dissenting.
The majority holds that Ballot Measure 3 (2000) violated Article XVII, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution by making two or more amendments to the constitution without submitting each amendment to the voters for a separate vote.1 Although I agree with the majority that Measure 3 made several substantive changes to the constitution, I disagree with its conclusion that at least two of the changes had to be adopted separately because they were not related closely enough to be adopted in a single amendment. I conclude that they were closely related and, consequently, that they did not have to be voted on separately. I also conclude that the measure complied with the single-subject requirement in Article IV, section l(2)(d).2 I therefore would affirm the trial court’s judgment that declared that Measure 3 did not violate either constitutional provision.
I commend the majority for its effort to make sense of the principle in Article XVII, section 1, that requires separate votes on separate amendments to the constitution. The text of the provision provides little guidance about its meaning, and the cases interpreting it provide little direct analytical help either. I am convinced, however, that the majority misunderstands the provision and the cases that have applied it.
*555Article XVII, section 1, requires that separate amendments to the Oregon Constitution be voted on separately. Equivalent requirements are found in many state constitutions.3 The provision complements Article XVII, section 2, which governs the process by which the constitution can be revised. Viewed together, the provisions establish a comprehensive system for altering the constitution.
An amendment involves a discrete, circumscribed change to the constitution. It can be proposed by initiative petition or by legislative referral. A majority vote by both houses of the legislature is required for the legislature to refer an amendment to the voters for their approval. Or Const, Art XVII, § 1.
In contrast, a revision involves a constitutional change that affects more than a discrete, circumscribed part of the constitution. It can be proposed only by the legislature, and it requires a two-thirds vote by both houses for it to be referred to the voters for approval. Id. at § 2.
For the amendment and revision provisions to work, they necessarily require that there be a standard or test by which to determine what constitutes an amendment to the constitution. Surprisingly, Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or 250, 959 P2d 49 (1998), was the first Oregon case to establish such a standard and one of the first in the country to do so. It is noteworthy that courts in several states have relied on Armatta in interpreting comparable provisions in their state constitutions.4
I will discuss Armatta in greater detail later in this opinion. What is important to note here is that it established a two-part test for determining whether a proposed constitutional change constitutes an amendment. Under the test, people who draft amendments and courts that enforce the separate-vote requirement for amendments first must determine whether a proposed amendment makes more than one *556substantive change to the constitution. If it does, then drafters and courts must determine whether the substantive changes are closely related. If they are, then the proposed amendment can properly be adopted as an amendment. Conversely, if the substantive changes are not closely related, then the proposed amendment cannot properly be adopted as an amendment. See id. at 275-77.
Armatta held that Ballot Measure 40 (1996) violated the test that the court established for the separate-vote requirement by making two or more substantive changes to the constitution that were not closely related. 327 Or at 283-85. Although the court explained in Armatta why the substantive changes on which it focused in the case were not closely related, see id., the court did not attempt to describe or further define the characteristics of substantive changes that would be closely related enough to meet the constitutional test.
The court has since refused to refine or alter the test established in Armatta, see Lehman v. Bradbury, 333 Or 231, 240-42, 37 P3d 989 (2002), which makes sense. Although the Armatta test is imprecise, it may be the best test available to implement the separate-vote requirement in Article XVII, section 1, given the broad range of conceivable substantive changes that could be made to the constitution. That means that court decisions that correctly apply the test or that are consistent with it will provide important guidance about the test.
A review of the Oregon cases that have applied the separate-vote requirement suggests that the structure of the constitution, itself, bears on whether a proposed amendment complies with the requirement. The Oregon Constitution and other comparable constitutions are structured as they are because of judgments that their drafters made about how different, discrete policies should be embodied in them. Some of the divisions within them are arbitrary, in that the constitutions could have been sensibly designed with fewer or different subdivisions.5 Nevertheless, the way in which the *557relevant constitutions are structured bears on whether a proposed amendment constitutes a single amendment or multiple amendments. A proposed amendment satisfies the separate-vote requirement if it addresses a discrete subject in a way that is consistent with the manner in which comparable subjects have been segregated into discrete components in the constitutions. That means that the provisions of a proposed amendment bear a close enough relationship to each other to be part of a single amendment if the provisions, when considered together, could reasonably have been included as a single component in the relevant constitutions, given the manner in which those constitutions have been divided into discrete components.6
As I will explain, that understanding of the separate-vote requirement is consistent with and, I believe, implicit in the Supreme Court cases that have applied -it. However, the understanding that I have described can perhaps best be explored through consideration of several hypothetical amendments to the constitution.
Assume, for example, that the Oregon Constitution did not have a Bill of Rights at its adoption and that a proposed amendment sought to add one to it. The proposed amendment arguably could satisfy the single-subject requirement in Article IV, section l(2)(d), of the constitution because it would seek to add to the constitution a body of civil liberties guarantees against the government. However, those guarantees traditionally have been embodied in separate provisions that address discrete subjects, such as free speech, religious liberty, the right to bear arms, etc. Consequently, as a matter of constitutional structure, the separate-vote requirement would require the different guarantees to be *558submitted as separate amendments, as was done with the federal Bill of Rights.
The same principle would apply to the particular guarantees themselves. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution contains several guarantees: religious liberty, freedom of speech and of the press, and freedom of assembly. US Const, Amend I. In contrast, the Oregon Bill of Rights contains six separate provisions on religious liberty, a separate provision on freedom of speech, and a separate provision on freedom of assembly. See Or Const, Art I, §§ 2-8, 26. The decision by the drafters of the Oregon Constitution to separate the religious liberty, speech, and assembly provisions in the manner that they did arguably suggests that each provision was understood to be independently significant, which suggests that the separate-vote requirement might require that each provision be amended by a separate amendment. However, the First Amendment provides some support for the idea that the various guarantees could sensibly be addressed in a single amendment. Furthermore, a good argument could be made that, notwithstanding the existing provisions of the Oregon Bill of Rights, at least some of the religious liberty guarantees are closely related enough so that they could be adopted or amended by a single amendment and not run afoul of the separate-vote requirement. See id. at §§ 2-4. The same point could be made about the free speech and free assembly provisions. See id. at §§ 8, 26.
In the same vein, it might not be possible to adopt or amend the constitution’s legislative article, Article IV, in a single amendment without violating the separate-vote requirement. It might be possible, however, to address portions of that article, such as the provisions on the form and adoption of bills, in a single amendment without violating the requirement. That might be so because, while there are several, separate provisions that address that subject in the constitution, see id. at Art IV, §§ 18-22, the different aspects of the subject that they address are closely related enough for them to be sensibly combined in a single amendment without conflicting with the structural principle embodied in the separate-vote requirement.
*559The Oregon cases are consistent with that understanding of the separate-vote requirement. Baum v. Newbry, 200 Or 576, 267 P2d 220 (1954), the first case that applied the requirement, provides a useful starting point from which to analyze the issue. Baum involved a separate-vote challenge to a 1952 amendment to Article IV, section 6, of the Oregon Constitution, the provision that governs the reapportionment of the Oregon legislature. The amendment made a number of substantive changes to the constitution. They included changes in the census used to apportion the legislature, creation of direct Supreme Court review of reapportionment plans, imposition of a requirement that the Secretary of State reapportion the legislature if the legislature fails to do so, alteration of the formula by which senators and representatives are to be reapportioned, and adoption of a reapportionment plan for the legislature that took effect in 1954. Or Const, Art IV, § 6 (1952). Although the amendment made those changes, the court rejected the plaintiffs contention that Article XVII, section 1, required a separate vote on any of them. The court was right to do that.
The 1859 constitution required the legislature to reapportion itself at least every ten years. Or Const, Art IV, § 6 (1859). However, as of 1952, the legislature had failed for 45 years to reapportion itself, and there was no apparent mechanism by which the requirement could be enforced. The people who proposed the 1952 amendment sought to correct the problem. Although the goal of obtaining valid and timely reapportionments of the legislature could have been accomplished in a variety of ways, all of the provisions of the 1952 amendment represented sensible choices to achieve that singular goal.
More fundamentally, however, the 1859 constitution addressed legislative reapportionment in a single section. See id. Although the 1952 amendment established a more complex and comprehensive scheme to ensure timely reap-portionments of the legislature, the amendment simply expanded the content of a single, discrete component of the original constitution without altering its essential character or function. Furthermore, there is no reason to conclude that, in light of the structure of the constitution, the provisions of the 1952 amendment could not sensibly have been placed in *560a single section of the constitution. In other words, the substantive changes made by the amendment were related closely enough to be considered to be a single amendment to a single section of the constitution.
However one analyzes the decision in Baum, I have no doubt that it reached the right result under Article XVII, section 1. An interpretation of Article XVTI, section 1, that required a separate vote on any of the components of the 1952 amendment would be an interpretation that made little or no sense. That is why I am now persuaded that the test that we established in Dale v. Keisling, 167 Or App 394, 999 P2d 1229 (2000), to implement Article XVII, section 1, was wrong. We held in Dale that multiple substantive changes produced by the enactment of a measure are “closely related” if a vote in favor of one necessarily implies a vote in favor of the others. Id. at 401. Under that test, many of the provisions in the 1952 reapportionment amendment would have had to have been voted on separately because a vote for one of them would not logically imply a vote for the others. We erred in Dale because we focused on the relationship of one substantive change to another without considering the relationship of the various changes to the whole, and because we failed to recognize that the constitution’s structure bears on whether a group of substantive changes to the constitution are related closely enough to constitute a single amendment.
The Supreme Court has since confirmed in Armatta, 327 Or at 268-69, and in Hartung v. Bradbury, 332 Or 570, 579 & n 5, 33 P3d 972 (2001), that Baum was correctly decided and would not have been decided differently under the separate-vote analysis that the court established in Armatta and has applied in subsequent cases. Consequently, any application of the principles established in Armatta must be consistent with Baum.7
The decision in Hartung also is instructive. There, the court upheld a 1986 amendment to the reapportionment section that was at issue in Baum. The 1986 amendment *561essentially codified the court’s holding in McCall v. Legislative Assembly, 291 Or 663, 674-86, 634 P2d 223 (1981), that state senators whose terms continue beyond the first election that is held under a new apportionment plan must be assigned to represent districts that did not elect senators at that election. Compare id. with Or Const, Art IV, § 6(1) (1986). It also amended the constitution to provide that the senators who are assigned to the new districts are subject to recall by the electors of the new districts rather than by the electors of the former districts from which they were elected. Compare Or Const, Art IV, § 6(5) (1986), with Or Const, Art IV, § 6 (1952). The latter change is a substantive change that represents a policy choice that is closely correlated to the policy choice to assign holdover senators to new senate districts. That change also happens to involve a subject—the recall of elected public officials—that is addressed by another section of the constitution, Article II, section 18.
It makes practical and political sense to design the system so that senators assigned to new districts are subject to recall by the electors of the new districts, but the system presumably could function if holdover senators were subject to recall by the electors of their former districts rather than their new districts. See McCall, 291 Or at 676-82. In other words, the policy choice that the change made is not one that was compelled by the decision to codify the McCall holding by assigning holdover senators to new districts. Furthermore, as a matter of constitutional design or structure, the recall provision for holdover senators could have been made part of Article IV, section 6, as it was, or it could have been made part of Article II, section 18, the recall section of the constitution. A proper understanding of the close-relationship test of Armatta must consider the import of those features of the 1986 measure, because Hartung held that the substantive changes made by the 1986 reapportionment amendment were related closely enough to meet the standard imposed by the separate-vote requirement.
Several other separate-vote cases must be considered as well. Armatta is the most prominent among them. As noted earlier, Armatta held that Ballot Measure 40 (1996), violated the separate-vote requirement. Among other things, the measure made substantive changes to a number of the *562provisions of the Oregon Bill of Rights. The court concluded that changes to existing provisions of the Bill of Rights that serve very different purposes and affect different groups of people were not changes that were closely related. Armatta, 327 Or at 283-84. That makes sense. The Bill of Rights embodies a number of distinct policy choices that are the products of very different historical developments. Except for provisions of the Bill of Rights that are related to each other, such as the provisions on religious liberty, see Or Const, Art I, §§ 2-7, it is unlikely that changes to two or more provisions of the Bill of Rights could be considered to be closely related changes because, as the court later put the point in Lehman, “it is difficult to make related changes to unrelated constitutional provisions.” Lehman, 333 Or at 246. The court subsequently applied that principle in League of Oregon Cities v. State of Oregon, 334 Or 645, 673-74, 56 P3d 892 (2002), in which it held that an amendment that made substantive changes to the guarantee of free expression in Article I, section 8, and the guarantee of just compensation for the taking of property in Article I, section 18, violated the separate-vote requirement.
Lehman involved a different problem. It concerned a challenge to Ballot Measure 3 (1992), which amended the Oregon Constitution to establish or modify term limits for a number of elected state officials and for the members of Oregon’s congressional delegation. With regard to the state officials, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that changes that affected legislative and executive officials were unrelated because they involved officials in different branches of government who performed very different functions. The court held that those changes were related because the original constitution had several provisions that imposed limits on elected officials in all three branches of state government. See Lehman, 333 Or at 247-48. That suggested, as a structural matter, that changes to the restrictions affecting elected officials in different branches of state government could appropriately be considered to be related to each other.
However, the court did not need to resolve whether those changes were closely related for purposes of the separate-vote requirement. That is because it concluded that the changes that affected the state officials were not closely related to those that affected the federal officials, which *563meant that the measure violated the separate-vote requirement and, hence, was invalid. Id. at 248-50. In reaching that conclusion, the court noted that, in contrast with the provisions in the original constitution that established various qualifications for elected state officials, there were no provisions in that constitution that imposed qualifications or limits on federal officials elected from Oregon. Instead, the qualifications and limits that apply to people elected to Congress from Oregon are found in the federal constitution.
There is a reason for that. The state and federal governments are fundamentally different entities. With few exceptions, decisions on how to constitute and limit state government and its elected officials are decisions that the people of Oregon make. In contrast, decisions about how to constitute and limit the federal government and its elected officials are decisions that the entire country makes. Consistent with that point, a decision to impose a limit on elected state officials presents a very different structural issue from a decision to impose a limit on elected federal officials. For example, a decision to impose term limits on all elected officials in the legislative and executive branches of state government affects both branches of state government in a consistent way. In contrast, a decision to impose term limits on the members of Oregon’s congressional delegation affects only Oregon’s members. In a Congress in which no other state imposes similar limits on its congressional delegation and in which seniority matters, the decision places Oregon in a very different position from all other states. Of course, the United States Supreme Court held in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 US 779, 115 S Ct 1842, 131 L Ed 2d 881 (1995), that states cannot impose term limits on the members of Congress because they lack the authority to add to the qualifications in the federal constitution for members of Congress. For our purposes, the important point is that a change in the Oregon Constitution on the qualifications for elected state officials presents an issue that is qualitatively and structurally different from a change in the qualifications for Oregon’s congressional delegation. Lehman properly recognized that fundamental difference.
The majority appears not to understand my point about Lehman. See 188 Or App at 550-52. As noted, U.S. *564Term Limits established that a provision imposing term limits on members of Congress cannot properly be made a part of a state constitution, which serves to emphasize the point that I have tried to make—that state policies affecting state officials present very different issues from those affecting federal officials. The state and federal officials are chosen by the same electors, but they perform functions for separate sovereigns. Even if a state constitution could be amended to include a provision on the qualification of members of Congress, the amendment that made that change would have to be adopted separately from one addressed to the qualifications of state elected officials because, as a matter of constitutional structure, state and federal officials are fundamentally distinct. Although the policy goal and subject of the two amendments would be the same—limiting the term óf office of people elected to public office—the state officials affected by the policy would be distinct from the federal officials affected by the policy when viewed in terms of the structure of the state and federal governments and, consequently, the structure of the relevant constitutions.
The final case that bears on the issue is Swett v. Bradbury, 333 Or 597, 43 P3d 1094 (2002). It involved a challenge to Ballot Measure 62 (1998), which adopted a number of provisions on the conduct of Oregon elections. The court focused on two of those provisions in concluding that the measure violated the separate-vote requirement. One of the provisions implicitly amended Article II of the constitution by imposing new campaign finance disclosure requirements on elected public officials who receive more than $500 from any one contributor. The other provision amended Article IV by adding a requirement that people who gather initiative signatures be registered Oregon voters. The court had little difficulty concluding that those two provisions were not closely related. The two provisions involved very different subjects— the conduct of elected public officials versus the qualifications of people who solicit initiative signatures—that are found in two different articles of the original constitution and that bear no apparent relationship to each other in terms of constitutional structure or design. See Swett, 333 Or at 608-09.
I will now turn to the measure involved in this case, Ballot Measure 3 (2000). It adopts a number of provisions *565that deal with the forfeiture of property to the government. The use of civil forfeiture as a law enforcement tool is a relatively recent phenomenon. Although a body of law has developed over the past several decades concerning its use, it remains an innovation whose use has expanded greatly over the past 30 years. Measure 3 represents an effort to modify and systematize the use of civil forfeiture in Oregon. As such, it contains a number of provisions that make substantive changes to the constitution in order to establish a systematic policy on civil forfeiture. They include (1) a provision that requires that property owners be convicted of crimes and their property be established "to have been instrumental in committing or facilitating the crime or to be proceeds of that crime” before their property can be forfeited to the government, (2) a provision that seeks to protect financial institutions and others who have interests in property that is subject to forfeiture, (3) a provision that addresses the forfeiture of unclaimed property and contraband, (4) a provision that preserves the ability of the state to retain property temporarily for evidentiary or protective purposes, (5) a provision that governs the sale of forfeited property and the distribution of the funds obtained from forfeiture, (6) provisions that address the manner in which the state deals with the federal government on forfeiture, and (7) a provision that imposes civil penalties against people who violate specified provisions of the measure. See Or Const, Art XV, § 10.8
Because the measure makes several substantive changes to the constitution, the issue for us is whether those changes are closely related enough for purposes of the separate-vote requirement to be adopted in a single amendment. I am persuaded that they are.
In my view, Measure 3 is equivalent to the 1952 reapportionment measure that was upheld against a separate-vote challenge in Baum. Both measures adopted a group of provisions that were intended to establish a coherent and comprehensive scheme to address a discrete policy goal.9 The *5661952 reapportionment measure sought to establish a system by which to ensure periodic reapportionment of the Oregon legislature. The measure embodied a series of policy decisions about the manner in which to accomplish that goal, but those policy decisions were ones that had to be addressed in order to accomplish the goal. There was no reason in terms of the structure of state government or the structure of the constitution to require the various provisions of that measure to be adopted by separate votes.
The same principles apply to Measure 3. It seeks to establish a comprehensive approach to the use of civil forfeiture as a law enforcement tool.10 It embodies a series of policy decisions about civil forfeiture, but those policy decisions are ones that had to be addressed in order to establish a comprehensive system of civil forfeiture. Furthermore, they are not decisions that, in terms of the structure of state government or the structure of the constitution, needed to be submitted to separate votes.11
Admittedly, the measures struck down in Armatta, League of Oregon Cities, Lehman, and Swett also sought to establish comprehensive systems of some kind, so it is not enough to show that the provisions of an amendment serve such a purpose. That showing may satisfy the single-subject *567requirement of Article IV, section 1(2)(d), but the separate-vote requirement addresses a different concern.
The nature of the latter concern is perhaps best addressed here through consideration of the two changes to the constitution on which the majority focuses in concluding that Measure 3 violated the separate-vote requirement. Those changes are (1) the addition of a requirement that a property owner be convicted of a crime in order for the government to forfeit the owner’s property and (2) the addition of a requirement that funds obtained by forfeiture be used to fund drug treatment programs. 188 Or App at 547. Although those two policy choices could have been submitted to the voters separately, there is no reason to believe that Article XVII, section 1, was intended to require them to be submitted to the voters separately. In particular, there is no reason in terms of the structure of state government or of the constitution to conclude that a provision that creates or regulates a source of funds must be adopted separately from a provision that controls the use of those funds. The 1984 measure that created the state lottery, Ballot Measure 4 (1984), contained provisions that created and regulated the state lottery and specified how the money raised from the lottery was to be spent by the state. Although the combination of those changes to the constitution in a single amendment has not been subjected to a separate-vote challenge, I believe that such a challenge, if made, would not succeed. I believe that the same conclusion applies to the two provisions on which the majority focuses in this case.
In reaching a different conclusion, the majority says that the changes at issue here appear to be no more closely related than were the changes at issue in Lehman, which the Supreme Court held to violate the separate-vote requirement. The majority says:
“If the constitutional changes at issue in Lehman, both of which related to a specific objective—the creation of term limits for public officials—had ‘little or nothing to do’ with each other, Lehman, 333 Or at 250, then it is difficult to conceive how the constitutional changes effected by subsections 3 and 7 of Measure 3 could be regarded as closely related. There is little, if any, logical relationship between subsection 3, a provision that gives a property owner the *568right to be convicted of a crime before his or her property may be forfeited, and subsection 7, which directs and restricts the purposes for which forfeiture proceeds can lawfully be used.”
188 Or App at 547. The comparison is inapt.
As noted earlier, the qualifications of elected state officials present very different issues in terms of the structure of state government and of the state constitution from those of the members of Oregon’s congressional delegation. Although the term-limits measure sought to achieve a specific objective, the relevant provisions of that measure addressed the qualifications of two different groups of elected officials that, in structural and constitutional terms, bore no relationship to each other. The changes on which the majority focuses in this case are in no sense comparable.
The mistake that the majority makes is to confuse the separate-amendment and single-subject requirements of the constitution. As I have explained, the separate-vote requirement is concerned with the structure of state government and the structure of the constitution. Whether two changes are closely related for purposes of that requirement concerns how the changes fit together when viewed in terms of governmental and constitutional structure. The focus is not on whether the changes achieve policy goals that are closely related to each other.
Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, see 188 Or App at 549-50, I recognize that an amendment that runs afoul of the single-subject requirement will necessarily run afoul of the separate-vote requirement because an amendment cannot satisfy that latter requirement if it includes provisions addressed to two different subjects. What the majority fails to understand, however, is that the question whether two constitutional changes are closely related for purposes of the separate-vote requirement does not concern whether the two changes are closely related as subjects, but whether they are closely related in a way that makes it appropriate for them to be included in a single, discrete provision of the constitution, in light of how the constitution, itself, is structured. *569The focus of the single-subject and separate-vote requirements is different in a way that the majority simply does not appreciate.
A comparison of the reapportionment amendment upheld in Baum and the forfeiture amendment at issue here should help clarify the point. In order to ensure that the legislature is reapportioned every 10 years, there must be a mechanism created to ensure that that occurs. There also must be a formula by which to allocate legislators to the different parts of the state. The 1952 reapportionment amendment addressed both issues. It provided for direct Supreme Court review of reapportionment plans, it required the Secretary of State to adopt a reapportionment plan if the legislature failed to adopt a valid plan, and it adopted a formula to be used to allocate legislators to different parts of the state. See Or Const, Art IV, § 6 (1952).
When viewed in isolation, there is no logical connection between the constitutional change that imposed on the Secretary of State the duty to adopt a valid reapportionment plan if the legislature failed to do so and the constitutional change that adopted a reapportionment formula for the allocation of legislators in the state.12 Nevertheless, Baum held that those changes were properly adopted as part of a single amendment, which means that the changes were closely related for purposes of the separate-vote requirement. That conclusion has to be correct. As a matter of constitutional design or structure, a reapportionment provision in a constitution is the type of provision that would commonly be placed in a single section of the constitution. Components that properly comprise such a provision, such as those addressed to the mechanisms and formula used to reapportion the legislature, are components that are closely related to each other for purposes of the separate-vote requirement.
The same analysis applies to the forfeiture amendment. A forfeiture system must contain provisions that specify the property and interests in property that are subject to *570forfeiture and the use to be made of forfeiture proceeds. Measure 3 addressed both issues. It identified the property that is subject to forfeiture and provided that property owners must be convicted of a crime in order to have their property forfeited. It also required that the funds obtained from forfeiture be used for drug treatment.
When viewed in isolation, there is no logical connection between the constitutional change that requires that property owners be convicted of a crime in order for their property to be subject to forfeiture and the constitutional change that requires that forfeiture proceeds be used for drug treatment.13 Nevertheless, as in Baum, those changes are closely related for purposes of the separate-vote requirement. As a matter of constitutional design or structure, a provision addressed to the forfeiture of property by the government is the type of provision that would commonly be placed in a single section of the constitution. Components that properly comprise such a provision, such as those addressed to the conditions under which forfeiture can occur and the use to be made of forfeiture proceeds, are components that are closely related to each other for purposes of the separate-vote requirement.
The majority also suggests that the two changes are not closely related for purposes of the separate-vote requirement because they arguably confer or address rights affecting different groups of people:
“In determining whether the provisions are closely related, we also consider whether they affect the rights of *571different groups of people. Here, they arguably do. Subsection 3 confers a right on owners of property subject to possible forfeiture, for whom a criminal conviction must precede forfeiture. Subsection 7, on the other hand, arguably confers a benefit on a different group, persons receiving drug treatment.”
188 Or App at 547-48. The majority is wrong. The provision that restricts the use of forfeiture proceeds to programs that provide drug treatment does not confer on people who need drug treatment a right to receive drug treatment any more than the creation of a dedicated fund for any other activity is understood to create rights in the possible beneficiaries of the fund. In other words, if the majority were correct, then the creation of the highway trust fund or the original lottery fund created rights in favor of the potential beneficiaries of those funds. Whatever ability potential beneficiaries (or taxpayers for that matter) have to obtain court relief against a misapplication of those funds, they do not have rights that are equivalent to the rights that are conferred on people by the Bill of Rights, which are the type of rights that were at issue in Armatta that led the court to invalidate Measure 40 on separate-vote grounds.14 It is the latter type of rights that, as a matter of constitutional structure, are unrelated to one another and that, as a consequence, must be addressed through separate amendments.
In summary, although Measure 3 made a number of substantive changes to the Oregon Constitution, those changes are closely related changes when evaluated under the policies that Article XVII, section 1, seeks to achieve. The majority errs in concluding otherwise. In light of the nature of Measure 3,1 also have no difficulty concluding that *572it complied with the single-subject requirement in Article IV, section l(2)(d), of the constitution. I therefore would affirm the trial court’s judgment that declared that Measure 3 complied with the separate-vote and single-subject requirements of the constitution.
Article XVII, section 1, provides, in part:
“When two or more amendments shall be submitted * * * to the voters of this state at the same election, they shall be so submitted that each amendment shall be voted on separately.”
Article IV, section l(2)(d), provides, in part:
“A proposed law or amendment to the Constitution shall embrace one subject only and matters properly connected therewith.”
See, e.g., Cal Const, Art XVIII, § 1; Iowa Const, Art X, § 2; Mont Const, Art XIV, § 11; NJ Const, Art IX, ¶ 5; NM Const, Art XIX, § 1; Pa Const, Art XI, § 1.
See Marshall v. State ex rel. Cooney, 293 Mont 274, 975 P2d 325, 328-31 (1999); Cambria v. Soaries, 169 NJ 1, 776 A2d 754, 763-65 (2001); Pennsylvania Prison Society v. Commonwealth, 727 A2d 632, 634-35 (Pa Cmwlth 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 565 Pa 526, 776 A2d 971 (2001).
For example, Article IV of the Oregon Constitution, the subdivision that addresses the legislative branch, did not have to be divided into as many sections as it is.
The majority suggests that consideration of constitutional design or structure is of little help in the separate-vote analysis because constitutions include seemingly arbitrary divisions. It notes, for example, that the provision that created the initial judicial districts was placed in Article XVIII, the schedule article, rather than in Article VII, the judicial article. See 188 Or App at 549-50, 550 n 13. The majority misunderstands the point. The structure of the Oregon Constitution and other comparable constitutions provides guidance in assessing whether proposed constitutional changes are closely related for purposes of the separate-vote requirement. It does not provide a rigid standard by which to make such an assessment.
I explain how the holding in Baum bears on the decision in this case later in this opinion. See 188 Or App at 565-66, 569-70 (Armstrong, J., dissenting). The majority makes no effort to reconcile its decision with Baum. It does not make that effort because its decision cannot be reconciled with Baum.
The measure contains additional provisions, for example, a provision that states the principles that underlie the measure. See Or Const, Art XV, § 10(2). However, the separate-vote requirement is concerned only with substantive changes to the constitution, so not all provisions of the measure need to be considered in assessing whether the measure violated the separate-vote requirement.
The majority contends that the Supreme Court in Lehman essentially rejected an approach to the separate-vote analysis that embodies such a focus. 188 *566Or App at 552-53. The majority misunderstands both my point and the point on which it relies in Lehman. In Lehman, the court said that it would not replace the close-relationship test that it had adopted in Armatta with a test that the state had proposed in Lehman because it did not believe that the proposed alternative test was preferable to theArmaifa test. Lehman, 333 Or at 242. Its decision to reject the alternative test did not imply that the alternative test was wrong or that it would lead to an incorrect result in every case in which it was applied. As to my point, I am not advancing a general test to be applied in every separate-vote case. Instead, I am analyzing the reapportionment amendment that was upheld in Baum and, in light of the characteristics of that amendment, explaining why it supports my conclusion that the forfeiture amendment also should be upheld under the separate-vote requirement.
The majority disputes that Measure 3 established a comprehensive approach to civil forfeiture. 188 Or App at 552-53. Civil forfeiture arose and operates within an established legal framework. Consequently, it is not necessary to address all aspects of civil forfeiture in order to establish a comprehensive approach to its use within the existing legal structure. The provisions of Measure 3 are comprehensive in their effect on the use of civil forfeiture in Oregon.
It should be telling that the majority makes no effort to reconcile its decision in this case with the decisions in Baum and Hartung, both of which upheld measures that involved substantive constitutional changes that were no more closely related than are the changes at issue here.
In other words, the decision to assign reapportionment tasks to the Secretary of State had no connection to the decision to adopt a particular formula for the allocation of legislators to the different parts of the state.
One could argue that there is a logical connection between those two changes in light of the apparent source of most forfeiture proceeds. It appears that most of the funds obtained from forfeiture are the product of drug-related offenses. If that is true, then there is some sense to the idea that forfeiture proceeds should be used for drug treatment, because the treatment would reduce the conduct that gives rise to the forfeitures. In contrast, there is no tenable connection between the decision to establish a state lottery and the decision to use the net proceeds from the lottery to fund economic development, yet the constitutional amendment that established the lottery required that lottery funds be used for economic development. See Or Const, Art XV, § 4 (1984). As noted earlier, I do not believe that the lottery amendment violated the separate-vote requirement by combining provisions that established the state lottery with a provision that required that lottery funds be used for economic development. The same conclusion applies to the forfeiture amendment.
Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, see 188 Or App at 548 n 11, I do not dispute that people who need drug treatment could seek judicial relief to enforce the provision that requires that forfeiture proceeds be devoted to drug treatment. They could seek that relief, but so could taxpayers. My point is that the provision that controls the use of forfeiture proceeds is not intended to confer a right to drug treatment on those who need it, and it does not confer such a right. Nothing would stop the state from reducing existing funding for drug treatment in the amount by which forfeitures would generate funds for drug treatment. The requirement that forfeiture proceeds be used for drug treatment does not create rights equivalent to those at issue in Armatta and League of Oregon Cities, that is, rights of the type that are guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Consequently, the inclusion of that requirement does not create a constitutional change that is unrelated to the change that requires that forfeitures be based on criminal convictions.