dissenting.
The majority concludes that petitioner is entitled to neither mandatory nor discretionary attorney fees under ORS 183.497.1 respectfully dissent.
A partial recapitulation of the facts is instructive. The first time these parties came before us, petitioner was seeking review of a notice of tax assessment issued by the Employment Department (department). We held that the department had incorrectly ignored the ruling of another agency, which the department was required to consider *591under ORS 670.600 and ORS 670.605.1 Kaib’s Roving R.Ph. Agency v. Employment Dept., 161 Or App 290, 984 P2d 886 (1999) (Kaib’s 7). On remand, the hearing officer issued an order affirming the department’s original tax assessment. Suspecting ex parte contact between the director and the hearing officer, petitioner sought records of such contact, which the department produced. It was at this point that the director, who until this time had not issued any of the orders in this case, issued a final order that affirmed the tax assessment and denied the existence of any ex parte contact. The director lacked legal authority to issue that final order.
As we said in Kaib’s Roving R.Ph. Agency v. Employment Dept., 182 Or App 481, 50 P3d 1193 (2002) (Kaib’s 77), ORS 657.684 prohibits the director from signing the final order because “the director is a party, not a decision-maker.” Id. at 486. State agencies are expected to know the law, just like citizens. Ignorance of the law is no excuse. This is especially the situation with state agencies, which are assumed to have subject-matter expertise. Furthermore, an agency “possesses only those powers that the legislature grants and that it cannot exercise authority that it does not possess.” Gaynor v. Board of Parole, 165 Or App 609, 612, 996 P2d 1020 (2000). As we said in Van Gordon v. Ore. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 63 Or App 561, 568-69, 666 P2d 276 (1983), “[a]gencies should be encouraged to look carefully at the laws they administer before applying those laws to the public, and victims of an agency’s patently unreasonable interpretation should not have to pay for their efforts to right the agency’s wrong.” It is simply not acceptable for a state agency to defend its failure to comply with state law by arguing that it was unaware of ORS 657.684. The basic point is clear and unambiguous: the agency did not follow ORS 657.684 and, as a result, petitioner was required to seek judicial review to reverse the director’s illegal order. There never was a reasonable basis in law for the director’s order.
*592ORS 183.497 provides, in part:
“(1) In a judicial proceeding designated under subsection (2) of this section the court:
“(a) May, in its discretion, allow a petitioner reasonable attorney fees and costs if the court finds in favor of the petitioner.
“(b) Shall allow a petitioner reasonable attorney fees and costs if the court finds in favor of the petitioner and determines that the state agency acted without a reasonable basis in fact or in law[.]”
The majority states that, in Van Gordon this court adopted “for all practical purposes, the no ‘reasonable basis in law or fact’ standard” for mandatory awards under ORS 183.497(l)(b). 189 Or App at 586. For that reason, the majority concludes that, “as applied here, there is no meaningful difference between the standards for mandatory and discretionary attorney fee awards. 189 Or App at 586 n 4. That methodology of statutory analysis is not appropriate.2 In White v. Employment Div., 77 Or App 35, 711 P2d 196 (1985), a case decided after Johnson, we considered the mandatory and discretionary provisions separately. We stated that, “[bjecause an award under ORS 183.495 is discretionary, we first consider ORS 183.497, which makes attorney fees mandatory in cases fitting within its terms.”3 White, 77 Or App at 38. We did not treat the mandatory language as superfluous, and we should not do so in this case.
*593Even under the majority’s treatment of the mandatory provision of ORS 183.497, we should still award petitioner attorney fees under the discretionary provision of ORS 183.497. The majority relies on Van Gordon. In that case, we stated:
“[W]hen we reverse or remand a final order because an agency has interpreted a statute in an unreasonable manner, we shall, as a general rule, award an attorney fee to a prevailing petitioner at least when it appears that the corrected view of the statute obtained by the petitioner may have a significant impact on the outcome of the case.”
Van Gordon, 63 Or App at 569. Van Gordon also stated the purposes of the discretionary statute:
“First, fee awards ought to serve as deterrents to groundless or arbitrary agency action. Second, the statute should operate to redress individuals who have borne unfair financial burdens defending against groundless charges or otherwise attempting to right mistakes that agencies should never have committed.”
Id. at 565-66 (emphasis added).
In Kaib’s II, we held:
“The statute treats the Director as one of the parties to the proceeding, not as the ultimate decision-maker. ORS 657.684 makes this point absolutely clear when it provides that either the employing unit or the Director may seek judicial review of the hearing officer’s decision.”
182 Or App at 485-86 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). By allowing the director to sign the final order, the department erroneously interpreted an absolutely clear and unambiguous statute and made a mistake that it never should have committed.
Though the department may have acted under a misguided belief, that belief was not reasonable because an “agency must comply with the statutes that govern it and follow its own rules.” Smith v. Veterinary Medical Examining Board, 175 Or App 319, 327, 27 P3d 1081, rev den, 332 Or 632 (2001). Logically, in order to follow that requirement an agency would have to know what those statutes and rules provide.
*594The reason these parties have been before us on two occasions is that the department was either unfamiliar with or ignored its governing statutes. Either is unreasonable and unacceptable.
I respectfully dissent.
ORS 670.600 defines the standards to be used in determining whether a person or entity is an “independent contractor.” ORS 670.605 provides that, “[i]n accordance with ORS 183.310 to 183.550, those agencies responsible for the administration of ORS 671.510 to 671.710 and ORS chapters 316,656,657 and701jointly shall adopt rules to carry out the provisions of ORS 670.600.”
Under ORS 174.010, when construing a statute, “where there are several provisions or particulars such construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.” To the extent that Van Gordon did otherwise, it was wrong, and we should no longer follow it. Additionally, when the legislature uses different language, e.g., “may” and “shall,” we presume that [it] intended different meanings. State v. Guzek, 322 Or 245, 265, 906 P2d 272 (1995). Also, we presume that the legislature did not intend to enact a meaningless or superfluous statute. FOPPO v. Washington County, 142 Or App 252, 259, 920 P2d 1141, rev den, 324 Or 394(1996).
Finally, I note both that Van Gordon was decided before PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 611-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), and did not use the interpretive analysis set forth in that case. However, the parties do not challenge either case based on PGE.
In 1985, the legislature repealed former ORS 183.495, the discretionary provision. Former ORS 183.495, repealed by Or Laws 1985, ch 757, § 7. The same year, the legislature amended ORS 183.497, the mandatory provision, by substantively reenacting the discretionary provision as ORS 183.497(l)(a), and, retaining the mandatory provision as ORS 183.497(l)(b). Or Laws 1985, ch 757, § 5.