veterans' administration, its predecessors or successor, shall file with the court annually, on the anniversary date of the appointment, in addition to such other accounts as may be required by the court, a full, true, and accurate account under oath, of all moneys so received by him, of all disbursements thereof, and showing the balance thereof in his hands at the date of such account and how invested. A certified copy of each of such accounts filed with the court shall be sent by the guardian to the office of the veterans' administration having jurisdiction over the area in which such court is located. A duplicate signed copy or certified copy of any petition, motion, or other pleading which is filed in the guardianship proceedings, or in any proceeding for the purpose of removing the disability of minority or of mental incompetency, shall be furnished by the person filing the same, to the office of the veterans' administration concerned. The court shall fix a time and place for the hearing on such account, petition, or other pleading, not less than fifteen (15) days nor more than thirty (30) days from the date of filing same, and notice thereof shall be given by the court to the aforesaid veterans' administration office not less than fifteen (15) days prior to the date fixed for the hearing. Notice of such hearing shall in like manner be given to the guardian.
(b) Any guardian appointed under this act [§§ 3-6-101 through 3-6-119] shall be accountable for property derived from sources other than the veterans' administration and shall be accountable as is or may be required under the applicable law of this state pertaining to the property of minors or persons of unsound mind who are not beneficiaries of the veterans' administration; provided, however, that he may at his option administer the same as provided in this act and include an accounting for such assets and income in the same account required with respect to assets derived from the veterans' administration, and if so included, the procedure with respect thereto shall be that hereinabove prescribed.
. § 3-6-113. notice to bureau. Investment of surplus money;
(a) It shall be the duty of such guardians to invest and keep invested their ward's surplus money, but only in the securities or other property, and in the manner hereinafter indicated, and in which securities or other property the guardian has no interest. The investments, except those provided in paragraphs (i) and (ii) of this subsection hereof, shall be made only upon the prior approval of the court, after notice to the veterans' administration as provided in W.S. 3-6-110, as amended:
(i) Direct obligations of this state and of the United States government, and obligations, the interest and principal of which are both unconditionally guaranteed by the United States government;
(i) The bonds of this state or of any other state, or any county, school districts, city, or town in the United States with a population as shown by next preceding federal census of not less than one thousand (1,000) inhabitants; and where the laws do not permit such counties, cities, school districts, or towns to become indebted in excess of six percent (6%) of the assessed valuation of property for taxation therein, and where the total indebtedness of such county, school districts, city, or municipality, does not exceed six percent (6%) of the assessed valuation of property for taxation at the time of such investment: provided always, there has been no default for more than thirty (30) days during the preceding ten (10) years upon any bonds of the issuing state, county, city or town;
(ii) In the legally issued notes of the owner of the fee simple title to improved, unencumbered real property located in this state secured by first mortgage or deed of trust thereon: pro*1034vided, that the total debt secured by such encumbrances shall not exceed sixty percent (60%) of the actual cash value of such real property at the time of such investment unless such loan be insured and while held by the guardian remain insured, by the federal housing administrator in accordance with the National Housing Act [12 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.];
(iv) In the entire fee simple title to real estate or lease of real estate in this state and the purchase of all necessary equipment, but only as a home for the ward, or as a home for his dependent family, or to rehabilitate the ward, or to protect his interests. Such purchase or lease of real estate or other investment provided in this paragraph shall not be made except upon the entry of an order of the court after hearing upon verified petition. Notice of such hearing shall be given the veterans' administration as provided in W.S. 3-6-110, as amended. Title shall be taken in the ward's name. This paragraph shall not be construed to limit the right of the guardian, on behalf of his ward, to bid and to become the purchaser of real estate at a sale thereof pursuant to decree of foreclosure of a lien held by or for the ward, or at a tax or a trustee's sale, to protect the ward's right in the property so foreclosed or sold, or at a sale under partition decree, if necessary to protect the ward's interest in such property.