concurring.
When a parent has been sentenced to a prison term that constitutes much of the minority of the parent's children, efforts to provide social services to the parent that have as their objective reunification of the parent with the children are necessarily futile. Because such efforts cannot succeed, it is difficult to describe them as timely and reasonable, the terms used in AS 47.10.086(a). But the legislature has recognized this problem and does not require fami*723ly reunification efforts when the "incarceration that the parent is scheduled to serve during the child's minority is significant considering the child's age and the child's need for an adult's care and supervision." AS 47.10.080(0)(1). Similarly, under . AS 47.10.086(c)(10) the court may determine that the reasonable efforts ordinarily required may be dispensed with under the same circumstances.
Frank is scheduled to be incarcerated for twelve years, with an additional ten years of probation during which he is not allowed contact with minors. This obviously qualifies as a significant period of his children's minority and the trial court so found. Because this finding is sustainable, the state was not required to provide reunification services to Frank and there is no need to consider whether the services that the state afforded Frank were reasonable and timely. I would affirm the judgment of the superior court on this basis.
Frank argues that it is unfair to waive the reasonable efforts requirement based on AS 47.10.086(c)(10) until his criminal appeal has been decided. In my opinion this argument lacks merit. A conviction is a judgment and as such it is final when it is entered in the superior court. Both direct and collateral consequences may be imposed based on the conviction regardless of the pendency of an appeal: "We have repeatedly held that the pendency of an appeal is irrelevant for the purposes of res judicata and collateral estop-pel.1 In A.A. v. State we recognized the risks of relying on a conviction pending appeal, but stated that "a trial court should have the discretion to proceed to a termination trial without a final ruling on a parent's eriminal appeal."2 This statement applies here.
It is of course possible that Frank's criminal conviction might be reversed on appeal. Speaking statistically, the chances are slim. According to the clerk of court, about eighty-two percent of criminal appeals were totally affirmed by the Alaska Court of Appeals over the last fiscal year. A number of cases in the opposite eighteen percent column were vacated or reversed only in part and did not result in a reversal of the conviction on the most serious charges. Further, when convictions on major charges are reversed, the charges are ordinarily retried, and the offender is often reconvicted. For those rare cases in which an offender is ultimately acquitted of major charges, Civil Rule 60(b)(5) offers the possibility of relief from a termination judgment that has been entered based on the conviction.
As this case illustrates, the appellate process is time consuming.3 It is now statutory policy that young children be expeditiously placed into permanent homes.4 If the waiver of reunification provisions contained in AS 47.10.080(0)(1) and AS 47.10.086(c)(10) are to be given effect consistent with today's expedited permanent placement policy, a final criminal conviction in the superior court should be the event that triggers a waiver rather than a decision of the court of appeals.
Because the superior court properly found that the reasonable efforts requirement did not apply because of Frank's significant incarceration, and because I agree with the opinion of the court that the superior court did not err when it found that the termination was in the best interests of the children, I agree that the termination judgment should be affirmed.
. Wyatt v. Wyatt, 65 P.3d 825, 831 (Alaska 2003).
. 982 P.2d 256, 260 (Alaska 1999).
. We are advised that Frank's criminal appeal has not yet been briefed.
. AS 47.05.065(5); see S.H. v. State, 42 P.3d 1119, 1125 (Alaska 2002) ('The timeliness of a permanent stable placement for the children is paramount. ...").