OPINION
ECKERSTROM, Presiding Judge.¶ 1 Following a jury trial, appellant Jose Guillen was convicted of possession of more than four pounds of marijuana for sale, a class two felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class six felony. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent, mitigated and presumptive prison terms, the longer of which is four years. Before trial, Guillen filed a motion to suppress physical evidence and statements he made to police, which the court denied following an evidentiary hearing. Guillen now challenges that ruling on appeal.
¶ 2 When reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, State v. Blackmore, 186 Ariz. 630, 631, 925 P.2d 1347, 1348 (1996), and view it in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court’s factual findings. State v. Gerlaugh, 134 Ariz. 164, 167, 654 P.2d 800, 803 (1982). We 'review the court’s decision “for abuse of discretion if it involves a discretionary issue, but review constitutional issues and purely legal issues de novo.” State v. Booker, 212 Ariz. 502, ¶ 10, 135 P.3d 57, 59 (App.2006).
¶ 3 In March 2006, officers received information that Guillen had been storing marijuana in large freezers in the garage at his residence. Approximately eight months later, Arizona Department of Public Safety Officer Ballesteros and Oro Valley Police Officer Soto conducted surveillance of Guillen’s residence. Specifically, the officers followed Guillen’s wife as she left the residence and asked Maraña Police Officer Moreno, a canine handler and narcotics investigator, to conduct a canine investigation at the house in her absence. Moreno confirmed with Bal-lesteros that he would walk with the narcotics-deteetion dog to the garage on Guillen’s property and then report his observations to Ballesteros.
¶ 4 The attached, enclosed garage and front door to the residence were both accessible by traversing Guillen’s driveway. Guil-len had erected no fences or barriers obstructing access to the property. And he had posted no signs expressly prohibiting public entry. Moreno and the dog walked onto Guillen’s property and “check[edj” the areas around Guillen’s front and garage doors. At the garage, Moreno focused the dog on the areas underneath, and at the sides of, the door — presumably to expose the dog to any scents emanating from inside the garage. The dog began barking and scratching, indicating it had detected the odor of a “narcotic or dangerous drag.”
¶ 5 Armed with this information, Soto approached Guillen’s wife in the driveway when she returned home. Soto identified himself as a police officer and asked if he could speak with her. She agreed and permitted Soto *83and Ballesteros to come inside the house to talk. Once inside, the officers told Guillen’s wife they had information that the residence was being used as a possible “stash house” and asked for permission to search the premises; she consented. After she led them through the house into the garage, both officers detected a “strong odor of marijuana.” Guillen’s wife agreed to open the garage door to the driveway, and Moreno then brought the dog inside. The dog immediately ran to one of three large freezers covered with brown tarpaulins and alerted on it by “jumping up on the freezer[,] barking and scratching.”
¶ 6 Guillen’s wife allowed the officers to open an unlocked freezer. The freezer was empty but smelled as if marijuana “had been there at one time.” Ballesteros then secured a telephonic search warrant. In the ensuing search, the officers discovered bales of marijuana packed inside the two freezers that had been locked. They also found “packaging items” and a plastic table elsewhere in the garage.
CANINE SNIFF SEARCH UNDER FOURTH AMENDMENT
¶ 7 Guillen first argues that the warrant-less dog sniff, conducted on his property at the front of the garage, was an illegal search of his home in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Although acknowledging that officers may generally traverse areas around a home “that are impliedly open to the public,” Guil-len contends the sniff search here reached inside his home “to explore details ... which would not be revealed without physical intrusion.”
¶ 8 The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in them persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” Searches conducted inside a home without a search warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). “To claim protection under the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.” State v. Millan, 185 Ariz. 398, 401, 916 P.2d 1114, 1117 (App. 1995). “A ‘search’ occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984).
¶ 9 Neither the United States Supreme Court nor any Arizona state court has specifically addressed the circumstances under which an’ officer may direct a narcotics-detection dog to sniff along the seams of a residential structure. However, the Supreme Court has considered the constitutionality of canine sniffs in other contexts. In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983), it held that exposing a defendant’s luggage, located in a public place, to a sniff by a narcotics dog “did not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” There, the Court reasoned:
A “canine sniff’ by a well-trained narcotics detection dog ... does not require opening the luggage. It does not expose noneon-traband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view____ Thus, the manner in which information is obtained through this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item....
In these respects, the canine sniff is sui genens. We are aware of no other investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the procedure.
Id. More recently, the Court has reaffirmed this analytical framework, observing that “governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband ‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest’ ” and holding, for that reason, that a canine sniff performed on the exterior of a lawfully detained car “does not rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable infringement.” Illinois v. Ca-balles, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005) (emphasis in original), quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123, 104 S.Ct. 1652.
*84¶ 10 In short, the Court has consistently characterized the canine sniff as a unique, minimally invasive species of search that, at least when applied to sniffs of lawfully detained vehicles and luggage in public places, is not a constitutionally relevant intrusion. In this ease, we must determine whether the same is true when that unique species of search occurs at the threshold of, and collects information from inside, a private residence.
¶ 11 The Court has identified the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures in the home as “ ‘the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’ ” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984), quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). And, it has observed:
The Fourth Amendment protects the individual’s privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home — a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms: “The right of the people to be secure in their ... houses ... shall not be violated.” ... [Therefore,] the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entonce to the house.
Payton, 445 U.S. at 589-90, 100 S.Ct. 1371 (citation omitted).
¶ 12 In conformity with those principles, the Court has found the government’s probe of a home with thermal-imaging equipment, deployed from a public thoroughfare, to be an unconstitutional search requiring a warrant. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 28, 40, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001). Guillen contends the canine sniff performed here is analogous to the thermal-imaging search conducted in Kyllo and argues the sniff must likewise be unlawful in the absence of a warrant.
¶ 13 We agree that the government’s use of thermal-imaging equipment in Kyllo and the state’s use of a canine sniff in this case share certain relevant characteristics. In both instances, the officers essentially deployed “sense-enhancing” tools to collect information from inside a home without having to physically enter the structure. Id. at 34, 121 S.Ct. 2038 (majority describing thermal-imaging device as “sense-enhancing technology” providing “information regarding the interior of the home”). Most saliently, both searches conveyed only limited information about the interior of the residences: the record here suggests the dog was trained to alert exclusively to the odor of narcotics, and the thermal-imaging equipment in Kyllo could only show “heat images” in black and white. See id. at 40, 121 S.Ct. 2038 (majority acknowledging possible conclusion from thermal images that “no ‘significant’ compromise of the homeowner’s privacy has occurred”).
¶ 14 But the two search methods are distinguishable in one crucial respect: the canine sniff yielded information exclusively about the presence or absence of contraband, while the thermal-imaging equipment could potentially reveal private information from the inside of the defendant’s home that was unrelated to any illegal activity. Indeed, the Court recently distinguished canine sniff searches from thermal-imaging scans on this very ground:
The legitimate expectation that information about perfectly lawful activity will remain private is categorically distinguishable from respondent’s hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection [by a canine sniff] of contraband in the trunk of his car. A dog sniff conducted during a coneededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Anendment.
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410, 125 S.Ct. 834. Thus, both canine sniffs of a vehicle or other containers and thermal-imaging searches of a residence may be comparatively minor intrusions when compared with an officer’s physical search of either. But the Court has characterized dog sniffs of containers as qualitatively different events because, in its view, they implicate no reasonable privacy interest at all. Id. at 408, 125 S.Ct. 834 (“We have held that any interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed ‘legitimate,’ and thus, governmental conduct that only reveals the *85possession of contraband ‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest.’") (second emphasis added), quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123, 104 S.Ct. 1652.
¶ 15 At the same time, the Court has not tolerated even minor intrusions into the privacy of the home and has made clear that any such intrusion, however slight, presumptively requires a warrant. Indeed, when analyzing reasonable expectations of privacy under the traditional criteria set forth in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), the Supreme Court has suggested it will recognize all subjective expectations of privacy as reasonable when the interior of a home is involved. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34, 121 S.Ct. 2038 (restating Katz rule that Fourth Amendment search occurs only when “government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable” and suggesting all privacy expectations in home are categorically so viewed). Specifically, it has observed:
The Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home has never been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information obtained----In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.
Id. at 37-38, 121 S.Ct. 2038.
¶ 16 Our jurisprudence suggests that the home enjoys such special protection because persons have privacy expectations, unique to their homes, not implicated in comparable searches of containers such as luggage or car trunks. Generally, the privacy interests recognized in closed luggage or car trunks relate exclusively to personal possessions and effects lawfully possessed — interests not offended by a dog sniff that will expose only the presence of contraband. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408-09, 125 S.Ct. 834. In contrast, reasonable expectations of privacy in one’s place of residence encompass additional interests in personal security, tranquility, and repose. Over eighty years ago, Justice Brandéis famously observed in the context of a governmental intrusion into the home that the constitutional protection of privacy “conferís], as against the government, the right to be let alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz.1 As the Court’s reasoning in Kyllo suggests, such interests can be offended by any governmental probe of the home, regardless of what that search may or may not expose.
¶ 17 In sum, the Court has held both (1) that dog sniffs, in several contexts, do not implicate reasonable expectations of privacy because they reveal only contraband, Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410, 125 S.Ct. 834, and (2) any intrusion into a home categorically implicates a reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of the nature of the information sought or collected. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37, 121 S.Ct. 2038. We must therefore determine which of these two categorical principles controls here, a vexingly close question. We note,- however, that the Court issued its ruling in Caballes after its ruling in Kyllo, and, although Caballes refers to Kyllo, the Court did not expressly limit its reasoning in Caballes to canine searches unrelated to the home. Because the Court has addressed such searches exclusively in the context of containers, we are mindful that there are aspects of home privacy implicated by canine sniff searches that the Court has not yet contemplated. Nonetheless, we join the majority of jurisdictions in concluding that, given the apparent direction of that jurisprudence, a dog sniff reaching into a home does not rise to the level of a “cognizable infringement” under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409, 125 S.Ct. 834; see United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644, 650 (6th Cir.1998) (canine sniff not Fourth Amendment search as long as canine unit lawfully present at location where sniff occurs); United States v. Roby, 122 F.3d 1120, 1124-25 (8th Cir.1997) *86(trained dog’s detection of odor in common corridor of hotel does not violate Fourth Amendment); United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 475-77 (D.C.Cir.1989) (canine sniff not Fourth Amendment search when conducted on train sleeping compartment from public corridor); Fitzgerald v. State, 153 Md. App. 601, 837 A.2d 989, 1035 (2003) (“[A] sniff by a trained dog, standing where it has a right to be, of odors emanating from any protected place, residence or otherwise, is not a ‘search’ within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment.”); People v. Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d 19, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1056 (1990) (canine sniff outside apartment not Fourth Amendment search); see also United States v. Lingenfelter, 997 F.2d 632, 638-39 (9th Cir.1993) (in context of commercial warehouse search, rejecting reasoning of another circuit court that dog sniff violated legitimate expectation of privacy in dwelling). But see United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir.1985) (heightened expectation of privacy in home rendered warrantless canine sniff unconstitutional Search); Florida v. Rabb, 920 So.2d 1175, 1188 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2006) (use of canine sniff to detect contraband inside home Fourth Amendment search); State v. Ortiz, 257 Neb. 784, 600 N.W.2d 805, 817 (1999) (absent reasonable suspicion, Fourth Amendment violated by canine sniff at apartment threshold).
CANINE SNIFF SEARCH UNDER ARTICLE II, § 8
¶ 18 We next address whether the warx-antless canine sniff of the seams of Guillen’s home violated article II, § 8 of the Arizona Constitution.2 That section provides: “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” Although Arizona’s state constitutional provisions generally were intended to parallel federal constitutional protections, Malmin v. State, 30 Ariz. 258, 261, 246 P. 548, 549 (1926), Arizona’s highest court has observed that article II, § 8 is worded differently than the Fourth Amendment and is more specific than its federal counterpart in “preserving the sanctity of homes and in creating a right of privacy.” State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260, 264-65, 689 P.2d 519, 523-24 (1984).
¶ 19 For this reason, the Arizona Supreme Court has not hesitated to forge its own path in articulating the scope of Arizona’s right to privacy in the home. See id. at 264-65, 689 P.2d at 523-24 (deciding propriety of war-rantless home entry on state constitutional grounds rather than Fourth Amendment grounds, recognizing “possibility that our interpretation of the Arizona search and seizure constitutional provision more narrowly *87circumscribes the right of police to make a warrantless entry [into the home]”); see also State v. Ault, 150 Ariz. 459, 466, 724 P.2d 545, 552 (1986) (“Our decision not to extend the inevitable discovery doctrine into defendant’s home in this case is based on ... art. [II], § 8 of the Arizona Constitution regardless of the position the United States Supreme Court would take on the issue.”). As the Arizona Supreme Court long ago observed:
It is true that we have held ... that section 8 of article [II] of the Constitution of Arizona is of the same general effect and purpose as the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. We have the right, however, to give such construction to our own constitutional provisions as we think logical and proper, notwithstanding their analogy to the Federal Constitution and the federal decisions based on that Constitution.
Turley v. State, 48 Ariz. 61, 70-71, 59 P.2d 312, 316-17 (1936). Applying these principles here, we hold that canine sniff searches of a residence, conducted from the threshold of a home, interfere with reasonable expectations of privacy and violate article II, § 8 of the Arizona Constitution to the extent they are conducted in the absence of reasonable suspicion to believe contraband may be found.
¶ 20 In so concluding, we have no quarrel with the United States Supreme Court’s general observations that canine sniff searches are considerably less intrusive than physical searches of containers and vehicles. See Ca-balles, 543 U.S. at 409, 125 S.Ct. 834; Place, 462 U.S. at 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637. And we agree with the view that a sniff search reaching into a home would likewise be comparatively less intrusive than an officer’s physical entry into the premises. But, when the target of a search is a person’s residence, we cannot agree that a canine sniff implicates no expectation of privacy at all beyond a criminal’s illegitimate privacy interest in his or her contraband. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408-09, 125 S.Ct. 834.
¶ 21 In contrast to a person’s privacy interest in luggage or the trunk of a car — spaces people use but do not themselves occupy— courts have long recognized as reasonable the expectation that a person’s home will be protected from governmental probing of any kind absent lawful authority. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34, 121 S.Ct. 2038. As shall be discussed below, potential interference with legitimate privacy interests in the home can occur not only in the scrutiny of personal effects but also in the disruption of a person’s right to a sense of security and repose therein.
¶22 When describing the scope of that right as guaranteed by article II, § 8 of the Arizona Constitution, the Arizona Supreme Court has observed: “Our constitutional provisions were intended to give our citizens a sense of security in their homes.... ” Bolt, 142 Ariz. at 265, 689 P.2d at 524 (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court has similarly acknowledged that traditional notions of home privacy include an interest in simple repose: “In 1604, an English court made the now-famous observation that ‘the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose.’ ” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999), quoting Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 195 (K.B.);3 The American Heritage Dictionary 1049 (2d college ed. 1982) (defining “repose” as “[cjalmness; tranquility”).
¶ 23 As discussed, the Court has articulated this privacy interest as “ ‘the right to be let alone’ ” and has characterized it as “ ‘the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man.’ ” Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985), quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478, 48 S.Ct. 564 (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz.4 And the Su*88preme Court has, in various ways since that time, acknowledged this privacy dimension when assessing purported governmental intrusions into the home. In Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961), the majority of the Court emphasized that, under the Fourth Amendment, the home' should be an “ ‘oasis, some shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is a man’s castle.’ ” Id. at 511-12, 81 S.Ct. 679, quoting United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315-16 (2d Cir.1951) (Frank, J., dissenting). Indeed, the Court’s opinion in Kyllo also implicitly embraced such a notion of privacy in holding that all expectations of privacy in the interior of a home are recognized as reasonable. 533 U.S. at 34, 121 S.Ct. 2038.5
¶ 24 By those standards, we have little difficulty concluding that a canine sniff that occurs at the threshold of a home, and collects information from inside, intrudes upon an expectation of privacy that our society has long recognized as reasonable. We believe a law-abiding person could reasonably perceive the specter of a uniformed police officer deploying a trained narcotics dog along the seams of his or her home as an unsettling and embarrassing event. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 421-22, 125 S.Ct. 834 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (characterizing canine dog sniff during routine traffic stop as intimidating event changing “character of the encounter,” making it “broader, [and] more adversarial,” and likely causing “distress and embarrassment” to law-abiding persons); see also Commonwealth v. Johnston, 515 Pa. 454, 530 A.2d 74, 79-80 (1987) (suggesting canine sniff search can entail “harassment, annoyance, inconvenience and humiliation”). Even persons with nothing to hide may worry about why their homes have been targeted in the first instance and whether the search could reveal something of which they were unaware. Nor would such anxiety during a canine search be entirely unwarranted. As the dissent in Caballes observed, the “infallible dog ... is a creature of legal fiction.” 543 U.S. at 411-12, 125 S.Ct. 834 (Souter, J., dissenting) (collecting cases showing significant error rates and study demonstrating even “generally reliable” dogs return false positives “12.5% to 60% of the time”). Thus, even for the person whose residence contains no contraband, a canine sniff carries a worrisome possibility that officers may later appear with a search warrant, based on an erroneous, false-positive response.
¶ 25 The dissent correctly observes that officers may lawfully, without reasonable suspicion, approach a home’s front door to conduct a consensual inquiry of a resident. See Baker v. Clover, 177 Ariz. 37, 39, 864 P.2d 1069, 1071 (App.1993) (recognizing, in Fourth Amendment context, reasonable expectation that members of society, including police officers on police business, may use driveway, walkway, and normal access route to reach residence). But, there is a marked difference between such a benign approach— which the resident may lawfully ignore altogether by declining to acknowledge the officer or declining to answer any inquüy — and the arrival on one’s threshold of an officer in the act of deploying a sensory-enhancing piece of equipment, without the consent of the resident, designed to collect information from within the residence. Indeed, when an officer deploys a dog to sniff the seams of a house, the officer has unmistakably targeted the residents of the home for criminal investigation. We do not believe that an officer’s mere arrival on a threshold, without a canine, to make an inquiry on some unknown topic is similarly embarrassing or worrisome for a law-abiding citizen.
¶ 26 Accordingly, although canine sniff searches may be less intrusive than physical *89searches by law enforcement authorities, they can also be intimidating, embarrassing, distressing, and worrisome encounters disrupting a person’s privacy interest in being “let alone” at home.6 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478, 48 S.Ct. 564 (Brandéis, J., dissenting). We read article II, § 8 of the Arizona Constitution as entitling Arizona residents to a “sense of security” in their homes, free of such probes in the absence of reasonable cause to believe contraband will be found. Bolt, 142 Ariz. at 265, 689 P.2d at 524. The emphasis on “the right of privacy” and “the sanctity of homes” evident in article II, § 8 reinforces our understanding of- its text. Id. at 264-65, 689 P.2d at 523-24 (article II, § 8 “specific in preserving the sanctity of homes and in creating a right of privacy”).7
¶ 27 Nor arq we alone in reaching that conclusion. As observed, the majority of federal circuits and state courts addressing whether sniff searches of the seams of a home violate the Fourth Amendment have concluded, or suggested, they do not. See ¶ 17 supra. But, of those states that, like Arizona, construe their respective state constitutions as providing, at least in some contexts, more protection from searches and seizures than that conferred by the Fourth Amendment, most have found such searches to be cognizable intrusions requiring some reasonable justification. See Dunn, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388, 564 N.E.2d at 1057-58 (holding dog sniff at threshold of apartment requires reasonable suspicion); State v. Dearman, 92 Wash.App. 630, 962 P.2d 850, 852, 853 n. 5, 854 (1998) (finding warrant required to conduct dog sniff at threshold of home under state constitutional provision with wording identical to article II, § 8 of Arizona Constitution); see also Pooley v. State, 705 P.2d 1293, 1310-11 (Alaska App.1985) (holding dog sniff is search requiring reasonable suspicion under state constitution); People v. Boylan, 854 P.2d 807, 810-11 (Colo.1993) (reasonable suspicion required under state constitution to conduct sniff search generally); State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 132, 135 (Minn.2002) (same); Johnston, 530 A.2d at 79-80 (state constitution requires reasonable suspicion for canine sniff searches generally); State v. Pellicci, 133 N.H. 523, 580 A.2d 710, 715, 716 (1990) (under state constitution canine sniff search of car required reasonable suspicion of contraband). But see Fitzgerald v. State, 153 Md.App. 601, 837 A.2d 989, 1035 (2003) (suggesting Maryland Constitution requires no different result than Fourth Amendment).8 And, some of those courts have expressed a 'concern that any other conclusion would sanction indiscriminate canine sweeps of residential thresholds — a prospect those courts have characterized as “ ‘Orwellian’ ” and “ ‘repugnant’ ” to constitutionally protected expectations of privacy in the home. Ortiz, 600 N.W.2d at 816, quoting Dunn, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388, 564 N.E.2d at 1058.9
*90¶ 28 The dissent asserts our conclusion defies settled Arizona law, contending our supreme court’s holding in State v. Morrow, 128 Ariz. 309, 625 P.2d 898 (1981), should control our result here. But that case addressed only the propriety of a dog sniff of luggage under the Fourth Amendment. It did not purport to address either the propriety of such a search when deployed at the threshold of a person’s home or whether the language of article II, § 8 of the Arizona Constitution might compel a different result under such circumstances.
¶ 29 And, Morrow’s core holding, that the government conducts no search when it merely collects emanations escaping from a protected area into the public domain, 128 Ariz. at 312-13, 625 P.2d at 901-02, has since been overtaken and limited by subsequent decisions of the United States Supreme Court. In Kyllo, the government similarly contended that its use of thermal-imaging equipment, deployed from a public thoroughfare, to collect heat that had fully escaped from a suspect’s home into the public domain, violated no privacy interest. 533 U.S. at 35, 121 S.Ct. 2038. The Court disagreed and held that the government’s collection “by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a search — at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use.” Id. at 34, 121 S.Ct. 2038, quoting Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512, 81 S.Ct. 679. Thus, the Court has made clear that neither the ability of sensory-enhancing equipment to collect information from emanations that have escaped into a public area, nor an officer’s deployment of that equipment from a lawful location, immunizes such a probe of a home from constitutional scrutiny. See id. at 34-35, 121 S.Ct. 2038. In contending otherwise based on Morrow, our dissenting colleague overlooks more current, controlling precedent.10
¶ 30 Thus, we hold that a dog sniff of the seams of a residence constitutes a cognizable intrusion under article II, § 8 of the Arizona Constitution. However, we do not conclude that such a search required the officers to have obtained a warrant upon a showing of probable cause. Although article II, § 8 is more explicit than the Fourth Amendment in characterizing the home as a zone of privacy, it contains no language comparable to that of its federal counterpart requiring a warrant for all searches in the home. Thus, nothing in the text of the Arizona Constitution necessarily mandates a search warrant for the limited intrusion involved in this case. In our view, the disruption of a person’s sense of security and repose caused by a canine sniff search of a home is far more analogous to that occasioned by a brief, investigatory detention — a governmental act requiring reasonable suspicion — than to the intrusion caused by a physical entry into a residence, which requires a warrant issued on probable cause. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (recognizing brief investigatory detention involves lesser intrusion than search of home and holding only reasonable suspicion required to conduct it). And, the bulk of states addressing the issue under their state constitutions have reached the same conclusion. See ¶ 27 supra. We likewise conclude that law enforcement officers need only a reasonable suspicion that contraband may be found in a home in order to conduct a canine sniff search of the exterior of the home.11 Accordingly, we remand this *91ease to the trial court to determine whether the officers here had reasonable suspicion to believe contraband would be found inside the Guillen home before the sniff search was performed.
¶ 31 Assuming, arguendo, the trial court concludes the canine sniff violated the Arizona Constitution, it must then consider whether the marijuana later found, during the continued investigation of the Guillen residence, should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. See State v. Fornof, 218 Ariz. 74, ¶ 5, 179 P.3d 954, 956 (App.2008) (requiring suppression of evidence obtained from police encounter not Ibased on reasonable suspicion); accord State v. Richcreek, 187 Ariz. 501, 506, 930 P.2d 1304, 1309 (1997). The state emphasizes, and the trial court found, that the contraband was discovered pursuant to a consent search of the residence and that the officers used no information gained from the dog sniff to secure that consent. But the record also suggests the officers might not have attempted to approach Guillen’s wife and seek such consent if the narcotics dog had not first confirmed the apparent presence of marijuana on the premises.12 See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920) (setting forth basic fruit-of-poisonous-tree doctrine: government may not use knowledge gained by its own wrongdoing to obtain evidence against accused); see also Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64-65, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (government may not “support a conviction on evidence obtained through leads from ... unlawfully obtained evidence”).
¶ 32 Thus, if the trial court concludes the canine sniff was conducted in violation of the Arizona Constitution, it must then determine whether the officers used the information acquired to trigger the next step in their investigation — asking for consent to search the house — or whether, in the alternative, they would have taken that step regardless of the outcome of the dog sniff. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988) (setting forth independent-source doctrine allowing admission of evidence obtained by “later, lawful seizure [that] is genuinely independent of an earlier, tainted one”); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) (applying inevitable-discovery doctrine to allow admission of illegally obtained evidence that “ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means”); Bolt, 142 Ariz. at 269, 689 P.2d at 528 (exclusionary rule no broader under Arizona Constitution).
¶ 33 We reverse the trial court’s denial of Guillen’s motion to suppress both the marijuana found in his garage and his statements to law enforcement officers, and we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
CONCURRING: GARYE L. VÁSQUEZ, Judge.'. This portion of Brandéis’s dissent has since been repeatedly quoted with approval in majority opinions issued by the Court. E.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985); Calif. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65, 94 S.Ct. 1494, 39 L.Ed.2d 812 (1974).
. In the introductory paragraph of his motion to suppress, Guillen moved generally to suppress the “physical evidence” secured from his home on grounds that the evidence was acquired in violation of his rights under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article II, § 8 of the Arizona Constitution. Later, he again asserted his entitlement to relief under article II, § 8 in the text of his supporting argument. We think that two such mentions of a specific Arizona constitutional provision, within a motion to suppress covering only six pages of total text, in a context wherein the federal citations therein provided were equally germane to the state constitutional question, was sufficient to alert the trial court that Guillen was asserting his motion to suppress under the Arizona Constitution as well as the Fourth Amendment. However, we agree with our dissenting colleague that the more limited reference to the Arizona Constitution in Guillen's appellate opening brief was not sufficient to trigger our duty to review that claim and, under most circumstances, we would decline to address it. But, such deficiencies in an appellate brief do not deprive this court of jurisdiction and we may exercise our discretion to address inadequately raised claims when they broach a matter of statewide importance. See Larsen v. Nissan Motor Corp., 194 Ariz. 142, ¶ 12, 978 P.2d 119, 124 (App. 1999) (addressing state constitutional claim not properly preserved on grounds of statewide importance). Were we to bypass the state constitutional aspect of the canine sniff search here, when such analysis leads to a different result than our analysis under the Fourth Amendment, we would risk misdirecting our law enforcement agencies. And, we think those agencies would be justifiably frustrated at our use of such a piecemeal approach — after they have adjusted their practices, and developed their prosecutions, in reliance on an incomplete analysis. Notably, this court ordered oral argument and, in conformity with our court’s longstanding practice, distributed a draft decision alerting the parties to this court’s inclination to address the state constitutional question. By this method, the parties were provided over one week to develop and present oral arguments on that issue. Indeed, the state filed two supplemental pleadings in advance of oral argument addressing the state constitutional aspect of the claim.
. Contrary to our dissenting colleague’s suggestion, we do not here rely on the underlying holding of a 1604 English case. Rather, we rely on a contemporary United States Supreme Court opinion that chose to emphasize certain language from a 1604 case.
. Our colleague complains that we rely on the dissent from an "eighty-year-old federal case” when we acknowledge the reasoning of Justice Brandéis in Olmstead. But, as observed previously, and made clear by our citation here, that particular reasoning has been quoted and *88adopted by the majority opinions in several subsequent United States Supreme Court cases. It is therefore part of the fabric of our nation's jurisprudence describing expectations of home privacy.
. In further emphasizing that reasonable privacy rights at home do not depend on the nature of the information sought or acquired by the governmental action, the majority reminded the dissent of its caution in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984), that, when a plumber is present, a " 'bathtub is a less private area ... even if his back is turned.’ ” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 39, 121 S.Ct. 2038, quoting Karo, 468 U.S. at 735, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in pait).
. Of course, a resident need not be physically present when the sniff search is conducted to be later worried, unsettled, distressed, or embarrassed by the fact that it occurred.
. The dissent correctly observes that our dispositive reasoning here is not found either in Guillen’s initial motion to suppress or his opening brief on appeal. But once we address a claim, we have a duty to resolve it correctly and explain our reasoning in doing so. Thus, although our review is generally limited to the claims and record properly before us, neither court rule, legal precedent, nor logic limits us to the reasoning or legal authority presented by either party when we resolve claims. See Decola v. Freyer, 198 Ariz. 28, 118, 6 P.3d 333, 336 (App.2000).
. As discussed above, in the limited context of home searches, our state supreme court has held expressly that the text of our state constitution places greater emphasis on home privacy rights than does its federal equivalent. Ault, 150 Ariz. at 463, 724 P.2d at 549; Bolt, 142 Ariz. at 264-65, 689 P.2d at 523-24. For that reason, we must analyze home searches under our state constitution through different lenses than those states that hew exclusively to federal constitutional law in analyzing such issues. Our review of non-Arizona authority therefore focuses on those jurisdictions, like our own, that similarly assess search and seizure questions independently under their respective state constitutions. Thus, although we find the extra-jurisdictional precedent cited in the dissenting opinion certainly relevant to the Fourth Amendment question, we find those cases somewhat less instructive on the state constitutional issue before us.
. Our dissenting colleague observes that such an indiscriminate approach is not before the court today. But, were we to rule, as the dissent asserts we must, that dog sniffs conducted at the threshold of a private residence are not searches at all and constitute no cognizable governmental intrusion on any privacy interest, such sweeps *90would become unquestionably lawful in Arizona. We know of no basis for the dissent's prediction about whether law enforcement agencies would or would not employ such investigative techniques if legally authorized to do so.
. Nor does the Court’s opinion in Caballes, subsequent to Kyllo, alter this conclusion. In Ca-balles, the Court held permissible a canine sniff of a car trunk because the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband. 543 U.S. at 408-09, 125 S.Ct. 834. Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, Caballes did not hold that the sniff was permissible because the aromas in question had escaped into the public domain.
. Although the law is well settled that police officers have the same right of access as any member of the general public to the curtilage of a person's property, see Baker v. Clover, 177 Ariz. 37, 39, 864 P.2d 1069, 1071 (App.1993) (recognizing, in Fourth Amendment context, reasonable expectation that members of society, including police officers on police business, may use driveway, walkway, and normal access route to reach residence), some authority suggests an offi*91cer entering to deploy a narcotics-detection dog would exceed the scope of that right of access. See Ortiz, 600 N.W.2d at 819-20 (holding officer with drug-detection canine exceeded scope of resident's expectation of privacy in hallway of apartment building); State v. Ross, 91 Wash.App. 814, 959 P.2d 1188, 1190 (1998) (finding officers not lawfully within curtilage after exceeding scope of implied invitation to be there). Thus, although police officers are entitled to the same access to curtilage that a resident allows delivery people or the general public, see Baker, 177 Ariz. at 39, 864 P.2d at 1071, we question whether any category of visitor could claim the same implicit consent to such access, consistent with a resident's reasonable expectations of privacy, when the visitor is armed with equipment designed to probe the private portions of the residence. However, because Guillen did not argue the officer exceeded the scope of his implied invitation to be on the curtilage of Guillen's property by bringing the drug-detection dog, and because we have granted Guillen relief on other grounds, we decline to address that question here.
. The officers had received a tip more than eight months earlier that the Guillen residence was being used to store marijuana. Nonetheless, they had refrained during that entire period from simply walking to the door and seeking consent to search. Even when they began further investigation of the house, the officers did not approach the occupants to seek consent to search but, rather, waited until the house appeared unoccupied to deploy the narcotics dog. In short, the record suggests the officers did not wish to alert the residents to the investigation until the officers felt confident the contraband necessary to prove their case would be found inside.