In this case brought under the state Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.), the majority upholds the authority of the Fair Employment and Housing Commission (Commission) to award compensatory damages for emotional distress to housing discrimination victims.1 In doing so, the majority declines to follow an 11-year-old decision of this court, Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 245, 267 [284 Cal.Rptr. 718, 814 P.2d 704] (Walnut Creek Manor), which, over my dissent, held that the Commission’s award of compensatory damages violated our state Constitution’s judicial powers clause (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 1). That constitutional provision allows adjudications by administrative bodies only when reasonably necessary to further the purposes of the law being enforced.
Unlike the majority in Walnut Creek Manor, I would in that case have upheld the Commission’s award of compensatory damages to Robert Cannon, a 55-year-old African-American man, who for two and a half years unsuccessfully sought to rent an apartment in a large complex and, while on a waiting list, was passed over 35 times. In each instance, the unit was rented to a non-African-American who had applied later than Cannon. (Walnut Creek Manor, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 273-287 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) I pointed out that the Commission’s authority to compensate for emotional distress is crucial to the effective enforcement of FEHA, in part because in most cases of housing discrimination the victim’s out-of-pocket damages are de minimis, thus leaving emotional distress as the only compensable injury. (Walnut Creek Manor, supra, at pp. 280-281 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) As I explained, “[u]nless the administrative forum can continue to offer meaningful redress, many persons who have clearly suffered invidious discrimination may simply forgo their claims.” (Ibid.) Contrary to the majority’s holding in *759Walnut Creek Manor, I concluded that the Commission’s award of emotional distress damages did not violate the judicial powers clause of the California Constitution. (Walnut Creek Manor, supra, at p. 282 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).)
In response to the majority’s decision in Walnut Creek Manor, the Legislature substantially amended FEHA. (Stats. 1992, ch. 182, § 19, pp. 924-925; Stats. 1993, ch. 1277, §§ 9, 10, pp. 7518-7522.) It added, among other things, a provision allowing either party to a claim of housing discrimination brought before the Commission to opt out of the administrative proceeding and “to have the claim[] asserted in the charge adjudicated in a civil action” in court. (§ 12989, subd. (a).) Here, the majority relies on that provision and on this court’s arbitration decisions (see Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 362 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 581, 885 P.2d 994] (Advanced Micro Devices); Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183, 832 P.2d 899] (Moncharsh)) in now holding that the Commission’s authority to award emotional distress damages does not violate the state Constitution’s judicial powers clause.2 A contrary conclusion, the majority observes, “would create an unjustified distinction between the authority of arbitrators and that of administrative adjudicators.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 754.) I agree. I thus concur in the judgment reinstating the Commission’s $10,000 emotional distress award to African-American police officer Sheryl McCoy for being denied housing because of her race.
Further statutory references are to the Government Code.
With respect to the two arbitration cases cited, there too I disagreed with the holdings of the majority, which sanctioned virtually unfettered discretion by arbitrators in the decision-making process (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 33-40 (cone. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.)) and in awarding damages (Advanced Micro Devices, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 391-406 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.)).