The majority strains to construe key statutory phrases in a manner inconsistent with the legislative intent as reflected in the language and history of the relevant statutes and as ascertained in our recent opinion in People v. Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 906, 3 P.3d 278], I respectfully dissent.
Penal Code section 120311 makes it a crime for a person to carry a loaded firearm in public. (Id., subd. (a)(1).) Ordinarily, a person found in violation of this statute is subject to misdemeanor punishment. (Id., subd. (a)(2)(G).) As relevant here, however, section 12031 authorizes felony punishment where the violator “is an active participant in a criminal street gang, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 186.22 [hereafter section 186.22(a)], under the Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act.”2 (§ 12031, subd. (a)(2)(C); hereafter section 12031(a)(2)(C).)
As the majority observes, just last month we unanimously concluded in People v. Castenada, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pages 745 and 752, that a defendant “actively participates” in a criminal street gang “within the meaning of section 186.22[(a)]” where the defendant’s gang involvement “is more than nominal or passive.”3 (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1110, fn. 2.) Logically, then, it follows that a person “is an active participant in a criminal street gang, as *1117defined in [section 186.22(a)]” where the person’s involvement with a criminal street gang is more than nominal or passive. Under this natural and commonsense reading of section 12031(a)(2)(C), the crime of carrying a loaded firearm in public, normally punishable as a misdemeanor, becomes punishable as a felony when the person carrying the firearm is more than nominally or passively involved with a criminal street gang.
As explained in People v. Castenada, a person’s active participation in a criminal street gang, without more, does not amount to a violation of section 186.22(a): “[T]he Legislature expressly required in section 186.22(a) that a defendant not only ‘actively participates’ in a criminal street gang . . . but also that the defendant does so with ‘knowledge that [the gang’s] members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity,’ and that the defendant ‘willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang.’ ” {People v. Castenada, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 749, italics added.) It therefore is plain that section 186.22(a)’s phrase “actively participates in any criminal street gang” refers to only one of three distinct elements of the offense described in that statute.. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the majority effectively construes section 12031(a)(2)(C)’s key reference to “an active participant in a criminal street gang, as defined in [section 186.22(a)]” to mean a person who: (1) actively participates in a criminal street gang by being more than nominally or passively involved in the gang; and (2) participates with knowledge that the gang’s members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity; and (3) willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by gang members. Accordingly, under the majority’s interpretation, section 12031(a)(2)(C) purports to authorize felony punishment only where the prosecution can establish all three criteria and prove not only that the defendant violated section 12031, subdivision (a)(1) by unlawfully carrying a loaded firearm in public, but also that he or she has committed a section 186.22(a) offense by aiding and abetting yet another separate felony offense by gang members (see People v. Castenada, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 749, 751). In the majority’s view, the prosecution may show that the section 186.22(a) offense was committed either concurrently with the section 12031(a)(1) offense or “at some other time.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1113.)
The majority’s construction flies in the face of section 12031(a)(2)(C)’s express language. By its own terms, the statute applies to any person who “is *1118an active participant in a criminal street gang, as defined in [section 186.22(a)]”; nowhere does it refer to the two additional elements necessary to establish an offense under section 186.22(a). (See ante, fns. 2, 3.) Moreover, section 186.22(a) makes clear through its wording and grammatical structure that its element of active participation in a gang is separate and distinct from its knowledge and aiding and abetting elements. As People v. Castenada reflects, we did not discern the meaning of section 186.22(a)’s phrase “actively participates in any criminal street gang” by reference to its other prerequisites for criminal liability. Rather, we construed the phrase by giving the words “actively” and “participates” their usual and ordinary meanings, i.e., “not passive” and “ ‘to take part in something (as an enterprise or activity).’ ” (People v. Castenada, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 747.) I see no basis for giving the phrase “active participant in a criminal street gang” a wholly different meaning here.4
Additionally, the express language of section 12031(a)(2)(C) leaves no room for the majority’s further conclusion that “it is entirely plausible” that the section was enacted to apply when the person carrying the loaded firearm had “at some other time’’’ in the past committed a violation of section 186.22(a). (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1113.) By authorizing felony punishment for a firearm violation specifically “[w]here the person is an active participant in a criminal street gang” (§ 12031(a)(2)(C), italics added), the statutory wording defies any notion that increased punishment applies where the person previously “was” an active gang participant who violated section 186.22(a) at some past point in time.
Legislative documents pertaining to the enactment of section 12031(a)(2)(C) also undermine the majority’s interpretation. Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, none of the legislative analyses or reports reflects an understanding that the provision would mandate felony punishment for a person who carries a loaded firearm either while violating section 186.22(a) (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1113) or after having violated section 186.22(a) “at some other time” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1113). Indeed, the legislative history Contains no indication whatsoever that a violation of section 186.22(a) is a necessary predicate to felony liability under section 12031(a)(2)(C). This stands in sharp contrast to other subdivisions of section 12031 that are *1119unequivocal in imposing felony punishment for persons found guilty of other crimes. (E.g., § 12031, subd. (a)(2)(A) [“the person previously has been convicted of any felony, or of any crime made punishable by this chapter [§§ 12000-12101]”]; § 12031, subd. (a)(2)(E) [“the person has been convicted of a crime against a person or property, or of a narcotics or dangerous drug violation”].)
Notably, the legislative analyses of the proposed text of section 12031(a)(2)(C) repeatedly commented that the provision would increase the penalty for unlawfully carrying a firearm from a misdemeanor to a felony for “a member of a ‘street gang,’ ” for “a gang member,” for “known gang members,” or for “active members of criminal street gangs.” (E.g., Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Assem. Bill No. 632 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 3, 1995, p. 1; Sen. Appropriations Com., Fiscal Summary, Assem. Bill No. 632 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 2, 1995, p. 1; Sen. Appropriations Com., Fiscal Summary, Assem. Bill No. 632 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 1, 1996, p. 1; Assem. Floor Analysis, Concurrence in Sen. Amends., Assem. Bill No. 632 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 1, 1996, p. 2; Assembly 3d reading analysis, Assem. Bill No. 632 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.), pp. 3, 4.) But none suggested the targeted gang members also must be found guilty of aiding and abetting a separate felony offense by other gang members as required for a section 186.22(a) violation. Viewed in context with the statutory language as enacted (“the person is an active participant in a criminal street gang”), these documents are strongly indicative of a legislative intent to increase the existing punishment for any person who carries a loaded firearm in public while actively involved with a criminal street gang, not merely for those proven violators of section 186.22(a) who, in addition, have “knowledge [of the gang’s] pattern of criminal gang activity” and “willfully promote[], further[], or assist[] in any felonious criminal conduct” by gang members. (Ibid..)5
In sum, I would construe section 12031(a)(2)(C) as providing felony punishment for the crime of carrying a loaded firearm in public in any case where the lawbreaker is more than nominally or passively involved with a *1120criminal street gang. Such construction is supported by both the language and the legislative history of the statute, and is consistent with our recent interpretation of what section 186.22(a) means by the phrase, “[a]ny person who actively participates in any criminal street gang.” In my view, this construction is superior to the majority’s interpretation, which falls conspicuously short on all three points and deprives the statute of much of its prosecutorial utility.
Because the Court of Appeal analyzed this case under a narrower construction of the relevant statutory phrases, I would remand the matter to allow that court to reexamine the propriety of the superior court’s refusal to reinstate the felony allegations against defendant in accordance with the views set forth herein.
Brown, J., concurred.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Section 12031 provides in relevant part: “(a)(1) A person is guilty of carrying a loaded firearm when he or she carries a loaded firearm on his or her person or in a vehicle while in any public place or on any public street in an incorporated city or in any public place or on any public street in a prohibited area of unincorporated territory. flD (2) Carrying a loaded firearm in violation of this section is punishable, as follows: [H]. . . [10 (C) Where the person is an active participant in a criminal street gang, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 186.22, under the Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (Chapter 11 (commencing with Section 186.20) of Title 7 of Part 1), as a felony . . . .”
Section 186.22(a) provides in full: “Any person who actively participates in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for a period not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months, or two or three years.”
For purposes of section 186.22(a), a “criminal street gang” is defined to mean “any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, *1117having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated in paragraphs (1) to (23), inclusive, of subdivision (e) [of section 186.22], having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.” (§ 186.22, subd. (f).)
If the language of section 12031(a)(2)(C) had made additional reference to a person’s active participation in criminal street gang “activity,” which would connote the aiding and abetting of felonious conduct by gang members as required under section 186.22(a), then the majority’s construction might be more tenable. As the legislators themselves recognized when they enacted section 12031(a)(2)(C), section 186.22(a) pertains to a crime that occurs “if a person is actively engaged in any criminal street gang activity.” (Sen. Com. on Crim. Procedure, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 632 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 2, 1995, com. 3, p. 8, italics added.)
The majority correctly notes that gang “membership” is not an evidentiary requirement for section 186.22(a)’s “actively participates” element or for a violation thereunder. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1114, fn. 4.) That the legislative analyses made repeated references to gang members, however, is consistent with a reasonable belief that active gang members were the primary focus of the statutory provision. The relevant point, which the majority overlooks, is that nothing in the legislative history suggests that the targeted criminals must commit three separate criminal offenses—(1) a firearm offense under section 12031 and (2) the so-called “active participation in a criminal street gang” offense under section 186.22(a), which in turn requires proof of (3) aiding and abetting some other felony offense by gang members—before qualifying for felony punishment under section 12031(a)(2)(C).