OPINION
PICKARD, Judge.{1} The question before us is whether the use of the criminal process to assist in the collection of money mistakenly deposited into the wrong account gives rise to civil liability under the tort of malicious abuse of process. See DeVaney v. Thriftway Mktg. Corp., 1998-NMSC-001, ¶ 17, 124 N.M. 512, 953 P.2d 277 (defining the elements of malicious abuse of process). In addition, we address whether NMSA 1978, § 56-8-4(A) (1993) requires a trial court to apply post-judgment interest to an award of punitive damages. Under the specific facts of this case, we answer both questions in the affirmative.
{2} Appellant Weststar Mortgage Company (Weststar) appeals from a judgment awarding Appellee Ken Jackson (Jackson) $50,000 in compensatory damages and $150,000 in punitive damages on Jackson’s claim for malicious abuse of process. Wests-tar challenges the jury’s verdict on every element of the malicious abuse of process claim and on the award of punitive damages. In particular, Weststar argues that (1) Weststar did not initiate or procure criminal proceedings against Jackson; (2) the trial court erred by failing to find, as a matter of law, that Weststar had probable cause to believe that a criminal claim could be established against Jackson; (3) the claim for malicious abuse of process was precluded by the facts that Jackson was guilty of larceny and the criminal proceedings did not terminate in Jackson’s favor; (4) Weststar did not misuse the criminal proceedings; (5) there was no evidence that Weststar had a primary improper motive in seeking the criminal prosecution; (6) the jury instructions were misleading; (7) the jury’s award of punitive damages was not supported by substantial evidence; and (8) the trial court erred in denying Weststar’s motion for a new trial given that Jackson failed to present evidence sufficient to support the jury’s findings. Jackson raises only one issue on cross-appeal, namely whether the trial court erred in failing to award post-judgment interest on Jackson’s punitive damages award. We affirm on the appeal, reverse on the cross-appeal, and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{3} Weststar is an escrow company that provides escrow, loan, and mortgage servicing. Its services include holding real estate contracts, collecting payments, and disbursing proceeds. Weststar also purchases real estate contracts.
{4} In 1998, Jackson owned a real estate contract encumbered by a mortgage. Wests-tar held the contract and disbursed payments to Jackson and to the mortgage holder. In April 1998, Weststar and Jackson executed a contract for Jackson to sell his real estate contract to Weststar. Pursuant to this agreement, Weststar arranged to direct-deposit approximately $3,000 in Jackson’s account at Norwest Bank. However, Norwest misunderstood Weststar’s instructions and mistakenly transferred all of the sale proceeds, including $12,927.26 that should have gone into Weststar’s account, into Jackson’s account.
{5} Jackson and his wife discovered the error several days later. On his wife’s advice, Jackson called Weststar to ask whether the wire transfer had been made correctly. Jackson admits that he did not tell Weststar why he thought there may have been a mistake during this phone call. The Weststar representative, Lon Lynch, told Jackson that the wire transfer had been completed. Jackson then withdrew $12,000 from his account and purchased a certificate of deposit. Jackson testified that he bought the CD because he thought Weststar might eventually want the money returned and he wanted to ensure that he did not spend it.
{6} When Weststar discovered the bank error in July 1998, Lynch called Jackson. During this first telephone call, Jackson denied having any knowledge of the money. However, later that day, Jackson called Lynch and arranged to return the money when the CD matured in August. Lynch testified that she did not demand that Jackson immediately return the money: “At that point he seemed willing to find out what he could do about the CD and return the money to us, so we were allowing him some time to do that.”
{7} Shortly after Lynch and Jackson made arrangements for the repayment of the money, Weststar’s attorney sent a letter to Jackson, demanding return of the money and threatening legal action should Jackson fail to cooperate. Concerned by the tone of the letter, Jackson and his wife contacted an attorney. The attorney erroneously, if not recklessly, told Jackson that it was his “lucky day” and that he was entitled to keep the money. Based on this advice, Jackson cashed in the CD and deposited the proceeds into another account.
{8} As the CD maturity date approached, Lynch again called Jackson. Jackson told Lynch that he had retained counsel and directed her to communicate with him through his attorney. Lynch reported this conversation to her supervisor, Gary Inman. Inman then called Jackson’s attorney. Jackson’s attorney told Inman that he viewed the situation as a “golden opportunity” for Jackson and that he would be responding to Wests-tar’s demand letter in due time.
{9} Inman or another supervisor then directed Lynch to make a complaint with the Carlsbad Police Department. Lynch met with Detective Boutelle on September 23, 1998. Boutelle testified that Lynch told him, ‘We want to avoid going to criminal court, if we can. We are hoping we get cooperation, and can get this resolved where we can just close the whole matter out and go from there.” Boutelle explained that he was not a collection agent and asked if Weststar wanted to proceed with the prosecution of Jackson. Lynch responded that she lacked the authority to authorize the prosecution and that her purpose in contacting the police was to document the situation in the event that Weststar was unable to resolve the situation civilly.
{10} Based on Lynch’s representations that Weststar wanted to avoid a criminal prosecution if possible, Boutelle called Jackson’s attorney to attempt to resolve the situation. Lynch was in the room at the time Boutelle made the call. Boutelle testified that he told the attorney, “I’m asking that you might talk to your client and try to come up with a reasonable solution, so that I can be eliminated from this process and you-all handle it yourselves. Otherwise I will be compelled — I will have to do my job and pursue this further.” Jackson’s attorney laughed at Boutelle and told Boutelle that he did not believe the matter was a criminal issue.
{11} The following day, Inman called Boutelle and directed the detective to pursue the prosecution of Jackson. During this conversation, Inman told Boutelle that he had received a letter from Jackson’s attorney basically stating that Jackson would not be returning the money. In fact, the letter discussed a settlement offer. Nonetheless, Inman told Boutelle that the letter was not the answer he was hoping to get from Jackson and therefore that Weststar wished to proceed with the criminal case.
{12} Jackson did not return the money and was arrested. The district attorney eventually dismissed the prosecution because he was unable to get necessary records from Norwest Bank in order to carry through with the trial before a required deadline.
{13} Shortly after Jaekson’s arrest, Wests-tar filed a civil complaint alleging unjust enrichment, fraud, constructive fraud, conversion, and promissory estoppel. Jackson counterclaimed for malicious abuse of process. After Jackson acquired new counsel and repaid the money, Weststar obtained partial summary judgment on its claim of unjust enrichment to memorialize Jackson’s repayment of the money.
{14} Weststar filed a motion for summary .judgment on Jackson’s claim of malicious abuse of process. The trial court did not rule on the motion, and the counterclaim was tried to a jury. The jury found in favor of Jackson and awarded $50,000 in compensatory damages and $150,000 in punitive damages. Weststar then filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion.
{15} At the presentment hearing, Jackson asked for pre- and post-judgment interest on both the compensatory and punitive damages awards. The trial court denied Jackson’s request and awarded pre- and post-judgment interest on the compensatory damages only. Weststar appeals from the judgment and damages awards, and Jackson cross-appeals from the failure to award post-judgment interest on the punitive damages award.
DISCUSSION
I. Malicious Abuse of Process
{16} The tort of malicious abuse of process represents “an attempt to strike a balance between the interest in protecting litigants’ right of access to the courts and the interest in protecting citizens from unfounded or illegitimate applications of the power of the state through the misuse of the courts.” DeVaney, 1998-NMSC-001, ¶ 14, 124 N.M. 512, 953 P.2d 277. Because of the importance of the right of access to the courts, the tort is disfavored in the law and must be narrowly construed. Id. ¶ 19.
{17} The elements of malicious abuse of process are:
(1) the initiation of judicial proceedings against the plaintiff by the defendant; (2) an act by the defendant in the use of process other than such as would be proper in the regular prosecution of the claim; (3) a primary motive by the defendant in misusing the process to accomplish an illegitimate end; and (4) damages.
Id. ¶ 17. To sustain an action for malicious abuse of process, “there must be both a misuse of the power of the judiciary by a litigant and a malicious motive.” Id.
A. Standard of Review
{18} Weststar challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the jury’s verdict. In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the verdict, we resolve all disputes of facts and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the prevailing party. Las Cruces Prof'l Fire Fighters v. Las Cruces, 1997-NMCA-044, ¶ 12, 123 N.M. 329, 940 P.2d 177. We do not reweigh the evidence and do not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder. Id. “The question is not whether substantial evidence exists to support the opposite result, but rather whether such evidence supports the result reached.” Id. Under the traditional standard of appellate review applicable to this ease, we disregard all evidence and inferences unfavorable to the jury’s verdict. See Tallman v. ABF (Arkansas Best Freight), 108 N.M. 124, 126-27, 767 P.2d 363, 365-66 (Ct.App.1988). The dissent does not appear to take this admonition to “disregard” unfavorable evidence and inferences to heart.
B. Initiation or Procurement of Judicial Proceedings
{19} Weststar asserts two challenges to the jury’s finding that it initiated or procured the criminal prosecution of Jackson: (1) the court erred in instructing the jury that it could hold Weststar liable for procuring, rather than initiating, the prosecution; and (2) Weststar could not be held liable as a matter of law because Detective Boutelle conducted an independent investigation of the allegations against Jackson and the district attorney made the ultimate decision to prosecute. We conclude that the jury was properly instructed and the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the decision to prosecute Jackson was made at the request and insistence of Weststar.
1. Jury Instruction
{20} The jury was instructed that Jackson bore the burden of proving that “Weststar initiated or procured criminal proceedings against Jackson.” Weststar’s challenge to this instruction focuses on the absence of the term “procured” from the definition of malicious abuse of process given by our Supreme Court in DeVaney. See 1998-NMSC-001, ¶ 17, 124 N.M. 512, 953 P.2d 277. We reject Weststar’s argument. Although DeVaney changed the law of malicious prosecution and abuse of process by merging the torts into one cause of action, the cases addressing the separate torts are still helpful in our analysis of the requirements of the unified tort. This is particularly true in a case such as the one at bar, where the claim arises from a criminal prosecution rather than a civil claim as was at issue in DeVaney. See id. ¶ 4.
{21} New Mexico cases involving liability for a criminal prosecution have consistently defined the first element of malicious abuse of the criminal process as requiring proof that the “ ‘defendant initiated, or procured the institution of, criminal proceedings against plaintiff without probable cause.’” Johnson v. Weast, 1997-NMCA-066, ¶ 19, 123 N.M. 470, 943 P.2d 117 (quoting Zamora v. Creamland Dairies, Inc., 106 N.M. 628, 632, 747 P.2d 923, 927 (Ct.App.1987)) (emphasis added). The inclusion of the term “procured” in assessing liability is consistent with the Restatement of Torts, on which our cases have relied in defining the elements of the tort. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 653 (1976). “[0]ne who procures a third person to institute criminal proceedings against another is liable under the same conditions as though he had himself initiated the proceedings.” Id. cmt. d.
2. Initiation or Procurement
{22} When a malicious abuse of process claim is predicated on a criminal prosecution, the evidence must show that a complainant took an active part in instigating or encouraging the prosecution before the complainant may be held liable. Zamora, 106 N.M. at 633, 747 P.2d at 928. If a complainant gives a prosecutor information believed to be true, “and the officer, in the exercise of his uncontrolled discretion, initiates proceedings based on that information, the informer is not liable.” Id. at 632, 747 P.2d at 927. “‘There can be no liability where the prosecuting officer relies upon his own investigation and upon information furnished by others than defendant or where defendant has himself fairly disclosed, and it is left to the officer’s own discretion, judgment and responsibility as to whether there shall be a prosecution.’ ” Id. (quoting Hughes v. Van Bruggen, 44 N.M. 534, 540, 105 P.2d 494, 498 (1940)).
{23} Weststar argues that the evidence was undisputed that it provided information that it believed to be true and that Boutelle conducted his own investigation. We disagree. First, we note that evidence was presented that Inman told Boutelle that Jackson admitted removing the money from his bank account in order to prevent the bank from correcting its error and that Jackson refused to return the money. However, Jackson testified that he removed the money from his bank account and purchased the CD to insure that he did not accidently spend the money by mingling it with his own funds. In addition, the letter upon which Inman based his statement that Jackson refused to return the money was actually an offer to settle the dispute and explained why Jackson and his attorney believed that Jackson might be entitled to keep a portion of the disputed funds. Under these circumstances, a jury could infer that Weststar had provided Boutelle with misleading information.
{24} Second, we disagree with Weststar’s characterization of Boutelle’s investigation as independent. From the record, it appears that Boutelle’s investigation consisted of requesting additional documentation from Weststar and perhaps requesting documents from Norwest Bank. However, neither Boutelle nor the district attorney were able to secure records from Norwest. As such, the prosecution was based solely on the information provided by Weststar. This lack of independent investigation and corroboration is in marked contrast to the facts of Zamora, on which Weststar relies in its brief in chief. In Zamora, the defendants provided an investigative report to the police and filed an offense report at the request of the police. 106 N.M. at 632-33, 747 P.2d at 927-28. During their investigation of the defendants’ allegations, the police interviewed twelve people other than the defendants. In addition, in deciding to prosecute, the district attorney relied on the results of the police investigation and used a confidential informant in connection with the case. Id. In this case, Boutelle’s investigation was based solely on information provided by Weststar, and the evidence suggests that the district attorney’s decision to prosecute was based solely on Boutelle’s representation of the facts as provided by Weststar and included in the police report. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the investigation by Boutelle was not independent of Weststar.
{25} Nonetheless, Weststar suggests that, to hold a complainant liable for initiating a criminal prosecution, the evidence must show that the complainant exercised undue influence upon the prosecuting authorities so as to effectively usurp the authorities’ discretion. We disagree. A complainant who persuades, requests, directs, or pressures prosecuting authorities to proceed with a prosecution can be regarded in proper circumstances as initiating the prosecution and be held liable for it. See id. at 633, 747 P.2d at 928; Kurschus v. PaineWebber, Inc., 16 F.Supp.2d 386, 392 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (“Under New York law, the minimum action necessary to sustain a claim of malicious prosecution is a request by a defendant that the authorities prosecute a plaintiff.”); Conway v. Smerling, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 1, 635 N.E.2d 268, 271 (1994) (holding that defendants who repeatedly inquired into progress of criminal investigation had initiated or procured criminal proceedings for the purposes of a malicious prosecution claim); W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 119, at 873 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter Prosser & Keeton).
{26} Viewed in the light most favorable to Jackson, the evidence of Weststar’s participation in the criminal proceedings supports a finding that Weststar procured the prosecution of Jackson. When Lynch first met with Boutelle, Lynch indicated that Weststar hoped to avoid proceeding with a criminal complaint, but would do so if Jackson did not cooperate by repaying the money. Based on this testimony, the jury could reasonably conclude that Lynch intended that the decision to proceed with the criminal investigation be left to Weststar. This understanding was confirmed by Boutelle when he assured Lynch that he would not proceed with the investigation unless instructed to do so. The following day, Inman called Boutelle for the express purpose of asking Boutelle to commence the prosecution. When Inman made this phone call, the evidence shows that he knew that the prosecution would not proceed without direction from Weststar. As Boutelle testified, “It is my understanding [that] Lori Lynch had called Gary [Inman], who is her supervisor, and relayed to him what my advice to her was, that I needed the authorization to keep going with this. And Gary, as the supervisor, called me back and he said, Yes, we do want to pursue this.’ ” Clearly, Weststar did more than merely provide information to the police. Under these facts, we cannot say as a matter of law that Wests-tar’s desire to have the proceedings initiated was not the determining factor in Boutelle’s decision to commence the prosecution. Cf. Zamora, 106 N.M. at 632-33, 747 P.2d at 927-28 (holding that defendants had not procured prosecution given district attorney’s statement that “the decision [to prosecute] was made solely by the district attorney’s office, without any encouragement, recommendation, direction, or pressure of any kind from the defendants”); Hughes, 44 N.M. at 537, 105 P.2d at 496 (finding no procurement where the record indicated that there was “no evidence to show that defendant himself initiated the action or that he advised or counselled (sic) with the District Attorney or any other person suggesting, even, that there should be a prosecution”).
C. Probable Cause
{27} Weststar argues that the trial court erred in not finding, as a matter of law, that Weststar had probable cause to believe that Jackson had committed a criminal offense. Weststar asserts that, in all cases, probable cause is an issue to be determined by the trial court and not the jury. We disagree that probable cause is necessarily an issue to be determined by a trial court and conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Weststar lacked probable cause in this case.
{28} In DeVaney, the Court held that “the filing of a proper complaint with probable cause, and without any overt misuse of process, will not subject a litigant to liability for malicious abuse of process, even if it is the result of a malicious motive.” 1998-NMSC-001, ¶ 20, 124 N.M. 512, 953 P.2d 277. Probable cause is defined as “the reasonable belief, founded on known facts established after a reasonable pre-filing investigation, that a claim can be established to the satisfaction of a court or jury.” Id. ¶ 22 (citation & footnote omitted).
{29} If the facts surrounding the initiation of process are in dispute, the question of probable cause is properly left to the jury. See id. ¶ 41; see also Stanley v. Webber, 260 Va. 90, 531 S.E.2d 311, 314-15 (2000); Brown v. Nationsbank Corp., 188 F.3d 579, 586 (5th Cir.1999); Lee v. Southland Corp., 219 Va. 23, 244 S.E.2d 756, 758-59 (1978) (reversing trial court’s determination of probable cause as a matter of law where evidence of plaintiffs intent in breaking door was disputed). In this case, the record indicates that the facts surrounding Inman’s decision to request that Boutelle pursue criminal charges, and the inferences to be drawn from those facts, were in dispute. As such, it was up to the jury to weigh the evidence and resolve the conflicts.
{30} Weststar argues that probable cause was established as a matter of law based on the “undisputed” facts that Jackson knew the extra money wired into his account did not belong to him, purchased the CD to deny Weststar access to the money, and, for a period of time, refused to return the money when requested to do so. We disagree that the facts upon which Weststar relies were undisputed. More importantly, however, the critical question in determining the existence of probable cause is not what Jackson knew or intended, but whether Weststar had a reasonable belief, founded on known facts established after a reasonable pre-filing investigation, that Jackson had committed a criminal offense. See DeVaney, 1998-NMSC-001, ¶ 22, 124 N.M. 512, 953 P.2d 277. In evaluating Weststar’s belief that Jackson had committed larceny, we look to the facts as they appeared at the time Inman directed Boutelle to pursue the prosecution.
{31} It is undisputed that Jackson was not responsible for the money being mistakenly deposited into his account. Although Jackson did not report the mistake to Weststar until after he was contacted by Lynch, he acknowledged that he was in possession of the money and initially indicated a willingness to return it to Weststar. When the CD matured in August, Jackson did not tell Weststar he would not return the money. Rather, he informed the company that he had retained counsel and directed Weststar to communicate with him through the attorney, as he apparently had been instructed to do by the attorney. Jackson’s attorney then indicated that Jackson was seeking a way to keep the money, but that the attorney would respond to Weststar’s demand letter.
{32} Inman’s decision to prosecute Jackson for larceny was based on the letter sent to Weststar by Jackson’s attorney. In this letter, the attorney indicated that Jackson had expended a portion of Weststar’s money in reliance on Weststar’s representations that the money had been properly wired into Jackson’s account. The attorney acknowledged that Jackson did not have the entire balance demanded by Weststar, but offered $3,000 to settle the matter without civil action. In his closing, the attorney stated: “Please consider this offer as an attempt to settle this matter in an amicable and expeditious matter [sic]. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.” Based on these facts, the jury could have properly concluded that a reasonable person would not have believed that Jackson was guilty of a criminal offense.
{33} Weststar argues that, notwithstanding the foregoing, we should find that it had probable cause as a matter of law because Boutelle, the district attorney, the magistrate judge who issued the warrant for Jackson’s arrest, and the committing magistrate all believed that probable cause existed. In some circumstances, reliance on the advice of a district attorney or a commitment by a magistrate may be enough to establish probable cause as a matter of law. See Restatement, supra, §§ 663, 666. Nonetheless, under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that a jury could find that the beliefs of the district attorney and the magistrate were based on incomplete knowledge of the material facts known to Weststar. “In determining what, if any, weight should be given to the commitment by a magistrate, the court should take into account evidence that the commitment ... was procured by false testimony offered by the prosecutor or given in his behalf, or by his withholding of material evidence known to him.” Restatement, supra, § 663 cmt. h; see also Chandler v. United States, 875 F.Supp. 1250, 1269 (N.D.Tex.1994) (indicating that a complainant may be shielded from liability by the actions of a public prosecutor only if the complainant makes a full and fair disclosure of material facts known to the complainant).
{34} Boutelle’s police report includes both incomplete and misleading statements of facts:
Lori presented a copy of a Certified Letter sent to Ken Jackson after several phone calls to him could not get him to cooperate with correcting this mistake. Lori said Ken first denied any knowledge of receiving that much money, but later changed his story to “well I guess it was my lucky day, huh.” Lori said Ken told her he did not have the money because it was tied up somewhere else, and he would work on trying to get it back to them sometime.
Gary advised their attorney Tom Marek (Carlsbad) received a letter from Ken Jackson’s attorney Mike Carrasco (Carlsbad) basically stating that Jackson would not be returning the misguided monies he received____ Gary said during contacts from Lori, Ken Jackson acknowledged that he knew what he was doing when he took that money out of his account so the bank could not reclaim it, but Ken would not tell Lori where the money is now hidden.
{35} Without a full disclosure of all material facts known by Weststar at the time it procured the prosecution of Jackson, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that Weststar had probable cause to initiate those proceedings. See id. at 1269-70 (concluding that complainant lacked probable cause due to complainant’s failure to make a frill and fair disclosure during grand jury proceedings).
D. Jackson’s Guilt and Termination of Criminal Proceedings
{36} Weststar argues that Jackson’s guilt and the fact the criminal proceedings did not terminate in Jackson’s favor preclude a finding of malicious abuse of process. First, the DeVaney opinion explicitly rejects the requirement that a proceeding terminate in favor of the malicious-abuse-of-process plaintiff. 1998-NMSC-001, ¶23, 124 N.M. 512, 953 P.2d 277 (“[F]avorable termination is not an element of an action for malicious abuse of process----”). Second, we disagree that Jackson was guilty of larceny as a matter of law.
{37} To hold Jackson criminally liable for larceny, the State would bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson “took and carried away” the money belonging to Weststar and that at the time of the taking, Jackson intended to permanently deprive Weststar of its money. See UJI 14-1601 NMRA 2001. “‘Carried away* means moving the property from the place where it was kept or placed by the owner.” UJI 14-1603 NMRA 2001. “Generally one who innocently receives an overpayment of money by mistake is not guilty of larceny if, after discovering the mistake, he converts the excess moneys to his own use, but the rule is otherwise if he receives the overpayment knowingly with intent at the time of the overpayment to convert the excess.” 52A C.J.S. Larceny § 29(c) (1968); see also Cook v. State, 196 Tenn. 104, 264 S.W.2d 571, 572 (1954) (stating that common law larceny includes situation in which defendant receives more money than was intended, defendant knows of the mistake at the time of delivery, and defendant intends to keep the money); State v. Woll, 35 Wash.App. 560, 668 P.2d 610, 613 (1983) (stating that common law larceny includes the wrongful appropriation of mistakenly delivered property if, upon receipt, the recipient knew that the property was mistakenly delivered and at that time formed the intent to keep it).
{38} Based on the evidence introduced at trial, a reasonable jury could conclude that Jackson was innocent of the crime of larceny. Whether Jackson ever intended to permanently deprive Weststar of its money was hotly disputed. Jackson testified that he removed the money from his bank account and purchased the CD to insure that he did not mistakenly spend the money before Weststar asked him to return it. If a jury believed Jackson’s testimony, it would necessarily acquit Jackson of larceny because Jackson lacked the intent to permanently deprive Weststar of its money at the time the money was “carried away” from the bank account and placed in the CD. See UJIs 14-1601, -1608. Similarly, if the State attempted to prove that Jackson committed larceny when he cashed the CD and deposited the money into a different account, Jackson could have raised the defense of good faith reliance on the advice of counsel. See United States v. Butler, 211 F.3d 826, 833 (4th Cir.2000) (describing elements of advice-of-counsel defense as (1) full disclosure of all material facts to the attorney and (2) good faith reliance on the attorney’s advice); United States v. Cross, 113 F.Supp.2d 1253, 1262-63 (S.D.Ind.2000) (stating that advice-of-counsel defense applies to specific intent crimes and describing elements of defense). Under these circumstances, we reject Weststar’s contention that Jackson was guilty of larceny as a matter of law.
E. Misuse of Process
{39} Even if a complainant initiated proceedings with probable cause, the complainant may nonetheless be held liable for malicious abuse of process if the evidence shows that the complainant misused the process “through some irregularity or impropriety suggesting extortion, delay, or harassment[J” DeVaney, 1998-NMSC-001, ¶ 28, 124 N.M. 512, 953 P.2d 277. The act giving rise to liability for misuse of process need not be improper per se. See id. ¶ 48. Instead, a factfinder must evaluate the act or acts in context and in light of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether they were improper. See id. ¶¶ 49-50.
{40} “ ‘[A] demand for collateral advantage that occurs before the issuance of process may be actionable, so long as process does in fact issue at the defendant’s behest, and as part of the attempted extortion.’ ” Id. ¶20 (quoting Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 121, at 898). It is well established that an action for malicious abuse of process may arise out of the use of a criminal prosecution for the purpose of debt collection. See generally Annotation, Use of Criminal Process to Collect Debt as Abuse of Process, 27 A.L.R.3d 1202, 1205-06 (1969). “[I]t has been held to be an improper use of criminal process for the creditor, or an officer of the law acting in concert with the creditor, to demand payment of a debt as a condition of the debtor’s avoiding arrest, or further confinement, or further proceedings in a criminal prosecution.” Palmer Ford, Inc. v. Wood, 298 Md. 484, 471 A.2d 297, 311 (1984).
{41} After sending Jackson a demand letter threatening legal action, Wests-tar contacted Boutelle to investigate the possibility of prosecuting Jackson. In this meeting, Lynch explained to Boutelle that Weststar hoped to avoid criminal action, but could only do so if Jackson repaid the money. Boutelle then called Jackson’s attorney while Lynch was still in the room, and he conveyed Weststar’s message that the only way for Jackson to avoid criminal prosecution was to resolve the dispute with Weststar. “There is, in other words, a form of extortion, and it is what is done in the course of negotiation, rather than the issuance or any formal use of the process itself, which constitutes the tort.” Prosser and Keeton, supra, at 898. Given the facts of this case, a reasonable jury could conclude that Boutelle was acting on behalf of Weststar and therefore Weststar should be charged with Boutelle’s action. Contrary to Weststar’s argument that it could not be charged with Boutelle’s action unless there was a formal, legal, agency relationship, we believe that the elements of the tort, particularly those discussed above in the “Initiation or Procurement” section of this opinion, permit Weststar to be charged with all conduct it initiated or procured. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Weststar used the criminal prosecution of Jackson to compel Jackson to return the money owed to Weststar.
F. Primary Improper Motive
{42} “Under the requirement of a primary improper motive, it is insufficient that the malicious-abuse-of-process defendant acted with ill will or spite. There must be a purpose to accomplish an illegitimate end.” DeVaney, 1998-NMSC-001, ¶ 29, 124 N.M. 512, 953 P.2d 277 (internal citations omitted). In the context of a criminal prosecution, an improper motive may be proven with evidence that the prosecution was “initiated primarily for a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice.” Zamora, 106 N.M. at 632, 747 P.2d at 927. The Restatement makes it clear that using the criminal process to compel another to pay a debt, even if the debt is owed, constitutes a misuse of process:
Since the only proper purpose for which criminal proceedings can be initiated is that of bringing an offender to justice and thereby aiding in the enforcement of the criminal law, it follows that one who initiates the proceedings to force the accused to pay money or to turn over land or chattels to the accuser, does not act for a proper purpose. This is true although the money is lawfully owed to the accuser or the thing in question has been unlawfully ■withheld or taken from him, so that relief, might have been secured in appropriate civil proceedings.
Restatement, supra, § 668 cmt. g.
{43} In this case, it is unnecessary for us to infer an improper motive because Jackson presented direct evidence that Weststar initiated the criminal proceedings to collect the money from Jackson and not for the purpose of bringing Jackson to justice. When Lynch met with Boutelle she admitted that Weststar just wanted its money back and would prefer to avoid a criminal trial. Boutelle also testified that he understood that Weststar would have and could have dropped the criminal charges had Jackson repaid the money. While we agree with Weststar that it was reasonable and legitimate for it to seek the return of its money, the criminal process was not a proper avenue for it to seek this result. See Restatement, supra, § 668 cmt. d (including as an improper purpose “when the proceedings are initiated for the purpose of obtaining a private advantage even though the advantage might legitimately have been obtained in civil proceedings”). We conclude that substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Weststar acted with an improper motive.
II. Jury Instructions
{44} Weststar challenges the validity of the jury instructions on several grounds. In particular, Weststar argues that (1) the jury should not have been instructed on elements of malicious abuse of process because the evidence was insufficient to support the claim; (2) the instructions improperly left the determination of probable cause to the jury rather than to the court; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to the meaning of “initiated or procured criminal proceedings,” “probable cause,” and “extortion.”
{45} We have already disposed of Weststar’s first two points of error. We decline to reach Weststar’s third point of error because Weststar failed to preserve the issue. See Baxter v. Gannaway, 113 N.M. 45, 50, 822 P.2d 1128, 1133 (Ct.App.1991). Weststar concedes that it failed to preserve the issue, but urges us to nonetheless consider the issue because the “trial court had an independent duty to define legal terms and terms of art used in its instructions.” We reject this argument. The cases cited by Weststar to support its contention that failure to instruct on legal terms is an exception to the general requirements of preservation do not support Weststar’s position. In all of these cases, the appellant had requested that the trial court provide definitional instructions and the trial court had refused to do so. See, e.g., Epperly v. Johnson, 734 N.E.2d 1066, 1074 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (“It is generally error for a trial court to refuse to define in its instructions technical and legal phrases relevant to material issues of a lawsuit if it is properly requested to do so.”) (internal quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted). Even in criminal cases in which the trial court’s duty to instruct is arguably more important, it is not reversible error for a trial court to fail to give definitional instructions unless they are requested. See State v. Tarango, 105 N.M. 592, 599, 734 P.2d 1275, 1282 (Ct.App.1987), overruled on other grounds by Zurla v. State, 109 N.M. 640, 645, 789 P.2d 588, 593 (1990). Because Weststar neither tendered instructions defining the terms at issue nor requested that the trial court provide such definitions, we will not consider Weststar’s argument on appeal. See Bassett v. Bassett, 110 N.M. 559, 563, 798 P.2d 160, 164 (1990).
III. Punitive Damages
{46} Weststar contends that, even if the evidence was sufficient to find it liable for malicious abuse of process, the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s award of punitive damages. We disagree.
{47} An award of punitive damages may be sustained on appeal only if the evidence shows a culpable state of mind. Allsup’s Convenience Stores, Inc. v. N. River Ins. Co., 1999-NMSC-006, ¶ 53, 127 N.M. 1, 976 P.2d 1. We require “the presence of aggravated conduct beyond that necessary to establish the basic cause of action in order to impose punitive damages.” Teague-Strebeck Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Ins. Co., 1999-NMCA-109, ¶ 78, 127 N.M. 603, 985 P.2d 1183 (order on motion for rehearing). Punitive damages may be awarded only when the evidence shows that the wrongdoer’s conduct was malicious, willful, reckless, wanton, fraudulent, or in bad faith. See UJI13-1827 NMRA 2001. In this case, the jury was instructed that it must find that Weststar acted maliciously, willfully, recklessly, or wantonly before it could award punitive damages to Jackson. “Willful conduct is the intentional doing of an act with knowledge that harm may result.” Id. “Recklessness requires indifference to the rights of the victim, rather than knowledge that the conduct will violate those rights.” Kennedy v. Deotter Consol. Schs., 2000-NMSC-025, ¶ 32, 129 N.M. 436, 10 P.3d 115.
{48} The financial and emotional costs of wrongfully being the subject of criminal proceedings are obvious. Viewed in the light most favorable to the award, the evidence shows that Weststar acted with utter indifference to Jackson’s right to be free from such a needless intrusion. In meeting with Boutelle, Weststar, at the very least, portrayed the facts known to it in the light most unfavorable to Jackson, and, at worst, misrepresented those facts. Weststar knew that Jackson’s belief that he might be entitled to keep paid; of the money was based on the advice of an attorney, and the evidence shows that Weststar’s decision to prosecute Jackson was based on its fear that Jackson and his attorney would defend against a civil action. By misusing the criminal process to gain an advantage in its negotiations for the return of the money, Weststar acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind to warrant an award of punitive damages.
{49} Weststar also raises a general challenge to the amount of the punitive damages award. In determining whether a damages award is excessive, we do not reweigh the evidence, but instead determine whether the award is excessive as a matter of law. Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999-NMSC-013, ¶ 49, 127 N.M. 47, 976 P.2d 999. On appeal, Weststar bears the burden of showing that the award was infected with “ ‘passion, prejudice, partiality, sympathy, undue influence, or some corrupt cause or motive.' ” Id. ¶ 51 (quoting Allsup’s Convenience Stores, Inc., 1999-NMSC-006, ¶ 19, 127 N.M. 1, 976 P.2d 1). As we discussed above, Weststar’s belief in Jackson’s guilt was unreasonable given that Jackson never refused to return the money and was in the midst of negotiating with Weststar when it decided to procure the criminal prosecution. As a result of Weststar’s actions, Jackson was arrested twice and suffered stress in his marriage. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the award is “ ‘so unrelated to the injury and actual damages proven as to plainly manifest passion and prejudice rather than reason or justice.’” Id. ¶53 (quoting Chavez-Rey v. Miller, 99 N.M. 377, 379, 658 P.2d 452, 454 (Ct.App.1982)). Because Weststar has presented nothing to demonstrate that the jury was somehow corrupted or unduly influenced, we conclude that the award is not excessive as a matter of law.
III. Post-Judgment Interest
{50} Jackson appeals the trial court’s refusal to award post-judgment interest on the punitive damages portion of his award. Weststar recognizes that Jackson asserted his right to post-judgment interest below, but argues that Jackson has changed the basis of his claim on appeal and urges us not to consider his appeal for this reason. Wests-tar asserts that Jackson’s argument below was essentially that post-judgment interest is different from pre-judgment interest and therefore that Weidler v. Big J Enterprises, Inc., 1998-NMCA-021, ¶ 55, 124 N.M. 591, 953 P.2d 1089, in which we held that prejudgment interest could not be awarded on punitive damages, was not controlling on the issue of post-judgment interest. On appeal, Jackson argues that post-judgment interest is mandatory under Section 56-8-4(A). The fact that pre-judgment interest is discretionary while post-judgment interest is mandatory is one of the major differences between the two forms of interest. Because Jackson’s cross-appeal raises a purely legal issue and requires us to analyze the post-judgment interest statute in light of the Weidler opinion, we conclude that the issue was properly preserved and will reach it on the merits. To do otherwise would require an overly technical application of the rules of preservation. See Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. La Farge, 119 N.M. 532, 540-41, 893 P.2d 428, 436-37 (1995).
{51} Weststar makes two arguments in support of the trial court’s denial of post-judgment interest on the punitive damages award. First, Weststar argues that post-judgment interest does not apply to punitive damages as a matter of law under our decision in Weidler. Second, if post-judgment interest is held to apply to punitive damages, Weststar argues that the award of interest is within the discretion of the trial court and the court did not abuse its discretion in this case. We reject both contentions and conclude that the trial court erred in denying post-judgment interest on the punitive damages award.
A. Weidler v. Big J Enterprises
{52} In Weidler, we held that pre-judgment interest does not apply to awards of punitive damages for two reasons. First, we noted that while pre-judgment interest serves to prevent undue delay and to compensate a plaintiff for the deprivation of just compensation for the wrong suffered, punitive damages serve to punish a defendant for prior bad acts and to deter the defendant from such acts in the future. 1998-NMCA-021, ¶¶ 52-53, 124 N.M. 591, 953 P.2d 1089. Because punitive damages are a “windfall conferred upon an otherwise fully compensated plaintiff’ and are a penalty to be determined by the jury, we concluded that “[ajdding pre-judgment interest to a punitive damages award would change what the jury determined to be appropriate punishment and, thus, undermine the principles of punitive damages.” Id. ¶ 53. Second, we noted that the compensatory purpose of pre-judgment interest is at odds with punitive damages, insofar as a plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages. See id. ¶ 54.
{53} By contrast, the purpose of post-judgment interest is to compensate the prevailing party for the deprivation of its judgment money and to discourage parties from pursuing meritless appeals. See, e.g., Brinn v. Tidewater Transp. Dist. Comm’n, 113 F.Supp.2d 935, 938 (E.D.Va.2000). As such, the rationale behind this Court’s denial of pre-judgment interest on punitive damages does not have much force. Once judgment has been entered on a verdict awarding punitive damages, the plaintiff becomes entitled to the punitive damages award to the same extent as the plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages. Awarding post-judgment interest on the full award, therefore, compensates the plaintiff for the deprivation of money owed and encourages the defendant to expeditiously pay the judgment debt. We conclude that once a punitive damages award has been incorporated into a judgment, it becomes a judgment for the payment of money and the award of post-judgment interest is mandatory. See Sunwest Bank v. Colucci, 117 N.M. 373, 379, 872 P.2d 346, 352 (1994); Bustos v. Bustos, 2000-NMCA-040, ¶¶ 20-21, 128 N.M. 842, 999 P.2d 1074; but see Gonzales v. N.M. Dep’t of Health, 2000-NMSC-029, ¶ 38, 129 N.M. 586, 11 P.3d 550
B. Post-Judgment Interest Mandatory Under Section 56-8-4(A)
{54} Weststar cites to Gonzales, in support of its argument that an award of post-judgment interest is within the discretion of the trial court. We disagree that Gonzales stands for this proposition. The issue before the Supreme Court in Gonzales was whether a section of the Human Rights Act, NMSA 1978, § 28-l-13(D) (1969, as amended through 1987, prior to 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2000 amendments) was a statutory exception to the general rule that the state is exempt from an award of pre- or post-judgment interest under Section 56-8-4. See Gonzales, 2000-NMSC-029, ¶ 37, 129 N.M. 586, 11 P.3d 550. In reaching the conclusion that the Human Rights Act does not create such an exception, the Supreme Court noted that “an interest award under Section 56-8-4 is not an absolute right, but rather is a matter to be left to the discretion of the trial court.” Id. ¶ 38. However, the basis for the Court’s holding was that Section 28-l-13(D) does not list judgment interest as an award for which “the state shall be liable the same as a private person.” Id. ¶ 38. Because Section 28-l-13(D) does not explicitly conflict with Section 56-8-4(A), and the plaintiff in Gonzales offered no authority for her assertion that the legislature intended to include judgment interest as an award allowed under Section 28-1-13(0), the Court held that it would not expand Section 28-1-13(0) to allow such interest. Id. ¶38. As such, the Court’s general statement regarding the discretionary nature of Section 56-8-4 was not necessary to reach its conclusion, is therefore dicta, and is not binding on this Court except in cases like Gonzales involving Section 28-1-13(D). See Ruggles v. Ruggles, 116 N.M. 52, 59-60 n. 8, 860 P.2d 182, 189-90 n. 8 (1993). .
{55} Our conclusion is supported by the, facts that the seminal case of Sunwest Bank was not cited and that the cases on which the Supreme Court relied were cases dealing with interest as an element of damages under NMSA 1953, § 50-6-3 (Repl.1962), now NMSA 1978, § 56-8-3 (1983), and not Section 56-8-4(A). See Kennedy v. Moutray, 91 N.M. 205, 206, 572 P.2d 933, 934 (1977); Trujillo v. Beaty Elec. Co., 91 N.M. 533, 538, 577 P.2d 431, 436 (Ct.App.1978). Prior to 1983, the award of interest was left to the discretion of the trial court, and the statutes merely set the interest rates applicable to various causes of action and judgments. See § 50-6-3, NMSA 1953, § 50-6-4 (Repl.1962), now § 56-8-4. In 1983, however, the law was amended such that the award of prejudgment interest under Sections 56-8-3 and 56-8-4(B) remained within the discretion of the trial court, but post-judgment interest under Section 56-8-4(A) became mandatory. See 1983 N.M. Laws, eh. 254, §§ 1-2. As such, although Kennedy and Trujillo remain good law with respect to awards of prejudgment interest under Sections 56-8-3 and 56-8-4(B), they are inapplicable to Section 56-8-4(A). See Sunwest Bank, 117 N.M. at 377-79, 872 P.2d at 350-52 (extensively discussing the distinctions between interest awards under Sections 56-8-3, 56-8-4(A), and 56-8-4(B) and holding interest under Section 56-8-4(A) to be mandatory).
CONCLUSION
{56} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment against Weststar and the awards of compensatory and punitive damages to Jackson. We reverse the trial court on its failure to award post-judgment interest on the punitive damages award and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
{57} IT IS SO ORDERED.
I CONCUR: IRA ROBINSON, Judge. JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge (dissenting in part and concurring in part).