dissenting:
Because I read the statutes to require a court to apply both the comparative negligence test under section 18-21-111, 5 C.R.S. (2000), and pro-rata apportionment under section 13-21-111.5, 5 C.R.S. (2000), to a solatium award under section 13-21-208.5, 5 C.R.S. (2000), I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The majority holds that in a wrongful death case, election of the solati-um award by the plaintiff entitles the plaintiff to the full $50,000 from a defendant as long as the decedent was less than 51% at fault for his or her own death. Under the majority's construction, if the defendant designates a nonparty that the jury determines to have been at fault, pursuant to section 13-21-111.5, the defendant must seek contribution in a separate action to recover the nonparty's portion of the damages. The majority relies on comparative negligence to determine the percentage of fault attributed to the plaintiff in the first instance, but declines to apply comparative negligence or pro-rata liability beyond that initial determination of liability. I find such an approach to be inconsistent. If principles of comparative negligence apply to establish the plaintiff's entitlement to any recovery, then I suggest that these same principles continue to apply in establishing the amount of the recovery.
I agree with the majority that a plaintiff may not recover from a defendant in a wrongful death action when the decedent was more than 51% at fault for his or her death. However, I suggest that the statutes require the imposition of comparative negligence and pro-rata liability to the solatium damages award. Additionally, unlike the majority, I do not read the solatium statute to allow joint liability in these situations. Therefore, I respectfully dissent and would reverse the court of appeals with directions to return the case to the trial court for apportionment of the award.
I.
I begin with the general proposition that the General Assembly has determined that: "In an action brought as a result of a death or an injury to person or property, no defendant shall be liable for an amount greater than that represented by the degree or percentage of the negligence or fault attributable to such defendant." § 18-21-111.5(1), 5 C.R.S. (2000). This court has observed that the statutory change "was intended to cure the perceived inequity under the common law concept of joint and several liability whereby wrongdoers could be held fully responsible for a plaintiff's entire loss, despite the fact that another wrongdoer, who was not held *698accountable, contributed to the result." Barton v. Adams Rental, Inc. 938 P.2d 532, 535 (Colo.1997). We reaffirmed our understanding of and commitment to that principle recently in Slack v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 5 P.3d 280, 282 (Colo.2000), in which we determined that responsibility for a loss must be apportioned between two tortfea-sors, even if one acted negligently and the other acted intentionally.
Similarly, in Mountain Mobile Mix, Inc. v. Gifford, 660 P.2d 883, 890 (Colo.1983), and in Inland/Riggle Oil Co. v. Painter, 925 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Colo.1996), we have repeatedly endorsed the notion that the damages award must follow the fault determinations of the jury, such that each person pays his or her pro-rata share of the damages. See also Bohrer v. DeHart, 961 P.2d 472, 475 (Colo.1998) (stating that pro-rata liability " 'rectifies the inequity caused by the common law rule of joint and several liability whereby any one responsible party could have been liable for all losses which the plaintiff incurred"). Thus, the General Assembly clearly intends that tortfeasers should bear their share, and only their share, of the victim's loss.
IL.
The solatium statute is merely a portion of the broader damages section of the statutes. The solatium statute provides:
Alternative means of establishing damages-solatium amount. - In any case arising under section 13-21-202, the persons entitled to sue under the provisions of section 18-21-201(1) may elect in writing to sue for and recover a solatium in the amount of fifty thousand dollars. Such solatium amount shall be in addition to economic damages and to reasonable funeral, burial, interment, or cremation expenses, which expenses may also be recovered in an action under this section. Such solatium amount shall be in lieu of noneco-nomic damages recoverable under section 13-21-208 and shall be awarded upon a finding or admission of the defendant's liability for the wrongful death.
§ 18-21-208.5, 5 C.R.S. (2000).
Article 21 governs the recovery of damages in Colorado. Part 1 of that article includes both the comparative liability seetion and the pro-rata liability section quoted above. The solatium section appears in Part 2 of Article 21, and relates to damages for death by negligence. Part 2 also identifies persons entitled to sue and recover for wrongful death caused by a defendant transportation company. § 13-21-201, 5 C.R.S. (2000). Section 18-21-202, 5 C.R.S. (2000), provides that the heirs of a decedent have a cause of action and may recover damages if the decedent would have been entitled to maintain that action had he or she survived. Section 13-21-2083, 5 C.R.S. (2000), sets out the limitation on damage amounts recoverable in wrongful death actions, including damages for noneconomic loss or injury. Finally, section 18-21-208.5, 5 C.R.S. (2000), the sola-tium award, provides an alternative means of recovery of noneconomic damages. The sola-tium damages may be sought in a liquidated amount to be awarded upon a finding of liability, and without the need for specific proof of noneconomic damages.
In my view, reading the Article as a whole, the comparative liability and pro-rata liability sections govern all wrongful death actions under Part 2. See Clint v. Stolworthy, 144 Colo. 597, 601, 357 P.2d 649, 651 (1960) (stating that sections 18-21-201 to 204 must be construed as one act, and each section construed as it is connected with and related to the whole act). Part 1 contains the general provisions relating to damages. Part 2 identifies when a victim may bring a wrongful death action, and what damage limitations control. Part 1 governs the solatium statute, just as it governs an award of noneconomic damages under section 13-21-2083. (Gen. Elec. Co. v. Niemet, 866 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Colo.1994). Thus, a reading of the Article as a whole requires the application of the comparative negligence and pro-rata statutes to solatium damages.
IIL
The majority cites three reasons for its conclusion that both the comparative negligence and the pro-rata liability statutes do not govern section 183-21-208.5. First, the majority reads the solatium statute not *699merely as offering an alternative to proving noneconomic damages, but instead as offering a specific award of a predetermined amount in lieu of noneconomic damages. Because the jury makes no actual determination of noneconomic damages, the majority concludes that comparative negligence and pro-rata apportionment are inappropriate. Second, the majority views the solatium statute as directly in conflict with the comparative negligence and pro-rata statutes. The majority views the solatium statute to be the more specific and the comparative negligence and pro-rata liability statutes to be the more general statutes. Hence, the majority holds the pro-rata and comparative negligence statutes inapplicable. Third, the majority reads the legislative history to exclude comparative negligence and pro-rata apportionment from solattum damages.
I disagree with the majority's reasoning on all three points, and would instead rely upon simple principles of statutory construction. First, although the solatium statute does not itself make reference to a reduction for comparative negligence or pro-rata liability, neither does the general wrongful death statute. Yet, this court has certainly held comparative negligence and pro-rata liability applicable to wrongful death awards. Smith v. Zufelt, 880 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Colo.1994). The solatium statute permits a survivor of a decedent to avoid the trauma and expense of trying to prove noneconomic damages: it does not abrogate the underlying principles of liability.
Second, I find the majority's reliance upon the solatium statute as the more specific statute, thus preempting sections 13-21-111 and 13-21-111.5, unpersuasive. Section 13-21-111.5 is necessarily broad in that it is designed to apply to all damages actions, including solatitum. The reference to a dollar amount certainly cannot vitiate pro-rata liability, or the cap on wrongful death noneco-nomic damages under section 13-21-2083 would similarly operate as a more specific provision that would vitiate pro-rata liability. That is clearly not the intent of the legislation.
Third, I do not read the legislative history as supporting the majority's position. The General Assembly clearly intended the solati-um statute to relieve a survivor of the onus of proving noneconomic damages, but it did nothing to change basic concepts of liability that run throughout the statutes. In my view, the statutory reference in the solatium statute to a "defendant's liability for the wrongful death" subsumes and includes all underlying notions attendant upon a determination of liability. A defendant joint tortfea-sor is only "liable" to the extent the jury concludes he is Hable, and I find nothing in the legislative history to the contrary.
The majority argues that allowing the reduction of the lump sum award through the application of comparative negligence principles would encourage defendants to engage in protracted litigation as to liability alone. See Dewey v. Hardy, 917 P.2d 305, 310-11 (Colo.App.1995)1 Although this may be true, the solatium statute sought to reduce litigation as it applies to the establishment of damages, not the determination of Hability. The solatium statute still requires juries to determine each party's liability for the death and to apportion liability accordingly. In this case, the parties contested liability and engaged in a four-day trial at which numerous witnesses testified. Therefore, even under the majority's construction, the only trial efficiency the solatium statute achieves is the elimination of proof of the plaintiff's noneco-nomic damages. It cannot eliminate or shorten proof of liability.
Lastly, I take issue with the majority's application of joint liability to this situation. As a general rule, the General Assembly has abolished joint liability in Colorado. Miller v. Byrne, 916 P.2d 566, 578 (Colo.App.1995). Although it is true that joint liability does still exist in certain cases, it is either specifically imposed by statute, see § 18-21-111.5(4) (stating that "joint liability shall be imposed on two or more persons who consciously conspire and deliberately pursue a common plan or design to commit a tortious act"), or is the subject of a well-established *700rule. Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, Inc., 763 F.Supp. 1552, 1560 (D.Colo.1991) (holding that the pro-rata liability section does not abrogate the well-established rule that partners are jointly and severally liable for the wrongs of the partnership). The solatium statute neither contains express language reviving joint liability nor arises in a common law context of joint liability. Accordingly, in my view, joint liability does not apply.
IV.
Finally, then, I look to the facts of this case and the outcome reached by the majority approach. The jury determined that Rossman was intoxicated and 55% responsible for the accident that killed Gary Gross. The jury also assigned 20% of the responsibility to the employee of the bar who served Rossman, and found that Gary Gross himself was 25% responsible.
The result of the majority's conclusion here is that Marla Gross, standing in Gary Gross's shoes for purposes of this action, is entitled to recover the full $50,000 solatium award against the bar, despite the jury's determination that the bar only bore 20% of the fault. The award will not be reduced by the fault attributable to the other parties. If Marla Gross had not elected the solatium award, and had proven her noneconomic damages to the jury, clearly any award would have been assessed under sections 13-21-1111 and 13-21-111.5. Niemet, 866 P.2d at 18367 (holding that trial courts must apportion tort-feaser's pro-rata liability according to their degree of fault before it applies the statutory cap on noneconomic damages). Hence, in exchange for electing the solatium award, the plaintiff not only is entitled to forego proof of noneconomic damages, but is also guaranteed full recovery of the award once even a de minimis determination of liability on the part of the defendant exists. For example, if the jury had found B.G.'s to be 5% liable for the accident, the award would be the same.
I view that application of the solatium statute to be directly contrary to the legislative intent, as repeatedly noted by this court, that no defendant will bear more than its pro-rata share of liability in a damages action. Smith, 880 P.2d at 1181.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and would reverse the court of appeals with directions to return the case to the trial court for apportionment of the award.
. My opinion in this case would disapprove of the court of appeals' holding in Dewey v. Hardy, 917 P.2d 305, stating that a solatium award is exempt from reduction by operation of the comparative negligence statute.