I respectfully dissent.
I agree with the majority that “to have the Repeal Statute govern product liability suits against tobacco companies . . . would indeed be a retroactive application of that statute . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 840.) Unlike the majority, however, I believe both the statutory language and the legislative history of Civil Code section 1714.451 evince a clear legislative intent to apply the statute retroactively. I further conclude that such retroactive application would not raise serious questions of constitutionality. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 845.)
Statutes are presumed to operate prospectively. (Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1208 [246 Cal.Rptr. 629, 753 P.2d 585] *849(Evangelatos); § 3.) “Of course, when the Legislature clearly intends a statute to operate retrospectively, we are obliged to carry out that intent unless due process considerations prevent us. [Citation.]” (Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 243 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 933 P.2d 507].) Whether the Legislature intended retroactive application of a statute requires an exercise in statutory interpretation to ascertain if, by “ ‘express language or clear and unavoidable implication,’ ” the presumption of prospective application has been overcome. (Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1208.) As this formulation in Evangelatos suggests, no talismanic word or phrase is required to establish retroactivity. Rather, the question is whether, from the language employed in the statute, there plainly emerges a legislative intent for the statute to operate retrospectively. Moreover, even in the absence of an express retroactivity provision, a statute may still be applied retroactively if the Legislature’s intention is sufficiently clear from such extrinsic sources as legislative history. (Id. at pp. 1208-1209.)
Contrary to the majority, I conclude that subdivision (f) of section 1714.45 (added by Stats. 1997, ch. 570, § 1; all references to the Repeal Statute are to the 1997 enactment) is a sufficiently unambiguous statement of the Legislature’s intent that the Repeal Statute be given retrospective effect. In reaching this conclusion, I rely on the familiar principle of statutory construction that requires, in the first instance, consulting the words of the statute itself to ascertain legislative intent. (Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg (1985) 38 Cal.3d 46, 51 [210 Cal.Rptr. 781, 694 P.2d 1153].) “The court is required to give effect to statutes ‘ “ ‘according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them.’ [Citations.] ‘If possible, significance should be given to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purposef ]’ [citation]; ‘a construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided.’ [Citation.]” ’ ” (Id. at p. 52.)
Subdivision (f) of section 1714.45 states: “It is the intention of the Legislature in enacting the amendments to subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section adopted at the 1997-98 Regular Session to declare that there exists no statutory bar to tobacco-related personal injury, wrongful death, or other tort claims against tobacco manufacturers and their successors in interest by California smokers or others who have suffered or incurred injuries, damages, or costs arising from the promotion, marketing, sale, or consumption of tobacco products. It is also the intention of the Legislature to clarify that those claims that were or are brought shall be determined on their merits, without the imposition of any claim of statutory bar or categorical defense. ” (Italics added.)
A statute speaks from the day it takes effect. (Hersh v. State Bar (1972) 7 Cal.3d 241, 245 [101 Cal.Rptr. 833, 496 P.2d 1201].) The inclusion of *850persons who “have suffered or incurred injuries” as among those to whom the abolition of the statutory immunity applies cannot be understood to mean anything other than that the Legislature, speaking as of January 1, 1998, intended to eliminate immunity for past injury-producing conduct by the tobacco industry. This construction of section 1714.45, subdivision (f) is further supported by the next sentence, which declares an intent that “those claims that were or are brought shall be determined, . . . without the imposition of any claim of statutory bar or categorical defense.” (Italics added.) The ordinary meaning of this language plainly precludes assertion by the tobacco companies of a statutory bar or other categorical defense not only to claims which may be brought in the future (“are brought”) but those based on past conduct (“were . . . brought”) as to which the original enactment (Stats. 1987, ch. 1498, § 3, p. 5778; hereafter the Immunity Statute) might otherwise have applied.
The majority is “not persuaded” that these “phrases in isolation” express the Legislature’s intent that the Repeal Statute should be retroactively applied. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 843.) The majority asserts: “Neither the italicized phrases nor section 1714.45, subdivision (f) as a whole states anything more than that Repeal Statute rescinded any former statutory immunity for tobacco companies.” (Ibid.) This conclusory statement, however, fails to suggest an alternative interpretation of the statute. In this respect, the majority’s approach does not comport with the principle of statutory construction that requires a reviewing court to give significance, if possible, to every word and phrase of a statute and avoid a construction that renders some words surplusage. (Steketee v. Lintz, Williams & Rothberg, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 52.) The majority then goes on to state that, even “were we to accept that proposed reading of subdivision (f), the Repeal Statute is, at best, ambiguous on the question of retroactivity because of the Legislature’s reference in subdivision (e) (allowing public entities to sue tobacco companies) to ‘a prior version’ of the statute as possibly precluding suits against tobacco companies by individual smokers.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 843.) Having thus discerned this ambiguity, the majority would apply the rule that a statute ambiguous as to retroactive application is to be applied prospectively. As I point out elsewhere, however, subdivision (e) does not conflict with the legislative mandate in subdivision (f) that the Repeal Statute be applied retroactively but, rather, addresses another legislative concern entirely; the possibility that the courts might determine that constitutional considerations preclude retroactivity, in which event, the Legislature carved out in subdivision (e) an exemption for public entities. In my view, therefore, subdivision (e) does not create an ambiguity. I would also observe that, by construing these two subdivisions so as to create a apparent conflict between them, the majority’s interpretation is contrary to the fundamental *851principle of statutory construction that requires us, in construing legislation, “to harmonize its various elements without doing violence to its language or spirit.” (Wells v. Marina City Properties, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 781, 788 [176 Cal.Rptr. 104, 632 P.2d 217].)
I find further support for my conclusion that the Legislature intended retroactive application of the Repeal Statute in the legislative history surrounding the addition of subdivision (f) to section 1714.45. This history strongly suggests that subdivision (f) was added in response to a concern that the statute might only apply prospectively.
Senate Bill No. 67, as originally proposed, did not contain what eventually became subdivision (f), nor any other declaration of legislative intent. (Sen. Bill No. 67 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) § 1, as introduced Dec. 11, 1996.) In anticipation of an April 1997 hearing on the bill, the Senate Judiciary Committee noted that “[s]ome concern has been expressed that [Senate Bill No.] 67 would apply only to causes of action arising on or after January 1, 1998, assuming it is enacted this year. In the absence of specific language in the legislature specifying retroactive application, a measure will operate prospectively only upon its enactment.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 67 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 14, 1997, italics added.) One week after this acknowledgement of concern about a prospective-only application of amendments as then drawn, the bill was amended further by the insertion of what would become subdivision (f). (Sen. Bill No. 67 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) § 1, subd. (d), as amended Apr. 16, 1997.)
The proximity of these events suggests that subdivision (f) was added to section 1714.45 in response to the concern expressed in the committee report. At minimum, that “the retroactivity question was actually consciously considered during the enactment process” (Evangelatos, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1211) supports a conclusion that retroactivity was intended.
The majority, examining this legislative history, simply concludes that the addition of subdivision (f) “may have been” the product of legislative compromise that allowed legislators with “differing views on retroactivity to vote for the Repeal Statute.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 845.) But no “differing views” are expressed in the committee report regarding retroactivity and I cannot agree with the majority’s explanation of the report. The plain meaning of the language used in subdivision (f) and the legislative history seem to me to unmistakably document such intent.
To buttress the assertion that subdivision (f) does not mean what it says, the majority, like defendants, cites subdivision (e) of section 1714.45. *852Subdivision (e) essentially reiterates an amendment to the Immunity Statute that exempted public entities from the statute. The original provision in the Immunity Statute stated that in an “action brought by a public entity, the fact that the injured individual’s claim against the defendant may be barred by this section shall not be a defense.” (§ 1714.45, former subd. (d), as amended by Stats. 1997, ch. 25, § 2, eff. June 12, 1997.) The current version in the Repeal Statute provides “[i]n the action brought by a public entity, the fact that the injured individual’s claim against the defendant may be barred by a prior version of this section shall not be a defense.” (§ 1714.45, subd. (e), italics added.)
The majority finds that the phrase “a prior version of this section” suggests that “even after the January 1, 1998, effective date of the Repeal Statute, ‘a prior version’ of that statute, namely the Immunity Statute, may continue to bar claims against tobacco companies brought by individual smokers.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 842.) In my view, subdivision (e) of section 1714.45 simply reflects the Legislature’s concern that, notwithstanding its intent that the Repeal Statute apply retroactively, the courts might decline to give retroactive effect to the statute based on due process or other constitutional concerns raised by retroactivity. (Western Security Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 243 [“Of course, when the Legislature clearly intends a statute to operate retrospectively, we are obliged to carry out that intent unless due process considerations prevent us” (italics added)].) Indeed, the majority touches upon these constitutional issues and while, in my view, they provide no basis to deny retroactive application of the Repeal Statute, the Legislature could not have forecast with absolute certainty whether its intent to apply the statute retroactively would survive a court challenge. This uncertainty by the Legislature is demonstrated by its use of the word “may.” Therefore, the Legislature chose to make it clear that, at minimum, suits by public entities would not be precluded by judicial fiat. This interpretation harmonizes subdivisions (e) and (f), which, notably, the majority’s approach does not. (Wells v. Marina City Properties, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 788 [“It is fundamental that legislation should be construed so as to harmonize its various elements without doing violence to its language or spirit.”].)
Finally, the majority suggests that constitutional considerations reinforce its interpretation of the Repeal Statute as not having retroactive application. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 845.) Specifically, the majority alludes to potential due process and ex post facto issues. The retroactive application of any statute must be vetted for constitutionality, but I do not agree that constitutional considerations support a conclusion of nonretroactivity. Nor are the cases cited by the majority persuasive in this respect. The concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel (1998) 524 U.S. 498, *853548-549 [118 S.Ct. 2131, 2158-2159, 141 L.Ed.2d 451], states little more than the truism that retroactive laws must meet the test of due process. The majority’s citation to dictum in Landgraf v. USI Film Products (1994) 511 U.S. 244 [114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229] on the ex post facto issue is equally general.
Retroactive application of a statute may be unconstitutional if, inter alia, it deprives a person of a vested right without due process of law. (In re Marriage of Buol (1985) 39 Cal.3d 751, 756 [218 Cal.Rptr. 31, 705 P.2d 354].) I am not convinced that the immunity conferred in this case, however, is a vested right. First, the immunity involved here was wholly a creation of statute, and its abolition does not affect the tobacco companies’ right to assert common law defenses in product liability actions. (Cf. Callet v. Alioto (1930) 210 Cal. 65, 67-68 [290 P. 438] [statutory rights, unlike common law rights, not vested for purposes of retroactive application of a statute because “all statutory remedies are pursued with full realization that the legislature may abolish the right to recover at any time”].) Second, I question whether a statutory immunity secured in part by deceptive representations by the tobacco companies about the lethal nature of their product should be deemed a vested right under any circumstance.2
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Immunity Statute created a vested right, it is settled that “[v]ested rights are not immutable; the state, exercising its police power, may impair such rights when considered reasonably necessary to protect the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the people.” (In re Marriage of Buol, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 760-761.) “In determining whether a retroactive law contravenes the due process clause, we consider such factors as the significance of the state interest served by the law, the importance of the retroactive application of the law to the effectuation of that interest, the extent of reliance upon the former law, the legitimacy of that reliance, the extent of actions taken on the basis of that *854reliance, and the extent to which the retroactive application of the new law would disrupt those actions.” (In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal. 3d 583, 592 [128 Cal.Rptr. 427, 546 P.2d 1371].)
I submit that, if the due process issue actually arose, all these factors would weigh heavily in favor of finding that retroactive application of the Repeal Statute does not contravene the due process clause. The state has a substantial interest in seeing that victims of dangerous products are compensated for their injuries by the manufacturers of dangerous or defective products that are in the best position to provide such compensation. (Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart (1978) 21 Cal.3d 322, 330 [146 Cal.Rptr. 550, 579 P.2d 441] [“one of the principal social policies served by product liability doctrine is to assign liability to a party who possesses the ability to distribute losses over an appropriate segment of society . . .”].) The state has an equally substantial interest in protecting and promoting the health of Californians. These interests would be significantly advanced by retroactive application of the Repeal Statute.
The Repeal Statute restores the right of Californians suffering from smoking-related illnesses to pursue product liability actions against the tobacco companies. Such meritorious actions would properly compensate the victims and would also shift the costs for their care from the public health system, to the extent the victims rely on public health care, to the tobacco companies. Furthermore, such actions expose the life-threatening consequences of tobacco use, as well as the tobacco companies’ deceptive practices in promoting the use of their products. In the past, such suits have helped create a popular repugnance toward the tobacco companies and their products that has, in turn, contributed to a decline in the amount of consumption of tobacco products, thus promoting the health of the populace and reducing health costs associated with tobacco use. Retroactive application of the Repeal Statute would serve both goals of victim compensation and reduction of the use of tobacco products. By contrast, the tobacco companies can claim little reliance on the decade-old Immunity Statute, since the claims ordinarily advanced in these kinds of suits involve conduct stretching back decades. Furthermore, as I observed, retroactive application of the Repeal Statute does not strip the tobacco companies of their common law defenses.
Briefly, the majority also suggests that retroactive application of the Repeal Statute could implicate the prohibition against ex post facto laws because of the potential availability of punitive damages. Again, however, the majority does not engage in an in-depth analysis that demonstrates retroactive application of the Repeal Statute would in fact violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Furthermore, the brief discussion of this *855point in the case cited by the majority, Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, 511 U.S. 244, is dictum. (Id. at p. 281 [114 S.Ct. at pp. 1505-1506].) Assuming a punitive damages award might be deemed penal for purposes of the ex post facto clause, the clause applies only if the challenged law makes criminal conduct that was not criminal at the time the action was performed. (Ibid. [“Before we entertain [the ex post facto] question, we would have to be confronted with a statute that explicitly authorized punitive damages for preenactment conduct”]; Collins v. Youngblood (1989) 497 U.S. 37, 42 [110 S.Ct. 2715, 2719, 111 L.Ed.2d 30].)
The conduct engaged in by the tobacco companies that might support an award of punitive damages in the instant case stretches back far beyond the 10-year period during which the Immunity Statute was in effect. As the majority concludes elsewhere in the opinion, neither due process concerns nor the ex post facto clause shields the tobacco companies from liability, presumably including punitive damages, for conduct they engaged in prior to the enactment of the Immimity Statute in 1988. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 847-848.) The effect of the Repeal Statute in that case is simply to restore the status quo ante that existed before January 1, 1988. Since the tobacco companies’ conduct that is the basis of the instant suit is a continuous course of action that encompasses several decades, I question whether a plausible ex post facto claim could be made. To do so the tobacco companies would be required to isolate specific acts that occurred during the immunity period and identify the percentage of a punitive damages award attributable to such conduct. This is not their position. Rather, they have argued that the Immunity Statute insulates them from any liability, including their pre-1988 conduct. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 847.) Therefore, the ex post facto concern raised by the majority seems both theoretical and dubious and does not present a substantive reason for declining to carry out the Legislature’s will by retroactively applying the Repeal Statute.
For all these reasons, therefore, I dissent.
All statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise indicated.
The majority asserts that there is no proof in the record that the 1987 legislation was the product of deception by tobacco companies. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 845, fn. 6.) At the time the Repeal Statute was proposed its author explained the need for the legislation was due in part to evidence that “the tobacco companies may have deliberately manipulated the level of nicotine” and also that “evidence shows the tobacco companies have systematically suppressed and concealed material information and waged an aggressive campaign of disinformation about the health consequences of tobacco use.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 67 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 8, 1997, p. 2.) In the same report, the California Medical Association, identified as “one of the main participants” in the 1987 legislation stated in support of the bill that “ ‘[o]ver the last decade we have learned much regarding the addictive nature of tobacco and the industry’s intentional efforts to mislead the public on the health effects of tobacco. This, coupled with the courts’ broad interpretation of the California statute, has precipitated the need to change that statute and remove tobacco’s liability protections.’ ” (Ibid) I submit that these remarks, particularly the comments of the California Medical Association which was a participant in the 1987 legislation, suggest that the tobacco companies did deceive the other parties to the legislative effort that resulted in the Immunity Statute.