concurring.
I write separately to emphasize that our affirmance of the judgements in these cases does not mean that we agree with the Borough's assertion that the noise ordinance at issue here is a proper exercise of the Borough's land use power under AS 29.40.040(a). The Borough relied on this rationale in the trial court, and Magistrate Zwink ruled in the Borough's favor on this point. But we are upholding the magistrate's ruling simply because Stevens has failed to brief the merits of that ruling.
There are reasons to doubt the Borough's assertion that the contested ordinance is justified under its land use power. AS 29.40.040(a) states that a second-class borough (such as the Matanuska-Susitra Borough) may regulate land use through (1) zoning regulations, (2) land use permitting requirements, and (8) "(any other] measures to further the goals and objectives of the [borough's] comprehensive plan" adopted under AS 29.40.0830.
The Borough relies on the second of these clauses, the permitting clause. That clause of AS 29.40.040(a) declares that the Borough is empowered to enact:
land use permit requirements designed to encourage or discourage specified uses [of land] and construction of specified structures, or to minimize unfavorable effects of [land] uses and the construction of structures[.]
The Borough claims that this statutory language-in particular, the phrases "discourage specified uses [of land]" and "minimize unfavorable effects of [land] use"-is the authorization for its noise ordinance.
The problem with the Borough's argument is that the noise ordinance at issue here does not appear to be a permitting ordinance. The ordinance simply establishes limits on the noise that can be generated on any property within the Borough (outside the city limits of Palmer, Wasilla, and Houston). It is true *14that a provision of the ordinance (8.52.020) allows an exemption from the normal noise limits for "a special event properly permitted under this code". But there is apparently no method for Stevens or any other property owner to apply for or obtain a permit that would exempt an ongoing business from the noise limits established by the ordinance.
Moreover, if the challenged ordinance is indeed a land use ordinance, the record leaves some doubt as to whether the Borough complied with state law when it enacted the ordinance. Under AS 29.40.040(a), all of a borough's land use ordinances must be adopted in accordance with, or to implement, a validly enacted comprehensive land use plan.1 This requirement "helps to guard against prejudice, arbitrary decision-making, and improper motives" by providing substantive standards to govern the borough's individual zoning decisions.2 This safeguard is particularly important in cases like the present one-where the borough government responded to public complaints regarding one particular person's use of his land.
Neither in its trial court pleadings nor in its briefing to this Court has the Borough explained how, or if, the challenged noise ordinance accords with or implements any provision of a comprehensive land use plan adopted by the Borough. From the record before us, it appears that the Borough Assembly did not discuss this issue at all when the Assembly debated and enacted the noise ordinance.3
Because I have these doubts about the Borough's offered justification for the noise ordinance, I want to emphasize that our ral-ing in this case is not intended to constitute an endorsement of the Borough's legal argument.
Order
In Stevens v. Matanusko-Susitna Borough, Alaska App. Opinion No.2051 (June 28, 2006), we affirmed Appellant Stevens's convictions in two cases for violating a Matanus-ka-Susitra Borough noise ordinance. Stevens had challenged the Borough ordinance on several grounds. We declined to resolve one of Stevens's claims-his claim that the Borough lacked the statutory authority to enact the noise ordinance-because we concluded that Stevens had not adequately briefed the issue.
Stevens filed a petition for rehearing, asking us to reconsider that decision. He now wishes to supplement his briefing so that the issue can be decided on the merits.
When Stevens raised this claim in district court, he relied on a specific statute: AS 29.35.210. He pointed out that this statute gave the Borough discretion to exercise a number of municipal powers-but that it did not give the Borough the authority to regulate noise.
The Borough conceded this point. It responded that the authority to enact the noise ordinance was found elsewhere in the Alaska Statutes-in AS 29.40.040(a), the statute defining the Borough's authority to regulate the use of land within its borders.
The trial magistrate agreed that the noise ordinance was a proper exercise of the Borough's land-use power, and issued a written order explaining his reasoning.
When Stevens raised this claim on appeal to this Court, he did not address the trial court's ruling. Instead, he repeated, essentially verbatim, the argument he made in district court-even though the Borough had already conceded his point.
In asking us to reconsider our conclusion that this amounted to inadequate briefing, Stevens notes that he cited authority in support of his argument. But the authority Stevens cited was irrelevant to the only disputed issue before this Court: whether the noise ordinance was a proper exercise of the land-use power conferred by AS 29.40.040(g). Stevens did not cite that statute anywhere in *15his briefs. And although he responded to questions on this issue at oral argument, that was too late to preserve his claim for appeal. Cf. Adamson v. University of Alaska, 819 P.2d 886, 889 (Alaska 1991).
It is well-settled that "[flailure to argue a point constitutes an abandonment of it." State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 528 (Alaska 1980). Even if we were to accept (as the Borough did) Stevens's claim that AS 29.85.210 does not give the Borough authority to enact a noise ordinance, we can not, in the absence of adversarial briefing, fairly resolve the larger and more complex question of whether the Borough has any authority under the Alaska Statutes to issue the ordinance.
Stevens argues that we should permit supplemental briefing on this issue. But the cases he cites in support of this argument involve either an unrepresented litigant or a party who, for whatever reason, failed to respond at all to a motion filed by the opposing party. Stevens was represented by counsel, and he filed briefs in two cases. When he filed those briefs, he had notice of all the arguments and rulings made in district court.
Accordingly, in consideration of the Petition for Rehearing filed on July 8, 2006,
IT IS ORDERED:
The Petition for Rehearing is DENIED.
Entered at the direction of the court.
. Lazy Mountain Land Club v. Matanuska-Susit-na Borough Board of Adjustment and Appeals, 904 P.2d 373, 377-78, 385 (Alaska 1995). See also Price v. Dahl, 912 P.2d 541, 542-43 (Alaska 1996).
. Lazy Mountain Land Club, 904 P.2d at 377-78.
. Minutes of the Matanuska-Susitna Borough Assembly, May 18, 2004, discussion of Ordinance No. 04-092, the Noise and Vibration Ordinance, adopting chapter 8.52 of the Matanuska-Susitna Borough Code.