dissenting:
T1 The majority holds that "the question of whether it was reasonably foreseeable that a person of Basford's training would find it necessary to use the lift without jack stands . was one of which reasonable people might differ," precluding summary judgment. The very presence of the warnings to employ jack stands, it seems to me, clearly shows that Gray indeed foresaw such a possibility, and for that reason, specifically warned against use of its jack without stands under any circumstances.
12 The defendant in a manufacturers' products' lability case is not liable for misuse of its product in an unforeseeable manner. See, eg., Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 1976 OK 106, ¶ 25, 555 P.2d 48, 57. ("A manufacturer is not liable for injuries resulting from [abnormal] use [of its product] if it is not foreseeable.") On the other hand, "where the seller has reason to anticipate that danger may result from a particular use, *1285... he [is] required to give adequate warning of the danger, and a product sold without such warning is in a defective condition. Restatement of Torts (Second), $ 402A, Comment h." Duane v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 1992 OK 97, ¶ 4, 833 P.2d 284, 286. That is: =.
A duty to warn fis] ... based upon the foreseeability that the user would use the product in that way, the type of danger involved, and foreseeability of the user's knowledge of the danger.
Id.
T3 Consequently, where a product is used in an industrial setting by one supposedly skilled at his job, a manufacturer has "no duty to warn of dangers inherent in the task or which are created by oversight or negligence of the contractor or fellow employees." Duane, 1992 OK 97, ¶ 8, 833 P.2d at 287. Moreover, a manufacturer is entitled to assume that professional users of its product will heed its warnings, and is not required to foresee that professional users will fail to read its warnings, then use the product in a manner that the manufacturer's instructions expressly warned against. Hutchins v. Silicone Specialties, Inc., 1993 OK. 70, ¶ 20, 881 P.2d 64, 67.
' 4 In the present case, the uncontroverted evidence showed that Basford was a foreseeable and knowledgeable consumer of the subject product, having admitted to training in this specific area, and having used lifts and jack stands with attendant safeties for sever-, al years. The uncontroverted evidence also showed Gray specifically warned users of its jack to employ lift stands and safeties, and Basford admitted he read and understood the warnings. The uncontroverted evidence lastly showed that Basford did not employ lift stands and specifically caused the safety to be disengaged at the time of the accident, all in violation of Gray's instructions.
T5 In short, it cannot be seriously disputed-and in my mind, reasonable persons would not differ-that Gray directed users of its products to employ lift stands in order that users of its product be protected from the obvious danger of collapse of a vehicle raised on one of its jacks. Basford admitted he appreciated this very danger of which Gray warned and which resulted in his injury.
T6 Basford argues the particular job required the use of the jack without lift stands. However, inasmuch as Gray cautioned against use of its jack without stands, Gray's jack was obviously not the right tool for the job, and Gray should not be held Hable for use of its jack in a manner contrary to the manufacturer's specific warnings of danger.
T7 The majority holds insufficient the warnings as given because the warnings did not warn of the specific, alleged defect which, according to Basford, caused the jack's failure to perform as expected. However, because the warning mandated the use of stands under any cireumstances, I would hold the warning sufficient to apprise users of the danger of the collapse of a vehicle raised on a Gray lift. The majority's construction of the warning renders any warning, however specific, defective and subject to attack, a position I cannot accept.
T8 Under the admitted circumstances of this case, I would therefore hold that Gray was entitled to assume that Basford would heed its warnings, and was not required to foresee that Basford would fail to heed its warnings and use the lift in a manner that the manufacturer's instructions expressly warned against. Gray should not be held liable for the admitted misuse of the jack without stands.
'I 9 I would consequently conclude the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Gray, and respectfully dissent to the contrary decision of the majority.