dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision affirming the Board’s holding that Douglas’ injury arose out of and in the course of his employment.
First, I disagree with the majority’s holding that the Board properly consulted the factors set forth in 2 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 22.01 (2009), in interpreting and applying the exclusionary provision of K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 44-508(f). Consider this fact, during oral argument, the appellee’s attorney conceded that the statutoiy recreational or social event exclusion under K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 44-508(1) was unambiguous. Moreover, the appellee’s attorney further conceded drat the Board did not need to resort to the Larson’s factors to interpret the statute. Yet, the Board *455injected ambiguity into K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 44-508(f) when it determined that the statute did not define the phrase “recreational or social event.” When deciding whether a statute is ambiguous, a basic principle of statutory construction provides that where words in a statute are not defined, they must be given their ordinary meaning. See Roda v. Williams, 195 Kan. 507, Syl. ¶ 3, 407 P.2d 471 (1965) (words in common use contained within a statute are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning); see also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 62 L. Ed. 2d 199, 100 S. Ct. 311 (1979) (words not defined in a statute should be given ordinary or common meaning).
In the phrase “recreational or social event,” which the legislature chose to use in K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 44-508(f), the word “recreational” is used as an adjective, and it refers to recreation. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1899 (1986) defines the noun “recreation” as a means of diversion or entertainment. The adjective “social” is defined as relating to convivial activities. Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary 1103 (1988). Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 274 (2004) defines the adjective “convivial” as “relating to, occupied with, or fond of feasting, drinking, and good company.”
Based on the ordinary and normal meaning of the phrase “recreational or social event,” there was no need for the Board to resort to the Larson’s factors in interpreting K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 44-508(f). The phrase was unambiguous within the context of K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 44-508(f).
Moreover, even if the phrase “recreational or social event” were ambiguous, the Board’s first duty was to attempt to determine the legislative intent underlying the phrase and to consider the words of the phrase in their plain and ordinary meaning. Instead, the Board determined that the phrase was ambiguous and immediately resorted to the Larson’s factors to develop a different standard to apply. In the process, the Board formulated an unstated statutory purpose when it focused on Douglas’ feelings and determined that Douglas subjectively perceived a duty to attend the Sadler’s event: “Claimant was given a choice of either going to the event or remaining at work but he said that he felt pressured to attend the *456event .” (Emphasis added.) The Board’s finding was important, and its importance will be demonstrated later.
Despite the clear statutory text requiring Douglas to show that he had a duty to attend the recreational or social event, the Board decided that a perceptible standard sufficed. The Board developed this perceptible standard from one of the Larson’s factors: “One factor is whether the employer expressly or impliedly requires participation in the activity . . . .” See 2 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 22.01(2), p. 22-2. After making this observation, the Board found as follows: “Claimant felt that participation was required and Ms. Hoffman agreed that she also felt some pressure to attend.” (Emphasis added.) Interestingly, the record shows that although Hoffman may have felt some pressure to attend the Sadler’s event, she chose not to attend the event.
This perceptible or subjective standard that the Board adopted is not found in K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 44-508(f). Moreover, this subjective standard is no standard at all in the reality of application. For example, if employees perceive that they have a duty to attend a recreational or social event, even though mistaken, they will satisfy the duty to attend requirement under the Board and the majority’s reasoning. As a result, the subjective standard test would be no test at all. The Board has subverted the plain language of K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 44-508(f) by using one or more of the Larson’s factors to adopt a perceptible or subjective standard at the expense of the statute. Moreover, the Board and the majority’s interpretation of K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 44-508(f) is erroneous as a matter of law.
Duty to Attend
As stated earlier, the Act recognizes a recreational or social event exclusion. It excludes from coverage any injury to an employee while engaged in a recreational or social event (1) when the employee was under no duty to attend the recreational or the social event and (2) when the injuiy did not result from the performance of tasks related to the employee’s normal job duties or from the performance of tasks which the employer specifically instructed the employee to perform. K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 44-508(f). I agree with the majority’s conclusion “that the second circumstance is met be*457cause go-cart racing is not part of Douglas’ normal job duties.” As a result, the only question that remains was whether the first circumstance was met.
Both the Board and the majority determined that Douglas was under “some duty” to attend the Sadler’s event. Yet, as previously stated, the Board specifically found that Douglas had a choice whether to attend the Sadler’s event: “Claimant was given a choice of either going to the event or remaining at work but he said that he felt pressured to attend the event.” (Emphasis added.) The Board and the majority’s determinations (that Douglas was under some duty to attend the Sadler’s event) rest on a logical contradiction.
For example, the Board’s argument begins with a conjunctive proposition that contains two conjuncts (one based on the statutory language contained in the first prong of K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 44-508[f] and the other based on the Board’s finding that Douglas was given a choice whether to attend the recreational event) that are logically contradictory: Douglas cannot both be under a duty to attend the recreational event and not be under a duty to attend the recreational event. In a two-part conjunctive proposition, like this one, one conjunct comes before the word “and,” and the other comes after the word “and.” (E.g., “It is both raining and not raining.”) In a conjunctive syllogism, the first premise negates the truth of a conjunctive proposition; the second premise affirms one of the conjunctive proposition’s conjuncts; and the conclusion then denies the other conjunct. Two contradictory conjuncts, as in this example, can never be true together or false together; one will always be true, and the other will always be false. See Joseph, The Trivium: The Liberal Arts of Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric, pp. 114-15 (2002).
The relation between these two conjuncts can be reconstructed as a conjunctive syllogism:
(1) The employee cannot both be under a duty to attend the recreational event and not be under a duty to attend the recreational event.
(2) The record indicates that the employee was not required to attend the recreational event (established by the Board’s finding *458that “[claimant was given a choice of either going to the event or remaining at work”).
(3) Therefore, the employee was not under a duty to attend the recreational event.
The statutory language of K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 44-508(f) allows for no middle ground: no employee can both be required to attend the recreational event and not be required to attend the recreational event. See Joseph, The Trivium, p. 115.
Consequently, to justify their reasoning, both the Board and the majority have resorted to the liberal construction rule. In doing so, they have divined an unstated statutory purpose and elevated it above the clear text of the statute requiring Douglas to show that he had a duty to attend the recreational event under K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 44-508(f). Here, the majority reasons that “just because attendance- at the event was not mandatory does not mean that Douglas was under no duty to attend. Here, the Board concluded that Douglas was under ‘some- duty’ to attend the event at Sadler’s.” Under the traditional square in opposition, the E proposition that Douglas was “under no duty to attend” and the I proposition that Douglas was “under some duty to attend” are opposed in both quantity and quality. Moreover, they too are contradictory. Of the two propositions, only one is true, and one is false. Copi and Cohen, Introduction to Logic, p. 187 (12th ed. 2005). The E proposition is true because the record states, as the majority correctly notes, that “Douglas was given a choice either to attend the event or to remain at work.” This fact proves the contradictory: that Douglas was “under no duty to attend.”
Moreover, under the subjective standard adopted by the Board and the majority, employees can show that they met the duty to attend requirement by simply maintaining that they perceived some duty to attend. How does one measure an employee’s perception of some duty to attend? This standard will invite confusion and increased arbitrariness.
Finally, if employees can avoid the first prong of the exclusion requirement under K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 44-508(f) by simply perceiving some duty to attend a recreational event, the statute will *459soon become meaningless because, as the majority correctly points out, an employee is barred from compensation under the Act only when both prongs have been met. There is a presumption that the legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation. Hawley v. Kansas Dept. of Agriculture, 281 Kan. 603, 631, 132 P.3d 870 (2006). Based on the.earlier stated reasons, the record lacks substantial competent evidence that Douglas had a duty to attend the Sadler s event. Some duty to attend is not contained in K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 44-508(f).
Because both prongs under K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 44-508(f) were satisfied, Douglas’ accidental injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. Moreover; because the majority has employed a broad expansion of K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 44-508(f), I would reverse.