specially concurring in part and concurring in the result in part.
I concur in Part I, II, III, V, VI, and VII of the majority opinion.
*33A. Punitive Damages
I concur in Part III. C. of the majority opinion regarding punitive damages. I write only to add an additional comment. The jury could have found, based upon the evidence, that Wendel made sexual advances towards Gunter and decided to retaliate when she rebuffed his advances. In order to retaliate, he, as the managing agent of Mountain West, wrongfully terminated its lease with Gunter and induced Murphy’s Lounge to wrongfully terminate both of its leases with her. The jury could also have found under the evidence that Murphy’s Lounge, through its managing agent Beverly, knew that there was no cause for the termination and that it was done wrongfully in retaliation for Gunter’s rebuff of Wendel’s sexual advances. Finally, the jury could have found that Wendel, Mountain West, and Murphy’s Lounge acted with knowledge of the likely consequences of then conduct, which was the termination of Gunter’s means of support. In summary, the jury could have found that the conduct of these defendants was an extreme deviation from standards of reasonable conduct done with knowledge of its likely effects, which supports an award of punitive damages. Myers v. Workmen’s Auto. Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 95 P.3d 977 (2004); Linscott v. Rainier Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 854, 606 P.2d 958 (1980).
B. Motion for a New Trial Because of Excessive Damages
I concur in the result in Part IV of the majority opinion. Gunter’s complaint alleged two causes of action: breach of contract and tortious interference with contract. In the special verdict, the jury was instructed to award damages for each claim, and it awarded $18,000 for the breach of contract and $18,000 for the tortious interference with contract. The district court initially added those two sums together and entered judgment for $36,000 in compensatory damages plus the $75,000 in punitive damages, for a total of $111,000. The defendants then moved for a new trial alleging, among other things, that the jury had awarded excessive damages that appeared to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. The district court found that “the jury awarded a double damage,” and it conditionally ordered a new trial unless Gunter accepted a remittitur reducing the compensatory damages to $18,000, which she did. On appeal, the defendants argue that where the compensatory damages are cut in half, the award of punitive damages should also be vacated and retried. They rely upon Yacht Club Sales and Service, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of North Idaho, 101 Idaho 852, 623 P.2d 464 (1980), in which we held that reversal of the award of compensatory damages also required reversal of the award of punitive damages.
The defendants’ argument, and the district court’s action, is based upon a misunderstanding of the jury verdict. The jury did not award $36,000 in compensatory damages. Gunter sought to recover the identical damages under two theories of recovery. The jury was instructed that the damages recoverable under each theory were the same. On the breach of contract claim, the district court instructed the jury that it could award as damages “[t]he amount of Shannon Gunter’s lost income for the remainder of the lease term.” On the tortious interference claim, the district court instructed the jury that it could award as damages “[t]he amount of Shannon Gunter’s lost income for the remainder of the lease term.” The district court directed the jury to award damages under each theory. Since the district court instructed the jury that the measure of damages under each theory was the same, not surprisingly the jury awarded identical damages under each theory. Its calculation of Gunter’s lost income was the same under both theories of recovery. There is nothing indicating that the jury thought it was awarding a total of $36,000 in damages, however. It was simply twice asked to calculate Gunter’s lost income, once under each theory of recovery. The only error was by the district judge in adding together the two $18,000 sums. It was the district judge, not the jury, who created the double recovery that prompted, in part, the motion for a new trial. The remittitur simply, in effect, corrected the district judge’s error. Since the damages awarded by the jury were not reduced, there is no basis for the defendants’ *34argument that the reduction in compensatory damages requires that the award of punitive damages be vacated.