concurring in the judgment.
While I agree with the majority that there is an enforceable agreement in Yaekle but not in Chotvacs, I disagree with its conclu*1113sion that oral agreements reached in mediation may be enforceable by court order. Under section 308 of the Dispute Resolution Act, sections 13-22-8301 to 18-22-8183, C.R.S. (2008), agreements reached in mediation are enforceable by court order only if they are "reduced to writing" and are "signed by the parties." By leaving open the possibility that oral statements made in connection with mediation may end up constituting a binding agreement-despite the fact that the parties have neither reduced their agreement to writing nor signed on the dotted line-the majority needlessly chills the candid and informal nature of mediation discussions. Because the majority's rationale contradicts the Act, I respectfully concur only in the majority's result.
At issue in this case is the meaning of section 308(1), which provides that "[i]f reduced to writing and signed by the parties, the agreement [reached in mediation] may be presented to the court by any party ... and, if approved by the court, shall be enforceable as an order of the court." Thus, an agreement reached in mediation is "enforceable as an order of the court" only if it is (1) in writing; (2) signed by the parties; (8) presented to the court; and (4) approved by the court. These statutory requirements set forth by the legislature are clear and straightforward; without them, a settlement reached through mediation is not "enforceable as an order of the court." Although the majority dismisses the statutory requirements as "formulaic," maj. op. at 1107, and expresses its preference for the more "sensitive" common law rule that recognizes oral agreements, id., it is the legislature's call on the issue, not ours, that must prevail. Seq e.g., Clancy Sys. v. Salazar, 177 P.3d 1235, 1237 (Colo.2008) ("Although [the legislature] has chosen to give the common law of England full force until repealed by legislative authority, ... it may therefore selectively modify or abrogate portions of that law, at its choice.").
The majority avoids the statutory language by suggesting that the legislature just was not clear enough. Maj. op. at 1107. According to the majority, "before accepting the conclusion that the common law of contracts is suspended when parties enter mediation, we must find either express intent to that end on behalf of the General Assembly or necessity in the language of the provisions." Id. at 1107. In my view, section 808 satisfies this standard by setting forth the requirements that an agreement be reduced to writing and signed by the parties before it can be enforced by court order. In the face of this statutory language, the majority states that the Act is "silen[t] on this matter." Id. The only thing it could mean by this statement is that the legislature, in order to depart from the common law, would have to state that the writing and signature requirements exclude oral agreements otherwise recognized at common law. But such language would simply be redundant of what is already there. Moreover, we have never required such precision from the legislature. See, eg., Leader Fed. Bank for Sav. v. Saunders, 929 P.2d 1343, 1351 (Colo.1997) (noting that "(all-though there is no language in the Act which specifies that it provides the exclusive means by which a mobile home can be converted from personal property into real property, such a conclusion is necessarily implied by [the Act's] terms" that set forth requirements for such conversion).
The majority's focus on the "voluntary nature of the procedure" is similarly misplaced. Maj. op. at 1108. The majority notes that under section 308, an agreement reached in mediation "may" be presented to the court "if" it is reduced to writing and signed by the parties. The majority mistakenly concludes from this language that "the General Assembly anticipated there would be other ways to resolve mediated disputes"-that is, through oral agreements. Id. Yet what is voluntary about the language is not, as the majority suggests, whether the prerequisites to enforcing an agreement reached in mediation by court order must be complied with. They must be. Instead, what is voluntary is whether the parties want to seek judicial enforcement of the written and signed agreement in the first place. In other words, the parties "may" choose to seek judicial enforcement of their agreement; if they do, they must abide by the statutory requirements.
*1114My interpretation of section 8308 is reinforced by the prior version of the statutory language, which mandated that parties who reach an oral agreement in mediation reduce their agreement to writing and submit it for judicial enforcement. As enacted in 1983, the language stated:
If the parties involved in a dispute reach an agreement, the agreement shall be reduced to writing and approved by the parties and their attorneys and shall be presented to the court as a stipulation and, if approved by the court, shall be enforceable as an order of the court.
§ 13-22-8308, C.R.S. (1983) (emphasis added). The 1991 amendments to the Act, which brought section 808 to its current version, made two significant changes to the language pertinent to this case. § 18-22-808, C.R.S. (1991). First, the parties were relieved of the mandatory obligation to reduce the oral agreement to writing and approve it. Thus, under the current version, the oral agreement "shall be reduced to writing and approved by the parties and their attorneys" only "wpon request of the parties." Second, the parties were relieved of the mandatory obligation to present the written agreement to the court. Under the current language, the oral agreement, "[ilf reduced to writing and signed by the parties, may be presented to the court ...." But nothing in the 1991 amendments relieved the parties of the mandatory obligation to reduce the agreement to writing if they seek court enforcement.
Under my interpretation of section 308, there is no enforceable agreement in Chot-vacs because the agreement reached in mediation, if any, was not reduced to writing, signed by the parties, or presented to the court.1 I would therefore affirm the court of appeals' result as well as its rationale, which holds that section 308 "provides the only method for obtaining court enforcement of [an agreement reached in mediation]." Chotvacs v. Lish, No. 05CA1369 at 5, 2007 WL 1366293 (Colo.App. May 10, 2007) (unpublished). By contrast, the December agreement in Yaekle is enforceable-not because it meets the requirements of section 808, but because it falls outside the purview of the Act. The December agreement was not an agreement reached in mediation; rather, as the majority points out, it was an agreement negotiated through a series of letters after the parties had decided to abandon mediation. Maj. op. at 1111. Thus, the enforceability of the December agreement depends on the application of common law contract principles. I would simply affirm the court of appeals' analysis of these principles. See Yaekle v. Andrews, 169 P.3d 196, 199-200 (Colo.App.2007).
While the majority downplays the importance that section 808 has on this case, it reaches the same result by focusing on section 307, which governs confidential mediation communication. As the majority recognizes, under section 307, there is no enforceable agreement in Chotvacs because the basis of Chotvaes's claim is communication that was "expressed in the course of . a mediation services proceeding" and is thus confidential § 18-22-302(25); maj. op. at 1112. The December agreement in Yaekle is enforceable, the majority concludes, because the negotiations were not conducted in connection with mediation, and therefore the communication between the parties is not confidential. Maj. op. at 1111. I agree with the majority's section 307 analysis. However, the majority's singular focus on section 307 causes it to miss an important point-namely, that section 807 reinforces section 808's requirements that the agreement be in writing and signed by the parties In other words, sections 8307 and 308 are coextensive and mutually reinforcing.
Section 807 provides that "mediation communication" is confidential and can only be *1115divulged under narrow cireumstances not relevant here. § 18-22-807(2). But significantly, section 13-22-802(2.5), which defines "mediation communication," expressly provides that "a final written agreement reached as a result of a mediation service proceeding ... which has been fully executed ... is not a mediation communication unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties." (emphasis added). Thus, section 807 expressly excepts from confidentiality a "final written agreement" that is "fully executed"-ie., one that is written and signed by the parties under section 808. Not surprisingly, then, both sections 807 and 308 recognize the importance of not binding the parties to anything other than their final written agreement.
Sections 307 and 808 are directed to the same end: to encourage open and candid discussion by the parties in an informal setting. See § 18-22-805(1) (directing the office of dispute resolution to establish rules "designed to establish a simple nonadversary format for the resolution of disputes by neutral mediators in an informal setting for the purpose of allowing each participant, on a voluntary basis, to define and articulate the participant's particular problem for the possible resolution of such dispute"). Section 307 promotes this goal by ensuring that mediation communications are not divulged to others. Section 808 promotes this goal by ensuring that those communications are not binding until the parties reduce their agreement to writing and sign on the dotted line. See, e.g., Reese v. Tingey Constr., 177 P.3d 605, 609 (Utah 2008) (noting that "[a] rule permitting courts to enforce only written mediation agreements operates in tandem with the rules providing mediation confidentiali-fly”).
Given that analysis of this case under either section 807 or 808 leads to the same result, the question remains why it matters which course the majority takes today. The majority's rationale may not make a difference in the outcome of this case, but it will have a serious negative impact on mediation more generally. By holding that an oral agreement reached in mediation is enforceable even though it does not meet the requirements of section 8308, the majority needlessly chills the candid and informal character of mediation discussion and reduces the efficacy of mediation as a dispute resolution tool-all in contradiction to the Act. For these reasons, I respectfully concur only in the result that the majority reaches.
I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE MULLARKEY joins in this concurrence.
. The majority describes the agreement as follows: "At the end of the mediation session, the mediator outlined the terms of an apparent agreement between the parties, but neither party signed the agreement." Maj. op. at 1104. Although the majority later suggests that the agreement was "reduced to writing," maj. op. at 1112, it states that "[nlothing about the document suggests the parties thought it a binding agreement." Maj. op. at 1112. In my view, that "agreement" was nothing more than a statement of principles outlining the parties' respective understandings of their properties. So, although this statement was "reduced to writing," it was never an "agreement," let alone a signed, binding one.