dissenting.
¶ 211 respectfully dissent from the Majority’s decision because I believe it stretches the holding in Williams too far, resulting in interpretations of A.R.S. sections 13-604.01 and 13-1304 that are contrary to legislative intent.
¶22 As the Majority notes, in order to commit a dangerous crime against children under section 13-604.01, a defendant’s conduct “must be focused on, directed against, aimed at, or target[ed] [against] a victim under the age of fifteen.” Williams, 175 Ariz. at 103, 854 P.2d at 136. The Majority goes astray, however, by deciding that commission of an offense enumerated under section 13-604.01(L) against a child under the age of fifteen years is not a dangerous crime against children if it is “incidental” to the ultimate goal of the Defendant. Consequently, the Majority concludes:
[t]he defendants intended a burglary or armed robbery. The age of anyone present, or even if anyone at all was present, was incidental to them. Thus, this case provides an example of a situation in which “[o]ne could commit an intentional crime and still not target a child as the victim.”
Majority opinion (“Maj.op.”), supra, ¶ 13 (citation omitted). This holding is unsupported by either Williams or the legislative intent underlying section 13-604.01.
¶23 The Williams court, in an apparent effort to restrict future application of its holding, stated that “[t]he issue we resolve only arises in that rare ease when, as here, an enumerated offense can be committed by unfocused actions, whether intentional, knowing or reckless in nature.” Id. at 104, 854 P .2d at 137 (emphasis added). This language makes clear that courts must determine whether an “enumerated offense,” rather than the ultimate crime, was “focused on, directed against, aimed at, or targeted]” against a child. Id. at 103-04, 854 P.2d at 136-37. The Majority errs by scrutinizing Defendant’s ultimate crime, burglary or armed robbery, to determine if Javier was a “target” rather than by examining Defendant’s actions underlying the enumerated offense of kidnapping. Analysis under the latter standard compels the conclusion that Defendant committed a dangerous crime against children.
¶ 24 As the Majority acknowledges, Defendant’s kidnapping conviction required the jury to find that he knowingly restrained Javier. A.R.S. § 13-1304. Therefore, Defendant’s act of restraint was not “reckless and unfocused,” creating a “ ‘risk to everyone around’ ” him, as in Williams and Jansing.7 Jansing, 186 Ariz. at 70, 918 P.2d at 1088 (quoting Williams, 175 Ariz. at 101, 854 P.2d at 133). Rather, when Javier was restrained, within the meaning of our kidnapping statute, he was the only one at risk and was therefore a “target” of the offense, justifying imposition of a sentence pursuant to section 13-604.01.8
¶ 25 The Majority’s holding also vitiates the clear language of section 13-604.01(L). *513Williams, 175 Ariz. at 100, 854 P.2d at 138 (A statute’s language is the best and most reliable guide of its meaning.). The legislature designated kidnapping, when committed against a minor under the age of fifteen years, as a dangerous crime against children. “Kidnapping” is defined, in relevant part, as occurring when a person knowingly restrains another person with the intent to “otherwise aid in the commission of a felony.” A.R.S. § 13-1304(A)(3). The legislature was presumptively aware of this definition of kidnapping at the time it enacted A.R.S. section 13-604.01 and thus necessarily intended such offenses to be dangerous crimes against children. Wareing v. Falk, 182 Ariz. 495, 500, 897 P.2d 1381, 1386 (App.1995) (“[T]he legislature is presumed to know existing law when it enacts a statute.”). This conclusion is more compelling here than in other cases as the legislature amended the kidnapping statute and enacted section 13-604.01 simultaneously and was therefore well aware of the breadth of kidnapping offenses enumerated as dangerous crimes against children. 1985 Ariz.Sess.Laws, ch. 346, §§ 4, 15 (amending §§ 13-604.01 and 13-1304, respectively). Thus, the legislature specifically included a kidnapping committed in aid of an armed robbery, and against a minor under fifteen years of age, within the definition of a dangerous crime against children. Phrased another way, such kidnappings are dangerous crimes against children even when committed “incidentally” to the perpetrator’s ultimate felony objective.
¶ 26 By contrast, the legislature designated only certain types of aggravated assaults committed against minors under fifteen years of age as dangerous crimes against children. A.R.S. § 13-604.01(L)(l)(b). The legislature’s failure to similarly except kidnappings accomplished to aid the commission of other felonies further evidences an intent that such kidnappings are dangerous crimes against children. State v. Averyt, 179 Ariz. 123, 129, 876 P.2d 1158, 1164 (App.1994) (court cannot interpret statute to insert words of limitation that legislature has expressly omitted).
¶ 27 The Majority further opines that “something more than the mere age of the victim” must be present in order to trigger sentencing enhancement under section 13-604.01(D) or the “enhancement” language contained in the kidnapping statute would be rendered superfluous. Maj. op., supra, ¶¶ 15, 18. I disagree because the kidnapping statute does not enhance the sentence if the victim is under fifteen years of age, and the cited language is therefore not superfluous. Kidnapping is a class 2 felony regardless of the age of the victim. A.R.S. § 13-1304(B). However, the statute lists two circumstances that serve to change the designation of the offense to a class 3 or class 4 felony. Id . But the legislature excepted from these circumstances cases in which the victim is under fifteen years of age, stating that the offense remains a “class 2 felony punishable pursuant to § 13-604.01.” A.R.S. § 13-1304(B). Unlike the aggravated assault statute at issue in Williams, which increases the felony designation if the victim was under fifteen years of age, the kidnapping statute merely maintains as a class 2 felony all kidnappings committed against children under the age of fifteen. Consequently, the kidnapping statute does not “enhance” the sentence for offenders who kidnap children under the age of fifteen, and designating such offenses as dangerous crimes against children does not render any language in section 13-1304(B) superfluous.
¶ 28 Even assuming that section 13-1304(B) “enhances” the sentence for perpetrators who kidnap children under the age of fifteen, the Majority’s holding is undercut by reference to other offenses enumerated under section 13-604.01(L) involving sexual and physical acts committed against children. The statutes outlining these offenses use language similar to the kidnapping classification language at issue.9 State v. Thomason, 162 *514Ariz. 363, 366, 783 P.2d 809, 812 (App.1989) (“A statute should be explained in conjunction with other statutes which relate to the same subject or have the same general purpose.”) (citing State ex rel. Larson v. Farley, 106 Ariz. 119, 471 P.2d 731 (1970)); see also Goulder v. Arizona Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Din, 177 Ariz. 414, 416, 868 P.2d 997, 999 (App.1993) (the goal is to achieve consistency between the statutes). For example, although taking a child for the purpose of prostitution is a class 4 felony, if the child is under the age of fifteen years, the offense is enhanced to “a class 2 felony and is punishable pursuant to § 13-604.01.” A.R.S. § 13-3206 (Supp.1999). Under the Majority’s reasoning, this offense, like kidnapping, would not constitute a dangerous crime against children if it was committed “incidentally” to an ultimate goal of the perpetrator. Such an interpretation should be avoided as it is clearly contrary to the legislative purpose of protecting children from such crimes, incidental or otherwise, by punishing offenders severely. A.R.S. § 1-211(B) (1995) (“Statutes shall be liberally construed to effect their objects and to promote justice.”); Campbell v. Super. Ct., 105 Ariz. 252, 255, 462 P.2d 801, 804 (1969) (“[Statutes should be construed as a whole with the purpose of the statute not being frustrated by a literal application of its terms.”).
¶29 But what of Williams? Unlike the Majority, I believe that the Williams holding is confined to offenses enumerated in section 13-604.01(L), like some aggravated assaults, that are capable of being committed without a particular target, although the ultimate victim is a child under the age of fifteen years. As acknowledged by Williams, it is impossible to imagine how the other enumerated offenses, including kidnapping, could be committed without targeting particular persons. Id. at 103, 854 P.2d at 135. The case before us is not the one to offer illumination. Defendant could have decided to forego his planned robbery once he knew of Javier’s presence in the apartment.10 He did not do so, electing instead to kidnap Javier during the course of the robbery. By necessity, Defendant aimed his actions at Javier in order to achieve the kidnapping, A.R.S. § 13-1304(A), thereby committing a dangerous act against children. A.R.S. § 13-604.01(L)(l)(i).
¶ 30 Finally, I disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that applying section 13-604.01 in this case “would not further the legislature’s intent that the statute should apply only to ‘criminals who prey specifically on children,’ who are ‘peculiarly dangerous to children,’ or who ‘pose a direct and continuing threat to the children of Arizona.’ ” Maj. op., supra, ¶ 19. As pointed out by the Williams court, one focus of discussion before the House Judiciary Committee before passage of the Dangerous Crimes Against Children Act was the perceived recidivist nature of people who commit kidnapping of children under fifteen years of age. Williams, 175 Ariz. at 102, 854 P.2d at 135. Indeed, because children in this age group generally possess limited physical, mental, and emotional ability to hinder crime, kidnapers, like Defendant, may repeatedly choose to restrain children during the commission of other crimes such as armed robbery and burglary. The legislature intended to deter criminals from preying on such easy targets by including kidnapping, in all its forms, as a dangerous crime against children.
¶ 31 For all these reasons, I would affirm Defendant’s sentence.
. Moreover, as the Majority suggests, Javier and his mother were not randomly selected victims of crime. Defendant specifically targeted their apartment in order to steal from the mother's boyfriend, who Defendant believed wrongly took money from his accomplice’s cousin. The evidence also allowed the jury to conclude that although Defendant saw Javier and his mother enter the apartment before him, Defendant elected to commit the offense. Therefore, unlike the “fortuitous” victims in Williams and Jansing, Javier was intentionally targeted by Defendant.
. The Majority’s focus on whether the enumerated crime was committed "incidentally” to the ultimate criminal objective leads to senseless re-suits. For example, had Defendant inflicted serious physical injury on Javier in aid of the robbery, under the Majority’s reasoning, Defendant would not have committed a dangerous crime against children. In light of the legislature’s clear intent to protect children, conditioning designation of an offense as a dangerous crime against children upon the ultimate criminal objective of a defendant, rather than his actions, is wrong. State v. Medrano-Barraza, 190 Ariz. 472, 474, 949 P.2d 561, 563 (App.1997) ("We presume the framers of the statute did not intend an absurd result and our construction must avoid such a consequence.”).
. See, e.g., A.R.S. §§ 13-1404(B) (Supp.1999) (if the victim is under fifteen years of age, "sexual abuse ... is a class 3 felony punishable pursuant to § 13-604.01”), 13-1405(B) (Supp.1999) ("Sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen years of age is a class 2 felony and is punishable pursuant to § 13-604.01.”), 13-1410 (Supp. 1999) (a person who molests a child under fifteen is guilty of "a class 2 felony that is punishable pursuant to § 13-604.01”), 13-3206 ("If the minor is under fifteen years of age, taking a child *514for prostitution is a class 2 felony and is punishable pursuant to § 13-604.01.”).
. Relying on Jansing, the Majority asserts that Defendant’s "mere awareness” of Javier’s presence in the apartment was insufficient to designate the kidnapping offense as a dangerous crime against children. Maj. op., supra, ¶ 18, n. 6. Jansing, however, is distinguishable as the drunk driver’s reckless actions in that case were unfocused on any particular victim. Jansing, 186 Ariz. at 70, 918 P.2d at 1088. By contrast, Defendant was aware of Javier's presence, and his young age, before committing an intentional offense against a specific victim — Javier.