DISSENTING.
The U.S. Supreme Court has a case pending before it with similar issues, Gralike v. Cook, 191 F.3d 911 (8th Cir.1999), that will provide additional insight to the states on how to deal with this kind of voter approved initiative. It would better serve Idaho if this Court withheld a decision until the U.S. Supreme Court ruling provides guidelines or indicates that it is solely a state concern.
The congressional term limits legislation and the question of voluntary ballot legends (additional information placed on the ballot) under consideration in this case may or may not be good governmental policy, however, this is not necessarily a decision for the courts. Unless the Federal or State Constitution is violated, this question must be resolved by the legislature. It should be emphasized that the ballot legends under consideration herein are voluntary for each individual candidate. This voluntary aspect is the unique distinguishing feature from *130previous congressional term limits legislation. I am unable to find the necessary constitutional or legal impediments for this Court to invalidate this voluntary term limits, ballot legend legislation. In addition, petitioners have created their own emergency to bring this case and thus do not qualify for the legal remedy sought. Finally, petitioners lack legal standing under existing Idaho law to adjudicate this matter.
For each of these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
A. The Term Limits Pledge Does Not Violate Either The Idaho Constitution Or The United States Constitution.
The right of suffrage, is a fundamental constitutional right and any infringement upon that right is subject to strict scrutiny legal analysis. The majority opinion recognizes this right and there is no disagreement from me on this bedrock fundamental principle. However, I am unable to find an infringement of that right within the voluntary provisions of the statute before us.
The majority holds that the ballot legends here violate the right of suffrage under the Idaho Constitution. It is important to note that ballot legends are not in and of themselves a problem. It is well accepted that ballot legends indicating a candidate’s political party do not violate one’s right to suffrage. In addition, in Idaho the judicial ballots contain a ballot legend indicating incumbency. Party designation and incumbency ballot legends undoubtedly influence voters. Perhaps logical consistency would require this Court to invalidate party designations and judicial incumbency ballot legends if a similar extra-ordinary writ were brought by well intentioned individuals. The point is rhetorical, but illustrates the slippery slope the majority opinion creates.
The majority opinion argues that “allowing a state official to place a particular message on the ballot, and to determine the circumstances under which such message should be placed, appears to be in conflict with Article I, section 19 of the Idaho Constitution.” In interpreting the Idaho Constitution it is very important to give it the required strict scrutiny legal analysis referred to above. Article I, section 19 provides:
“No power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere with or prevent the free and lawful exercise of the right of suffrage.”
Obviously, the drafters intended that the government would not interfere with the individual’s right to cast his or her vote. The reference to military power obviously means that troops or soldiers cannot in any way be used to discourage or interfere with an individual’s right to vote. No such problem is presented here. The reference to civil power undoubtedly indicates that the government cannot place any obstacles or impediments in the way of each person’s right to vote at the ballot box. The law here, which began as an initiative, contains specific provisions that provide the candidate with a voluntary choice of whether to take the pledge or not. This is awkward and quite inconvenient, but no legal authority has been uncovered that provides that a voluntary pledge violates a person’s right to suffrage.
Idaho Code, title 34, chapter 9 (I.C. §§ 34-907(A) and -907(B)) contains the term limits’ voluntary provisions under consideration. Nothing in the two statutes that comprise this scheme sets up a civil or military power that infringes upon or interferes with the right of suffrage. The statutes do not suggest that all congressional aspirants must take the term limits pledge. Further, candidates who have taken the pledge may choose to ignore it. Thus, the contemplated ballot legends “Signed TERM LIMITS pledge” and “Broke TERM LIMITS pledge” are voluntary to the candidates. In this way the pledge creates the opportunity for those who support term limits to help identify the candidate of his or her own choice. Altematively, the pledge imposes on those who take the pledge the negative affiliation with those voters who do not support term limits.
Put more succinctly, party designations, incumbency designations and voluntary term limits compliance will each cause some voters to vote for the candidate and some to vote against the candidate. As awkward as ballot additions may make the ballot, they do not necessarily become illegal. This is true, even if popular support for some ballot legends *131has eroded. As stated above, the State Legislature is the proper forum to address such statutory concerns.
B. A Writ Of Prohibition Is Not Appropriate Because The Petitioners Had An Adequate Remedy At Law.
The petitioners allege in their petition for a writ of prohibition that due to the “significance and urgency of this action,” this Court should “set an expedited briefing and argument schedule.” The petitioners claim this “urgency” is the result of the time frame established by Idaho Code section 34-907B. Under Idaho Code section 7-702, a writ of prohibition “may be issued by the supreme court ... in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” I.C. § 7-402.
The majoi’ity overlooks the fact that the petitioners had a “plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,” but chose not to pursue that remedy in a timely maimer. I.C. § 34-907B was enacted in November of 1998. At that time the petitioners had the necessary time to pursue a judicial review of the statute.
The affidavit of Petitioner Van Valkenburgh claims that the delay in pursuing a remedy was facilitated by his waiting to see if the Attorney Genex’al would take up the issue. However*, Petitioner Van Valkenbux’gh does not explain why he waited until October 26, 1999, eleven months after the enactment of the statute, to bring the matter to the attention of the Attorney General.
Neither am I persuaded by the affidavit of Larry L. Eastland, who joined as a petitioner the day before the matter was to be argued. With the exception of facts relating to his personal political career, Petitioner East-land’s affidavit recites essentially the same allegations and concerns as the other two petitioners. Petitioners obviously want this Court to nullify the voluntary congressional term limits law. However, they are vague on what constitutional basis exists for this Court to exercise its jurisdiction.
The petitioners argue that “an expedited briefing and argument schedule” is necessary because of the looming elections. However, I believe that the necessity of the writ of prohibition is the result of either poor planning or clever manipulation on the part of the petitioners. This Court should not be rushed into considering “novel and impox*tant constitutional issues” simply because of the willful procrastination of the petitioners. I am concerned that the majority is creating dangerous precedent by allowing the petitioners to obtain an extraordinary writ based upon an emergency of their own creation.
C. The Petitioners Do Not Have Standing Because They Lack Personalized Injury.
Standing is the requirement that each party to the suit has such a personal stake in the outcome as to assure the court that a justiciable controversy exists. Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 375, 973 P.2d 142, 146 (1999). In other words, it must be shown that the parties to the lawsuit have a tangible and legally protectable interest in the subject matter of the litigation.
When making a standing inquiry, this Court will focus “on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated.” Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989). Additionally, this Court has held that in order to have standing, the petitioners must allege an injury of some sort. Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass’n, Inc. v. State, 127 Idaho 239, 242, 899 P.2d 949, 952 (1995) (SPBA I). This Court has determined that “[A] citizen and taxpayer may not challenge a governmental enactment whex*e the injuiy is one suffered alike by all citizens and taxpayers of the jurisdiction. In those situations the px'oper forum to re-shape the challenged governmental policy is the political arena through the voting process.” Miles, 116 Idaho at 641-42, 778 P.2d at 763-64. “When the assexfed harm is a ‘genei’alized grievance’ shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.” Id. at 641, 778 P.2d at 763; see also Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371, 375, 913 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1996) (holding that individuals must allege *132an injury “not suffered alike by all citizens of the county.”).
Applying these standards, the majority holds that because “the Petitioners have alleged an injury not suffered by all citizens and taxpayers alike, ... we find the Petitioners have standing to contest the constitutionality of I.C. § 34-907B.” (Italics added.) The majority determines that Petitioners have standing because they suffer an injury not suffered by all Idaho voters, namely that the injury is only suffered by those who oppose the term limits pledge.
In addition to relying on the unsubstantiated allegations contained in the Petitioner’s affidavits, this conclusion overlooks the clear holding of this Court in Selkirk-Priest Basin Association, Inc. v. State, 128 Idaho 831, 919 P.2d 1032 (1996) (SPBA II). In that case, the appellants provided affidavits indicating that they used the subject timbered property for hiking and berry picking. This Court held that the affidavits did not provide the appellants with standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute in question because the “use of the area for recreational or aesthetic enjoyment [does not] create[ ] a particularized injury such that [the appellant’s] have a ‘distinct palpable injury’ not shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens.” Id. at 834, 919 P.2d at 1035.
The facts of the present case appear to be on point with those in SPBA II. In both eases, the party claiming standing asserted an injury based upon opposition to the application of a statute. In both eases the claiming party represents the view of only a portion of the voting public. Obviously not every Idaho citizen used the timbered area in SPBA II for hiking and berry picking. Likewise not every voting citizen in Idaho opposes the Term Limits Pledge. Therefore, based on the prior decisions of this Court, I would hold that the petitioners lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of I.C. § 34-907B.
The lack of personalized injury is brought out further by an examination of the affidavits filed by the petitioners in support of their motion for a writ of prohibition. Of the three affidavits in support of the motion for a writ of prohibition, two were filed with the motion and Mr. Larry Eastland’s was filed on the eve of oral argument. The first petitioner, Jack Van Valkenburgh, claims that I.C. § 34-907B is “unconstitutional and damaging to the integrity of the electoral process,” and that it “violates the candidate’s free speech rights.” Petitioner Van Valkenburgh alleges that his personal rights of free speech are violated by I.C. § 34-907B because it forces the candidates to speak. The rights that Petitioner Van Valkenburgh appears to want to protect are those of unknown political candidates. His affidavit is unclear as to how his personal rights would be violated.
Similarly, Petitioner Penny Fletcher alleges that the law “violates the rights of voters and candidates for federal office.” While Petitioner Fletcher notes that she has been a candidate in the past, she does not claim to be a political candidate in the future. Finally, Petitioner Eastland repeats the generalized claims of the other petitioners that the law “damages the integrity of the electoral process.” He and the other petitioners do not explain how the electoral process is damaged or what part of the U.S. or Idaho Constitutions are being violated.
Thus, none of the petitioners allege that the rights being violated are different from those “shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens.” SPBA II, 128 Idaho at 834, 919 P.2d at 1035. Not one of the petitioners allege that they are candidates for elected offices. On the contrary, Petitioner Van Valkenburgh conceded that no “current officeholders or declared candidates were willing to serve in the role of petitioner in this case.” The generalized concerns alleged by the petitioners about the “integrity of the electoral process,” are the same types of concerns shared by all voters. These generalized concerns of the voting public are the same as those of the appellants in SPBA II, where this Court denied standing under just such circumstances.
D. Conclusion
Therefore, in conclusion, my analysis makes it clear to me that neither Idaho nor *133the U.S. laws or Constitutions have been violated as the law exists at this time. Further, the petitioners should have utilized the legal system that was available rather than ask this Court to grant extra-ordinary relief. Finally, the petitioners’ case fails because they have not shown any personal or unique injury. It is my view that lawsuits should be utilized to remedy wrongs or injuries; not as a means of political expression.