(dissenting):
T 14 I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to reverse the trial court's order.
[ 15 The trial court, perhaps unwisely, denied Oseguera's rule 60(b) motion.1 However, we must remember that " '[aln appeal of alrJule 60(b) order addresses only the propriety of the denial or grant of relief. The appeal does not, at least in most cases, reach the merits of the underlying judgment from which relief was sought!" Franklin Covey Client Sales v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, ¶ 19, 2 P.3d 451 (citation omitted). "'Appellate review of [rJule 60(b) orders must be narrowed in this manner lest [rfJule 60(b) become a substitute for timely appeals'" Id.
1 16 While I am sympathetic to Oseguera's position, she has failed to present even the most rudimentary argument supporting her appeal of the trial court's denial of her rule 60(b) motion. See, e.g., Franklin Covey, 2000 UT App 110 at ¶ 25, 2 P.3d 451 (refusing to address the defendant's rule 60(b) claim, stating "[appellant] has not even attempted to present 'mistakes' for which relief may be obtained under rule 60(b)(1)"). Instead, Ose-guera argues only that the trial court improperly decided the legal merits of her underlying claim. Notwithstanding Oseguera's plea to consider her underlying claim, the merits are not properly before this court. In fact, the record clearly shows that Oseguera has already attempted to present this claim to the Utah Supreme Court, and the supreme court subsequently denied it as untimely. It is not now appropriate for this court to treat the claim in a different manner.
117 Further, had Oseguera properly presented an argument concerning the trial court's denial of her rule 60(b) motion, I would still affirm. We afford trial courts broad discretion in ruling on rule 60(b) motions and will disturb such rulings only in the face of an abuse of that discretion. See Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah Ct.App.1989). While we have not addressed previously the effect that a failure to receive *1013notice has under our rule 60(b)(6), in the federal system, "[rlule 60(b) relief is unavailable when the only reason for the failure to appeal is the lack of notice of the entry of judgment." Tucker v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 800 F.2d 1054, 1056 (11th Cir.1986).2 Moreover, the validity of a judgment is not affected by a finding that a party has not received notice of the judgment, see Workman v. Nagle Constr. Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 751 (Utah Ct.App.1990), and a party cannot use a rule 60(b) motion to avoid the consequences of failing to timely file an appeal. See Franklin Covey, 2000 UT App 110 at ¶¶ 23-25, 2 P.3d 451.
{18 The only exception to this general prohibition, as correctly highlighted by the majority, is found when an "appellant has exercised due diligence to ascertain whether the judgment has been entered or has given sufficient reason for the lack of such diligence." Spika v. Village of Lombard, 763 F.2d 282, 285 (7th Cir.1985).3 The majority interprets the second portion of this exception to include incidents where an appellant has been misled by the court. See supra ¶ 9; see also Tubbs v. Campbell, 731 F.2d 1214, 1215-16 (5th Cir.1984) (concluding that the trial court properly granted relief from judgment to the plaintiff after determining that the plaintiff had diligently made inquiries concerning the judgment and had been informed by the office of the court clerk that no judgment had been entered). I do not take issue with the adoption of this standard. I do, however, have reservations regarding the majority's application of this standard to the instant case.
119 Here, the majority concludes that Oseguera was "actually misled" by the trial court. The majority presents two "facts" to support this conclusion. First, the majority notes that Oseguera was "misled" when the trial court set a scheduling conference well after the judgment had been entered. Second, the majority concludes that the trial court "actually misled" Oseguera when it ruled on her summary judgment motion absent a notice to submit. |
1 20 I disagree with this conclusion as well as the underlying premise that Oseguera demonstrated due diligence in this process. First, the trial court entered judgment on February 29, 2000. After that date, there is nothing in the record to support a conclusion that either Oseguera or her counsel contacted the trial court concerning either the motion or the status of the case. In fact, the only record contact between Oseguera and *1014the trial court 4 came on April 28, 2000, more than two months after Farmers's filed a notice to submit concerning its rule 56(f) motion. The majority also relies on a May 2 minute entry setting a June 2 scheduling conference to support its determination that the court misled the parties. The conference was scheduled by a visiting judge, not the judge responsible for the summary judgment decision.5 Therefore, there is insufficient information in the record to support the majority's conclusions that Oseguera acted with the required due diligence, or that she had been "actually misled."
121 Second, I believe that the majority's reliance on rules 4-501 and 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration is misplaced. As we have stated, "[oJnce a motion is properly made, and other parties ... have had the opportunity ... to respond, the court may act at its convenience to decide the matter. No notice to submit for decision under [rule 4-501 is required." Scott v. Majors, 980 P.2d 214, 217 (Utah Ct.App.1999) (emphasis added). Here, it is undisputed that the trial court acted without a notice to submit on Oseguera's summary judgment motion, but, the court apparently determined that enough material had been presented to render a decision. While I probably would not have acted in a similar manner, the trial court clearly has the latitude to determine how to proceed in its own courtroom. See Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 702 (Utah Ct.App.1994). Accordingly, I see nothing to support the majority's conclusion that the trial court "actually misled" Oseguera.
122 Finally, we have long held to the principle that we will not consider issues that improperly "'shift the burden of research and argument'" to this court. Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, ¶ 8, 995 P.2d 14 (citation omitted), cert. denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). Oseguera's arguments on appeal were solely focused on issues not properly before this court, and she did nothing to develop an argument concerning the trial court's denial of her rule 60(b) motion. Therefore, she has shifted the burden of both argument and research to this court, forcing us to invest valuable resources to address this issue. Thus, were I to agree with the majority's analysis of the issue, I would still feel compelled to dismiss Oseguera's appeal.
123 While the trial court's actions were perhaps ill-advised, and while I acknowledge that I would have decided Oseguera's rule 60(b) motion differently, I do not believe this presents a sufficient basis to reverse the trial court's decision.6 Oseguera failed to argue the underlying equities of her case, the one material issue left to her at this juncture, and in so failing, I do not believe we should address her claim. Moreover, while I believe that the majority has properly read a due diligence requirement into rule 60(b)(6), I do not believe that it has properly applied this requirement to these facts. I therefore dissent from the result reached by the majority and would instead affirm the trial court's decision.
. After the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers based solely on Osegu-era's motion and failed to notify either side of the decision, Oseguera appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. However, because Oseguera's appeal was untimely, the court dismissed the ap'peal. Oseguera then filed her rule 60(b) motion in the trial court, which the trial court summarily denied. In its order, the trial court ruled that summary judgment had been decided properly and that the parties should have known of the judgment.
. Rule 60(b)(6), by its own terms, grants solely to the trial court, not the Court of Appeals, the equitable power to repair decisions that may be unfair to a party. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) ("On motion and upon such terms as are just, the [trial] court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order, or proceeding ...." (emphasis added)). Here, assuming the majority's characterization of Ose-guera's claim is correct, Oseguera argued that it was unjust for the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of Farmers absent Farmers's cross-motion for summary judgment, its opposition to Oseguera's motion, and a notice to submit on one or both summary judgment motions. However, in ruling on Oseguera's 60(b) motion, the trial court clearly determined that the result would not have changed had the additional documents been submitted. Thus, the trial court implicitly determined that justice had been done and denied the motion, in essence finding that Oseguera had failed to satisfy the threshold requirement for 60(b) relief.
While I agree with the majority position that under certain circumstances the trial court can abuse its discretion, I believe those situations are very rare. See, e.g., Tubbs v. Campbell, 731 F.2d 1214, 1215-16 (5th Cir.1984). Moreover, this court should resist the urge to superimpose its judgment over that of the trial court merely because we disagree with the result reached. Decisions regarding 60(b) motions are at their very core decisions of equity, and not law. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the trial court is the only court in a position to properly assess the equities of these situations and determine whether justice will be furthered through the granting of a rule 60(b) motion.
. Whether under federal rule 60(b) or 4(a)(6), relief for failure to receive notice is limited, discretionary, and left to the trial court to decide. Compare Spika v. Village of Lombard, 763 F.2d 282, 285 (7th Cir.1985) (affirming the trial court's denial of relief under rule 60(b)) and Tubbs, 731 F.2d at 1216 (affirming the trial court's grant of relief under rule 60(b)), with Nowak v. INS, 94 F.3d 390, 391 (7th Cir.1996) {affirming the trial court's denial of relief under rule 4(a)(6) and rule 60(b) and noting that rule 4(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure commends to the discretion of the trial court the decision to extend the time for appeal in response to a motion filed within 180 days of the judgment if the losing party did not receive timely notice).
. I am giving Oseguera the benefit of the record, which merely states: "Motion/scheduling conference scheduled on June 2, 2000 at 9:30 AM." Neither party is identified as having requested the conference.
. The judge who scheduled the conference was a visiting judge who may not have been familiar with the case. Thus, Oseguera was not divested of her due diligence obligation concerning her pending motion or the posture of Farmers's pending rule 56(f) motion. Moreover, Oseguera was aware that Farmers's notice to submit its 56(f) motion had been pending for well over 60 days, which should have put her on further notice of her responsibility to investigate the court's decision.
. I share in the majority's concern with the trial court's actions in this matter. After sua sponte ordering summary judgment in favor of Farmers, the trial court failed to notify either party of the decision for at least three months, thereby precluding Oseguera from filing a timely appeal. While it is likely that Oseguera's underlying claim was destined to fail, I can discern no substantial reason for the trial court's decision to deny Oseguera's rule 60(b) motion. The court could have easily granted Oseguera's motion and then reentered the summary judgment decision at that time, thus permitting Oseguera the opportunity to pursue appellate review of her underlying claim.