dissenting
Appellant Rafael O. Joseph, a pro se litigant, filed suit in the Territorial Court, seeking to enjoin and restrain local officials of the Bureau of Corrections, from transferring him from the Golden Grove Prison facilities on St. Croix to the federal prison facilities at Lampoc, California. Appellant couched his suit as a petition for a "Writ of Habeas Corpus." Subsequently, the trial court appointed counsel for Appellant to represent him in this matter.
In his brief, Appellant's counsel reiterated and made it exceedingly clear that Appellant does not challenge his conviction, his present incarceration, confinement, or restraint nor does he challenge his sentence. Rather, the focus or primary claim of Appellant, despite its original designation by Appellant in his initial complaint, is injunctive relief against the local prison officials' action of transferring him to Lampoc, California. Moreover, this suit would not have been filed, if Appellant was allowed to remain incarcerated, confined and restrained in the local Golden Grove prison facility on St. Croix. Therefore, it was the act of Appellant being transferred to an off-island facility that prompted the filing of the suit as he sought to prevent his transfer. Appellant expects to be confined and incarcerated, but it is the location of his confinement and incarceration and not the legality of his confinement or incarceration that is the real issue. Therefore, it is of significant importance that the case be properly posited, so that the issue can be placed in proper perspective.
As was made abundantly clear, Appellant is not a lawyer but was a pro se litigant at the inception of his suit. Therefore, his complaint is not expected to have neither the artfulness nor the distinguishing legal nuances of a complaint drafted by an experienced attorney. Nonetheless, all pleadings shall be construed as to do substantial justice. See, Rule 8(f), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure; Section 1286. Further, it is not the designation assigned a claim by a liti*316gant, but rather the substance of the allegations and the relief that the litigant seeks that are determinative of the nature of the suit.
Additionally, after counsel was appointed for the Appellant, counsel succinctly stated the nature of the case in his memorandum of law filed with the trial court and made a part of the appeal appendix. It states at page A-44:
"As properly construed, plaintiff's pro se pleading should be considered a civil action filed against officials of the Virgin Islands Government in their official capacity seeking the following remedies:
(a) That his prison file be corrected by the expungement of erroneous information; and
(b) That defendants/respondents be ordered to transfer plaintiff/petitioner to the Golden Grove Correction Facility to serve the remainder of his sentence pending any change of condition which would otherwise justify his transfer pursuant to 5 V.I.C. 4503(c)."
Similarly, the trial court placed the suit in proper perspective when it stated the following in its opinion: "However, Joseph does not question either his conviction or his sentence. He seeks neither release nor reduction in sentence. Rather, he attacks what he claims was his impermissible transfer from a Virgin Islands institution to a stateside penitentiary. Indeed, his current position, advocated through counsel, is that his pro se pleading not be viewed as a true habeas corpus petition."
Despite the above, much time was expended in addressing the issues of whether the trial court had jurisdiction over a suit for a petition for habeas corpus and the merit of Appellant's claim for such a writ. Therefore, I will address the matter of the writ of habeas corpus only to demonstrate its inapplicability in this case.
Appellees moved to dismiss the suit, asserting inter alia, that the Territorial Court lacked jurisdiction to hear a suit for a writ of habeas corpus. The trial court, however, ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear the application for a writ of habeas corpus but declined to exercise its jurisdiction. Therefore, this appeal followed.
Based upon legal precedent, it is clear that if the local courts, District or Territorial, have jurisdiction to hear an application for a writ of habeas corpus, that authority is not based on federal law, because it has already been determined that the local District Court is not a District Court for purposes of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241(a) (1970), *317the statutory mandate for a Federal writ of habeas corpus. See, Ali v. Gibson, 572 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1978). Rather, the only statutory grant of authority providing for a writ of habeas corpus by local courts is the local statute as codified in 5 V.I.C. 1301, et seq. See, Bennett v. Soto, 850 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1988).
Accordingly, two things become crucial. First, in asserting a claim for a writ of habeas corpus in the local courts, the language of Title 5 V.I.C. 1301 et seq., and its intent govern the claim. Second, it does not matter, as has been suggested, that Federal Courts may have expanded the traditional use or applicability of a writ of habeas corpus, because the federal habeas corpus statute is inapplicable to local cases.
The unequivocal language of section 1301 supra, entitled "Right to Writ of Habeas Corpus," enumerates the parameters for seeking a writ of habeas corpus under local statute. It states:
"Every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint."
A situation of being "unlawfully imprisoned or restrained" is the cornerstone for granting a writ of habeas corpus under local law.
Additionally, when one reads the ambiguous language of the pertinent sections of the local habeas corpus statute, namely sections 1302, 1311 and 1312 of Title 5, it is obvious that the local statute uses such words as "imprisoned or restrained", "confined or restrained", and "... allege any fact to show either that his imprisonment or detention is unlawful, or that he is entitled to his discharge." Therefore, the unavoidable conclusion is that the local habeas corpus statute was promulgated to address the traditional and conventional purposes for a writ of habeas corpus, i.e., to challenge the legality of restraint or imprisonment, or to challenge the legality of a sentence which has resulted in the petitioner being restrained, incarcerated or imprisoned. This is the intent and purpose of the local habeas corpus statute. But, Appellant does not challenge any of those circumstances, and he has continuously maintained that posture throughout this litigation by eschewing any claim which impinges on those circumstances.
I am not unmindful of what the Third Circuit Court of Appeals explained in Ali, supra, concerning a writ of habeas corpus being used by a prisoner to contest his transfer to a prison facility outside *318the Virgin Islands. It must be remembered, however, that the Ali suit raised a plethora of issues and contentions not present in this case. What is significant, however, is the Appellate Court's recognition of the dichotomy of the Ali complaint in which the court states:
"In addition to the habeas corpus petition, petitioner also asked for injunctive relief to be entered and for an order to transfer him back to the Virgin Islands." Ali, 572 F.2d at 972.
Furthermore, Appellant's suit cannot be a suit for a writ of habeas corpus, because the allegations in his complaint are not based on his being "unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his liberties." This posture is buttressed by Pierre v. United States, 525 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1976), in which the Court said that a writ of habeas corpus is not available to review questions unrelated to the cause of detention.
In commenting on the nature of a writ of habeas corpus, the Pierre court further stated, "Its sole function is to grant relief from unlawful imprisonment or custody and it cannot be used properly for any other purpose. While it is correctly alluded to as the Great Writ, it cannot be utilized as a base for the review of a refusal to grant collateral administrative relief or as a springboard to adjudicate matters foreign to the question of the legality of custody." Even more illuminating and instructive on the purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is the following language in Praiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973):
.. from the common law history of the writ,... the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody .... Whether the petitioner had been placed in physical confinement by [an] executive director alone, or by order of a court, or by private parties, habeas corpus was the proper means of challenging that confinement and seeking release .... But, over the years, the writ of habeas corpus evolved as a remedy available to effect discharge from any confinement contrary to the Constitution or fundamental law, even though imposed pursuant to conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction. . . ."
After citing approximately thirteen cases from 1874 to 1972, the year before the case was decided, and in further commenting on the utilization of the writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court fur*319ther stated: "... in each case his grievance is that he is being unlawfully subjected to physical restraint and in each case habeas corpus has been accepted as the specific instrument to obtain release from such confinement." Praiser, 411 U.S. at 486.
Therefore, I conclude that despite what was the original designation of the suit by Appellant when he was proceeding pro se, I find that his cause of action was not only misconstrued and mislabeled, but also that a writ of habeas corpus is not what he really seeks.
I find that the essence, focus, and underpinning of Appellant's claim is one for injunctive relief, i.e., to prevent his transfer or to seek a reversal of his transfer to a stateside prison facility, because at that facility, he will suffer irreparable harm, including but not limited to personal injury. Appellant further intimated that he anticipates being victimized by prison violence, if he is returned to a mainland prison facility.
Therefore, I find that Appellant's claim, while couched as an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a pro se litigant, is in actuality a claim for injunctive relief. A prisoner seeking injunctive relief to enjoin his transfer has already been addressed in other jurisdictions. For example, in Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 697 F. Supp. 1036 (S.D. Ill. 1988), the court recognized the vehicle of injunctive relief to enjoin a prisoner's transfer; however, the petitioner failed on the merits of his claim when he did not meet the prerequisites for injunctive relief. In Smith v. Keohane, 491 F. Supp. 626 (W.D. Okla. 1979), the court stated that a petitioner who filed a pro se action denominating it a petition for a writ of habeas corpus but "where the pleadings made it apparent that the relief he sought was in the nature of injunctive relief, his petition would be addressed as seeking injunctive relief. . . ." Having found that the Appellant's claim is one for injunctive relief, I conclude that the Territorial Court has jurisdiction to hear the case pursuant to 4 V.I.C. 76. See also, Richards v. Election Committee of St. Thomas-St. John, 13 V.I. 531 (Terr. Ct. St. T. and St. J. 1977); Bryan v. V.I. Water and Power Authority, 22 V.I. 48 (Terr. Ct. St. T. and St. J. 1986).
It matters not which court sentenced Appellant or in which court he was tried in the criminal case which resulted in his incarceration, because these issues were resolved approximately two decades ago. Appellant's claim is a new and distinct suit which has absolutely nothing to do with his criminal trial, his conviction, or his sentencing! neither of which he challenges in this suit. The case *320is simply a matter of whether Appellant has stated a cause of action for injunctive relief to enjoin local prison officials from transferring him to the mainland, and whether the Territorial Court in which the case was filed has jurisdiction to hear the claim.
Having concluded that the Territorial Court has jurisdiction to hear Appellant's claim for injunctive relief, I would remand the case to the trial court for a hearing on the merits of Appellant's claim.
Accordingly, for the above enumerated reasons, I DISSENT.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
THIS MATTER came before the Court on the appeal of Raphael O. Joseph from the November 21, 1990 order of the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands. The Court having filed its opinion of even date herewith, and the premises considered, now therefore it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED:
THAT the judgment of the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands is hereby AFFIRMED.