Concurring and Dissenting. — The questions we face are whether “suggestive” or “coercive” Palma notices1 are permissible, given the strictures of Code of Civil Procedure section 1088 and the California Rules of Court, and whether, even if so, we should countenance them in the exercise of our supervisory powers over the courts of this state. The answer to the first of these questions is “probably not”; the answer to the second, I submit, is an unqualified “no.” Accordingly, on the merits of this appeal, I respectfully dissent.2
I
My colleagues and I agree on many points. For one, we agree it is critical in writ proceedings for parties to have notice and the opportunity to submit briefing to the decision maker before adverse action is taken. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1248-1250.) For another, we agree that conservation of judicial resources — to the extent it can be accomplished without compromising the interests of litigants in fair hearings — is an admirable and worthy goal. What we disagree over is the extent to which suggestive Palma notices, even as modified by the additional trial court proceedings the majority proposes (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1248-1250), satisfy these goals.
In Palma, we interpreted Code of Civil Procedure section 1088’s requirement that “due notice” be provided before a peremptory writ could issue. We *1252identified both notice and an opportunity to be heard as essential prerequisites: “[A] peremptory writ of mandate or prohibition [may] not issue in the first instance unless the parties adversely affected by the writ have received notice, from the petitioner or from the court, that the issuance of such a writ in the first instance is being sought or considered. In addition, an appellate court, absent exceptional circumstances, should not issue a peremptory writ in the first instance without having received, or solicited, opposition from the party or parties adversely affected.” (Palma, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 180.) A traditional Palma notice satisfies these requirements: The party opposing the writ receives notice and is given time to file opposition in the Court of Appeal before that court decides the merits of the writ. Here in contrast, where the Court of Appeal issued a suggestive Palma notice instead, the proceedings below violated Palma’s requirements.
This case arises from an insurance coverage dispute. Law firm Brown, Winfield & Canzoneri, Inc. (Brown Winfield), was sued for malpractice by Azusa Pacific University based on the firm’s handling of an eminent domain action. Brown Winfield sought coverage from its malpractice carrier, Great American Insurance Company (Great American); Great American accepted defense of the action with a reservation of rights, but also filed a declaratory relief action asserting there was no coverage. Brown Winfield obtained a stay of the declaratory relief action pending decision of the underlying malpractice case, but in 2007 the trial court lifted the stay.
On Brown Winfield’s petition for writ relief, the Court of Appeal issued the suggestive Palma notice at issue here. The notice discussed the merits at length and strongly suggested the trial court had erred in lifting the stay. Having done so, the Court of Appeal gave the trial court jurisdiction to change its mind and enter a revised order. The trial court did so the next day and the Court of Appeal dismissed the petition two weeks later, all without any briefing or opportunity by Great American to be heard.
While Great American technically was provided notice, one may question how meaningful the notice was in light of the fact it was issued after the close of business on August 28, 2007, and elicited a reversal from the trial court less than 24 hours later.3 More clearly, the proceedings below violated the requirement that an opportunity to present opposition be provided parties opposing issuance of a writ before the matter is adjudicated. (Palma, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 180; Code Civ. Proc., § 1088.) Were Great American’s counsel Superman himself, he could not have prepared an opposition brief and filed it in time for the Court of Appeal to read it, rethink its position, issue a new *1253order reversing itself, and have the trial court receive and consider that new order before reversing itself.
This case illustrates how a suggestive Palma notice subverts the orderly process we intended before a peremptory writ could issue. By issuing a suggestive notice, the Court of Appeal — the decision maker on the writ— expresses an opinion on the merits without having ever heard from the opposing side. That this decision can be deemed “tentative” (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1245-1246) does not redeem the process. When a court issues a tentative decision, the party who stands to lose generally has a chance to argue its side to that court in hopes of persuading it to reconsider and reach a different decision. A suggestive Palma notice denies writ opponents this opportunity because it effectively sends the case back to the trial court immediately, thus permitting (or, as in this case, encouraging) the issue to be resolved in the trial court without further proceedings in the Court of Appeal. Here, of course, the problem was amplified by the trial court’s speedy response, which meant that Great American was unable to tell its side to either court.
While it is true we acknowledged in Palma that it might suffice for a Court of Appeal to merely solicit informal opposition from the potentially adversely affected party (Palma, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 180), we did so in contemplation of a situation where that party, afforded a reasonable time in which to submit briefing, voluntarily elected to forgo its opportunity to put forward the merits of its position. We did not contemplate a situation where, as here, the adversely affected party was provided no meaningful opportunity to explain why a peremptory writ should not issue.4 Nor does it matter that no writ was actually issued because the trial court, attuned to the clear import of the Court of Appeal’s notice, did as directed and reversed itself. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1240, 1245.) The sine qua non of a peremptory writ under Palma, meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard, was lacking here. The majority’s unsupported contention to the contrary (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1244) is disingenuous and simply wrong.5
*1254Moreover, the proceedings here also failed to comport with the California Rules of Court, which provide: “If the court notifies the parties that it is considering issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance, the respondent or any real party in interest may serve and file an opposition.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.487(b)(1).) While “may” is permissive rather than mandatory, the most credible reading of this provision is that an adversely affected party has a right, but may choose not to exercise that right, to oppose issuance of a peremptory writ. Suggestive Palma notices like the one issued here cannot be reconciled with that right.6
As a practical matter, the majority’s proposal to permit suggestive Palma notices, provided the trial court solicits briefing before acquiescing in the Court of Appeal’s views on an issue, does not in my view cure these failings. What Code of Civil Procedure section 1088, Palma, supra, 36 Cal.3d 171, and rule 8.487(b)(1) of the California Rules of Court all focus on is the importance of a meaningful opportunity to be heard by the decision maker, the entity with the ultimate authority on a question. In suggestive Palma notice situations, the Court of Appeal, not the supposedly mistaken trial court, is the true decision maker. Consequently, the opportunity to be heard in the trial court may prove illusory. Rare, I believe, is a trial court that would adhere to its initial ruling in the face of a Court of Appeal’s written assessment that it was patently wrong. Critically, if the position advanced in the suggestive Palma notice is flawed because of something the Court of Appeal overlooked, the trial court, unaware of this oversight from the text of the notice itself, may be reluctant to rely on such an overlooked ground as dispositive; presented with a meritorious but overlooked argument, the trial court is likely to reverse itself anyway. I cannot see from a fairness perspective, or a perception of fairness perspective — affording litigants the sense they have been heard and had their day in court — how this is superior to having Courts of Appeal wait a few extra days for opposition briefing.7
*1255II
The urge to look past the requirements of Palma and the California Rules of Court might be at least understandable, if still unjustified, were there some significant administrative benefit to the suggestive Palma procedure in either its original form or as modified by the majority. There is not.
That suggestive Palma notices have saved Courts of Appeal a small amount of time, albeit at the likely cost of having some litigants feel they were deprived of a fair hearing, may be true. But Court of Appeal economy is not the same as judicial economy, and the transfer of decisionmaking from one court level to another is not necessarily a resource saver in the aggregate. We must consider the costs to the court system as a whole, at the trial as well as at the appellate level. That the trial court proceedings the majority now proposes involve any increased judicial efficiency over the usual Palma procedure is not apparent.8
From an efficiency perspective, moreover, a more pernicious unintended consequence of today’s decision for both courts and litigants is likely. As amicus curiae the California Academy of Appellate Lawyers ably explained in its briefing and at oral argument, attorneys advising their clients how or whether to oppose a writ petition must take into account the full range of potential outcomes they face. Before today, attorneys could safely advise their clients that doing nothing, or filing a preliminary opposition limited solely to the petitioner’s failure to establish the essential procedural prerequisites for writ relief, would not cost their clients the opportunity to be heard on the merits by the court with ultimate decisionmaking power in the matter. From the perspective of client advice, whether I or the majority is right about the sufficiency of trial court briefing as a substitute for briefing in the Court of Appeal matters not. If any significant number of attorneys perceive being returned to the trial court with the deck stacked against them is a risk and less desirable than remaining in the Court of Appeal with an opportunity to brief why relief should be denied, or simply wish to insulate themselves from client criticism such a turn of events might entail, the Courts of Appeal can expect to see a rise in the number of full-blown preliminary opposition briefs addressing the merits of a writ petition. Increasingly, writ briefing may *1256become frontloaded. Consideration of such briefs will necessarily consume more Court of Appeal time and resources, to say nothing of the extra cost to the litigants.
The majority’s solution for this problem is to encourage — but not require— Courts of Appeal to notify the parties and invite opposition before taking any action other than summarily denying a writ. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1248.) But Palma and the Code of Civil Procedure already require this for peremptory writs. (Palma, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 180; Code Civ. Proc., § 1088.) If the suggestion is for Courts of Appeal to issue a presuggestive Palma-notice notice — a new and additional “Brown Winfield' notice, if you will — to just eliminate suggestive Palma notices would seem far simpler.
HI
The original Palma procedure was not broken; it did not need fixing. It should have sufficed here for this court to remind the Courts of Appeal that the Palma procedure is to be rarely, not routinely, invoked, and that the procedure requires an opportunity for briefing before the Court of Appeal reaches the merits of a writ petition. (See Palma, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 180.) No sound reason exists to dispense with Palma's requirements of notice and an opportunity for the opposing party to be heard in the Court of Appeal.
The majority acknowledges that Palma notices are appropriate only in the “rare circumstances” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1237) where immediate action is required or the trial court’s error is utterly indisputable, and I fully agree with that sentiment. (See Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1261 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 85, 970 P.2d 872] [“We emphasize, however, as we have in previous decisions, that the accelerated Palma procedure is reserved for truly exceptional cases — primarily those in which a compelling temporal urgency requires an immediate decision.”]; Alexander v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1218, 1223 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 397, 859 P.2d 96], overruled on other grounds by Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital (2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 724, fn. 4 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 623, 74 P.3d 726]; Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 856, 840 P.2d 961] [“We stress that the accelerated Palma procedure is the exception; it should not become routine.”].)9 But the rest of the majority opinion effectively undermines this view. By giving our imprimatur to the suggestive Palma procedure, we inevitably will encourage its spread, and with it, I fear, further overuse and abuse of the Palma procedure itself.
*1257For these reasons, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the Court of Appeal did not err in issuing a suggestive Palma notice, a notice that resulted in Great American having a ruling in its favor reversed by the trial court less than 24 hours later with no opportunity to be heard. I further disagree with the majority’s decision to erect elaborate new procedural requirements to cure the unadmitted flaws in the suggestive Palma notice procedure, a step that may do little to cure those flaws and is likely to entail its own unintended consequences.
Moreno, J., and Corrigan, J., concurred.
Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171 [203 Cal.Rptr. 626, 681 P.2d 893] (Palma). In a suggestive or coercive Palma notice, a Court of Appeal intimates to the parties to a writ proceeding, and to the trial court, that it will probably grant peremptory writ relief unless the trial court reverses itself. While one may debate what terms best describe these notices, for convenience I accept the majority’s choice of nomenclature and will refer to them as suggestive.
Because this case is moot, I agree the Court of Appeal’s judgment dismissing the writ proceeding technically should be affirmed, and to that limited extent I concur.
Our copy of the notice shows it was faxed by the Court of Appeal clerk’s office at 6:25 p.m. on August 28. The trial court’s minute order is dated August 29 at 1:30 p.m.
Notably, the notice here gave only a conditional right of response; if the trial court had not already reversed itself, Great American could file a response within 13 days. As the trial court reversed itself the very next day — an occurrence that is probably not uncommon, given the strong wording of notices like this one — Great American had no opportunity to respond.
The acknowledgement that “exceptional circumstances” might warrant proceeding without an opportunity for opposition (Palma, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 180) does not come into play here. Given that Palma was discussing the procedural requirements for issuing a peremptory writ, which itself requires highly unusual circumstances, the exceptional circumstances it alluded to cannot be simply those that would justify a peremptory writ — clear error or exigent circumstances. That is, if every time the preconditions for a peremptory writ were present, the preconditions for skipping opposition were also present, the “requirement” would be an empty one. The exceptional circumstances that might warrant proceeding without opposition may, I *1254think, reasonably be confined to cases where the peremptory writ is justified by exigent circumstances — where time truly is of the essence — rather than cases where the writ is justified only by the (apparent) obviousness of the trial court’s error. Even then, depending on just how exigent the circumstances are, there may be time for a Court of Appeal to solicit oral or written input from the parties on a greatly expedited schedule.
In concluding that suggestive Palma notices are consistent with the California Rules of Court, the majority addresses only rule 8.487(a)(4), which permits a court to issue notice that it is considering issuance of a peremptory writ without first obtaining preliminary opposition. It disregards that rule’s subdivision (b)(1), which governs the right to submit briefing after notice that a peremptory writ is being contemplated has been sent.
The majority opinion suggests that depriving the Courts of Appeal of the use of suggestive Palma notices would amount to “muzzlfing]” them. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1247, fn. 8.) Not so. The vice of such notices lies in the invitation to trial courts to unburden the Courts of Appeal from further proceedings — the “strong]] suggestion] that the trial court act in accordance with the appellate court’s views” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1246) — thereby placing litigants in the position of losing without a bona fide opportunity to be heard before the true decision maker in *1255a case. Nothing in Palma would foreclose a Court of Appeal from offering an account of its preliminary views in a Palma notice, so long as it also made clear further proceedings were to be conducted in that court and not the trial court. That is not what was done here, nor, it would appear, is it generally the case with suggestive Palma notices. (See Cal. Civil Writ Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 4th ed. 2009) § 22.22, pp. 603-604; id., § 28.9, pp. 747-748.)
Moreover, if a trial court standing in the shadow of a suggestive Palma notice reverses itself erroneously, for reasons the Court of Appeal overlooked but that could have been expeditiously called to its attention had briefing occurred initially in that court, a second trip up to the Court of Appeal will be necessary. This is the opposite of efficiency.
We are advised by counsel for amicus curiae that some courts now routinely include Palma notices in their initial form notices requesting preliminary opposition. Whatever convenience this might afford the Courts of Appeal, it defeats the purpose of the Palma notice, which is to provide actual notice that a peremptory writ is in fact being contemplated, and is at odds with our repeated admonitions that Palma procedures are to be reserved for exceptional cases.