concurring.
I write separately to more fully explain my analysis of the legal issues presented in this appeal. These issues concern the relationship between Alaska Criminal Rule 32.1(d), Alaska Criminal Rule 32.1(F), and this Court's decisions in Evans v. State, 23 P.3d 650 (Alaska App.2001), and Hamilton v. State, 771 P.2d 1358 (Alaska App.1989)-decisions which hold that a sentencing judge can rely on verified hearsay information contained in the pre-sentence report for proof of the matters asserted, unless the defendant offers a testimonial denial of that information and submits to cross-examination.1
Garland was initially indicted for first-degree sexual abuse of a minor. He and the State proposed to resolve the case by having Garland plead no contest to the reduced charge of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor. In addition, the plea agreement called for Garland to receive a specific sen- ° tence: 6 years' imprisonment with 3 years suspended.
Before deciding whether to accept this proposed disposition of the case, Superior Court Judge Daniel Schally ordered a pre-sentence report. When this pre-sentence report was prepared, it contained information concerning a 1997 sexual assault case in which Garland was the suspect.
Alaska Criminal Rule 32.1(d)(5) states that, if a defendant objects to any information in the pre-sentence report, the defendant shall notify the court and the government of the objection, shall "state the basis for the ... objection", and shall supply "any information upon which the defendant intends to rely" in refuting the objected-to information in the pre-sentence report.
Garland filed an objection to the information about the 1997 sexual assault. However, Garland did not directly assert that this information was untrue, nor did he offer any contrary information. Rather, Garland argued that the information was "irrelevant", that it was "hearsay", and that the sentencing judge's reliance on this information would violate Garland's right to confrontation.
Garland argued that the information was irrelevant because his plea agreement called for imposition of a specified sentence. Thus, Garland contended, the information had no significance because his sentence would remain the same regardless of whether he committed the 1997 sexual assault. But Judge Schally had not yet decided whether to accept the plea agreement-and the fact that Garland might have committed another sexual offense had obvious relevance to Judge Schally's decision.
Garland also argued that the information was hearsay. This is clearly correct; the information was derived from out-of-court statements that were being offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted.2 However, under the Alaska Supreme Court's decision in Nukapigak v. State, 562 P.2d 697 (Alaska 1977),3 a sentencing judge can rely on hearsay statements if they are "sufficiently verified to appear trustworthy and the defendant [is] given the opportunity to deny [the truth *830of the statements] or present contrary evi-denee of his own." 4
Garland argues that the government can not rely on such hearsay accusations unless those accusations have led to a grand jury indietment or to some other form of criminal charge that has been independently sereened and declared to be well-founded. Garland is wrong. The hearsay accusations in Nukapi-gak included third-hand hearsay accusations made by villagers, communicated to the village council, and then passed on to the author of the pre-sentence report. It seems that none of these accusations had ever been the subject of a criminal charge. And yet the Alaska Supreme Court held that the sentencing judge could properly rely on this information.
Finally, Garland argued that use of the information regarding the 1997 sexual assault would violate his right of confrontation. But we held in Evans and Hamilton that a erimi-nal defendant has only a limited right of confrontation in sentencing proceedings. Before a defendant can demand that the government support its sentencing allegations with in-court testimony, the defendant must deny the allegations under oath and submit to cross-examination. Garland did not do that. Thus, the inclusion of hearsay information in the pre-sentence report did not violate Garland's right of confrontation.
In other words, Judge Schally properly rejected all three of Garland's objections to the inclusion of this information in the pre-sentence report.
On appeal, Garland raises two new claims.
First, he argues that this Court's decisions in Evans and Hamilton contravene the Alaska Constitution's guarantee against compelled self-incrimination (Article I, Section 9). As just explained, Evans and Hamilton stand for the proposition that if Garland wished to contest the information concerning the 1997 sexual assault, he had to take the stand, deny the assault under oath, and submit to cross-examination. Garland asserts that, because he might still be prosecuted for the 1997 sexual assault, it is unconstitutional to require him to give testimony and submit to cross-examination concerning this event.
Garland did not raise this argument in the superior court, so he must now show plain error. He has not done so. Garland makes the bald assertion that the rule of Evans and Homilton is unconstitutional, but he offers no legal authority to support his position. Whatever merit Garland's argument might have, it is no more than debatable. Reasonable judges could conclude that this Court's decisions in Evans and Hamilton do not contravene the Alaska Constitution. Thus, Garland has failed to show plain error.5
Second, Garland argues that once Judge Schally decided to adopt the proposed plea agreement, the judge was obliged to delete the information concerning the 1997 sexual assault from the pre-sentence report.
Garland relies on Alaska Criminal Rule which states that "if the [sentencing] court determines that [a] disputed assertion is not relevant to its sentencing decision|[,] so that resolution of the dispute is not warranted, the court shall delete the assertion from the report without making any finding."
Garland points out that, when this matter was discussed at the sentencing hearing, Judge Schally declared that the 1997 sexual assault "[was] not necessarily relevant to the sentence that [he was] going to impose". Garland argues that, given Judge Schally's conclusion that the 1997 sexual assault was not relevant, the judge was obliged under Rule 32.1(f)(5) to delete all mention of that incident from the pre-sentence report.
Garland's argument fails for two reasons.
First, although the 1997 sexual assault may no longer have been relevant to Judge Schally's sentencing decision after he decided to accept the proposed negotiated sentence, the 1997 sexual assault was obviously relevant to Judge Schally's decision to accept or reject that negotiated sentence. Judge Schally never said otherwise.
*831Second, Rule 82.1({)(5) applies only to assertions of fact that are disputed. As I pointed out above, and as Judge Stewart points out in the lead opinion, Garland never fulfilled the procedural requirements for contesting the pre-sentence report's information about the 1997 sexual assault. Thus, this information was not "disputed" for purposes of Rule 32.1(F).
For these reasons, I concur in this Court's resolution of Garland's appeal.
. Evans, 23 P.3d at 652; Hamilton, 771 P.2d at 1362-63.
. See Alaska Evidence Rule 801(c).
. Affirmed on rehearing, 576 P.2d 982 (Alaska 1978).
. Nukapigak, 562 P.2d at 701; affirmed on rehearing, 576 P.2d at 984-85.
. Cooper v. State, 153 P.3d 371, 373 (Alaska App.2007); Simon v. State, 121 P.3d 815, 820 (Alaska App.2005).