dissenting.
Even though father remains a resident of the State of Oregon and ORS 107.135 provides Oregon courts with continuing subject matter jurisdiction over Oregon’s dissolution of marriage judgments, the majority interprets ORS 109.744 to preclude the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over father’s motion to modify.1 I dissent because the majority’s interpretation is contrary to the legislature’s intent as to how the statute should operate.
In May 1998, father filed a petition for dissolution of the parties’ marriage in Clackamas County, and mother consented to the Oregon court’s jurisdiction. Pursuant to that jurisdiction, the trial court dissolved the parties’ marriage, awarded custody of the children to mother, and put a parenting plan in place. The trial court exercised its jurisdiction again in April 1999 when the parenting plan was modified at the request of the parties.
Then, in early October 1999, mother asked a German court to assume jurisdiction. In December 1999, father filed new motions regarding modification of visitation in the trial court and also registered the equivalent of a “special appearance” in the German court for the sole purpose of contesting the German court’s jurisdiction. A hearing occurred in the trial court in August 2000 on father’s motion to modify.
On October 30, 2000, the German court declined jurisdiction. On November 15, 2000, the trial court ruled on father’s motion to modify, while still unaware of the German court’s decision to decline jurisdiction. It found that: *649(a) Mother is a citizen and resident of Germany; (b) Germany is the children’s home state; (c) the potential witnesses are in Germany; and (d) the German court was an available forum. The trial court therefore declined to exercise jurisdiction. Significantly, the court did not find that father had left Oregon, that the children no longer had a significant connection with the state, or that substantial evidence was no longer available in Oregon concerning their care.
Father subsequently received notice of the German court’s decision and notified the trial court that it was the only available, remaining forum. Accordingly, father moved under ORCP 71 B(1)(b) to set aside the order of dismissal, arguing that there was newly discovered evidence (the German order of dismissal), which could not have been discovered but which now should be considered, and alternatively, that the court should withdraw its order under ORCP 71 B(1)(e) so as to provide a forum for the parties’ present dispute.2 The court denied the motion and ruled:
“Under ORS 109.741, Oregon never had jurisdiction to make an ‘initial child custody determination.’ In order for Oregon to have ‘continuing jurisdiction under ORS 109.744, the ‘child custody determination’ must have been made consistent with ORS 109.741. If it could somehow be said to have had initial jurisdiction, Oregon would have lost that jurisdiction pursuant to ORS 109.744(1)(a) by the time of this hearing.”3
Father appealed originally from the judgment of dismissal, but later filed an amended notice of appeal, also *650appealing from the denial of his motion to set aside the judgment. Both questions are properly before us. This case presents a question of continuing jurisdiction under circumstances where the trial court had exclusive jurisdiction at the time of its initial determination and where the only other court that could have subsequently exercised jurisdiction has declined jurisdiction. Our standard of review in deciding father’s motion to modify is de novo on the factual record before us. ORS 19.125(3); Henry and Keppel, 326 Or 166, 168, 951 P2d 135 (1997). .
In general, jurisdiction as it applies to courts encompasses: (1) jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) jurisdiction over the parties; and (3) the jurisdiction or power to render a particular judgment. Landis v. City of Roseburg, 243 Or 44, 49, 411 P2d 282 (1966). All three kinds of jurisdiction existed in the trial court in 1998. At that time, the trial court acquired personal and subject matter jurisdiction under ORS 107.105. Also, it had the power to render custody or parenting plan decisions under ORS 107.105. Because the trial court had complete jurisdiction over the matter, ORS 107.135 would ordinarily confer continuing personal and subject matter jurisdiction, as well as the power to modify its prior judgment. However, the legislature intended that the jurisdictional requirements of ORS chapter 109 supplement those of chapter 107. Thus, while a court might appear to have the power to modify its custody awards under ORS 107.135, it may be deprived of jurisdiction because of the operation of ORS chapter 109. State ex rel Pennsylvania v. Stork, 56 Or App 335, 340, 641 P2d 660, rev den 293 Or 190, 648 P2d 851 (1982). With that much of the majority opinion, I agree.
The difference between the majority opinion and my view exists because we hold different understandings of the legislature’s intent when it enacted the UCCJEA in 1999. The UCCJEA provides the following means by which a court exercises jurisdiction in child custody matters: (1) it can take initial jurisdiction of child custody matters under ORS 109.741; (2) it can take jurisdiction to modify a determination made by another state under ORS 109.747; (3) it can take temporary emergency jurisdiction under ORS 109.751; and (4) it can exercise already-existing jurisdiction to modify a determination when there is a simultaneous proceeding to *651enforce the determination in another state, under ORS 109.757. In addition, it can decline to exercise the jurisdiction that it has under the foregoing statutes on the ground that another state is the more appropriate forum under ORS 109.761. Operating within that statutory scheme, ORS 109.744 declares that a court of this state that has made a child custody determination consistent with the UCCJEA has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction until the court determines that certain statutory prerequisites exist to divest it of jurisdiction. In other words, ORS 109.744 is a statute that confers exclusive continuing jurisdiction on the court that initially exercises valid jurisdiction.
In this case, the trial court acquired initial jurisdiction in 1998. That exercise of juris diction was consistent with the UCCJA, which was in effect at the time. Father’s motion to modify, filed in December 1989, implicates for the first time the provisions of the UCCJEA and ORS 109.744. ORS 109.744 provides:
“(1) Except as otherwise provided in ORS 109.751, a court of this state that has made a child custody determination consistent with ORS 109.741 or 109.747 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until:
“(a) A court of this state determines that neither the child, nor the child and one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a significant connection with this state and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child’s care, protection, training and personal relationships; or
“(b) A court of this state or a court of another state determines that the child, the child’s parents and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this state.
“(2) A court of this state that has made a child custody determination and does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section may modify that determination only if the court has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under ORS 109.741.”
The majority concludes that exclusive continuing jurisdiction no longer exists in the trial court under ORS 109.744 because of the provisions of ORS 109.741 that are referred to in ORS 109.744. ORS 109.741 provides, in part:
*652“(1) Except as otherwise provided in ORS 109.751, a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if:
“(a) This state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state;
“(b) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under subsection (l)(a) of this section, or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum under ORS 109.761 or 109.764, and:
“(A) The child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence; and
“(B) Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child’s care, protection, training and personal relationships;
“(c) All courts having jurisdiction under subsection (l)(a) or (b) of this section have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under ORS 109.761 or 109.764; or
“(d) No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in subsection (1)(a), (b) or (c) of this section.”
As I understand the majority’s reasoning, it holds that the trial court does not have exclusive continuing jurisdiction under ORS 109.744 because the trial court would not have had jurisdiction under ORS 109.741, had ORS 109.741 been in effect in 1998. It interprets the language “a court of this state that had made a child custody determination consistent with ORS 109.741” in ORS 109.744 to require compliance with the requirements of ORS 109.741 before exclusive jurisdiction could continue in the trial court. However, when the trial court made its initial determination in 1998, it had jurisdiction under former ORS 109.730(1)(b) of the UCCJA *653and, if former ORS 109.730 had not been replaced by ORS 109.741, jurisdiction to modify clearly would still continue.4 The majority’s interpretation of the “consistent with ORS 109.741” language in ORS 109.744 is the pivotal point from which its reasoning and its ultimate result proceed. The effect of its interpretation is to restrict exclusive continuing jurisdiction to cases in which the initial determination had as its basis one of the grounds for jurisdiction specified in ORS 109.741. Thus, the majority presumes that the legislature, by adopting the UCCJEA, intended to undo the grant of jurisdiction that the legislature had authorized courts to exercise under former ORS 109.730(1)(b), (c) or (d), and ORS 107.105.
The majority’s interpretation is but one of two reasonable possibilities regarding the legislature’s intent as demonstrated by the text and context of ORS 109.744. The word “consistent” connotes as being “marked by harmony, regularity, or steady continuity throughout; showing no significant change, unevenness, or contradiction,” “marked by agreement and concord,” and “coexisting and showing no noteworthy opposing, conflict, inharmonious, or contradictory qualities or trends.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary, 484 (unabridged ed 1993). In the context of ORS 109.744, the words, “consistent with” suggest, in accordance with their ordinary meaning, that a child custody determination that is valid under the law in effect at the time it was made will be deemed “consistent with” ORS 109.741 if it is not in conflict or inharmonious with ORS 109.741. It is important to note that in ORS 109.744, the legislature did not use the phrase “a court of this state that made a child custody determination under ORS 109.741” or the phrase “a court of this state that made a child custody determination in compliance with ORS 109.741.” Because the legislature chose *654to use the language “consistent with” when it could have used other language requiring adherence to the provisions of ORS 109.741, it follows that the legislature meant “consistent with” to mean something other than requiring that the initial determination has, as its basis, one of the grounds for jurisdiction under ORS 109.741.
There are other reasons why the majority’s interpretation is not the only reasonable interpretation of ORS 109.744. ORS 109.741 was not in effect at the time that the court validly exercised jurisdiction under the UCCJA and ORS 107.105. ORS 107.135 provides continuing jurisdiction to modify determinations made under ORS 107.105. It follows from the majority’s interpretations that in cases where a state validly assumed initial jurisdiction on the basis of former ORS 109.730(1)(b), (c) or (d), the legislature intended to divest that state of continuing jurisdiction by the enactment of the UCCJEA. That approach results in the anomaly that jurisdiction existed in 1998 in this case on the ground of a significant connection/substantial evidence under former ORS 109.730(1)(b), but ceased to exist by operation of law under ORS 109.744 by December 1999. That view of the law requires, in effect, an awkward, retroactive reevaluation of what was, concededly, valid jurisdiction, through the lens of a law not in effect at the time. It is at odds with common sense that the legislature would have intended that a court that has validly acquired initial jurisdiction to determine child custody and parenting plan issues will lose modification jurisdiction, not because of a change in the circumstances of the parties and the children, but because of a subsequent amendment to the law. In sum, it cannot be said, for all of those reasons, that the majority’s interpretation of ORS 109.744 is the only reasonable one.
When a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, resort to legislative history is necessary. The legislative history shows that the legislature intended to adopt, almost verbatim, the uniform draft of the UCCJEA proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL). Thus, we are to rely on both the Oregon and the NCCUSL commentaries on the UCCJEA for guidance in interpretation. See State ex rel Torres v. Mason, 315 Or 386, 848 P2d 592 (1993) (relying on *655the commentary to the UCCJA to interpret Oregon’s version of the statute). Before 1999, the UCCJA governed interstate child custody disputes. It provided four grounds for jurisdiction over a custody dispute: (1) child’s home state jurisdiction; (2) significant connection jurisdiction; (3) temporary emergency jurisdiction; and (4) default jurisdiction. As among those grounds, the law did not prioritize. A state could exercise jurisdiction after finding any one of the grounds to exist. At the same time, the PKPA also governed interstate child custody disputes. The two acts were supposed to work together to remove the incentive for noncustodial parents to remove their children to a new state in the hope of finding a forum that would grant a modification of custody. The PKPA provided several grounds for jurisdiction as well, but more importantly, it also provided “priority” to the child’s home state. The PKPA contained its own, built-in tie-breaker system: if the home state wanted to exercise jurisdiction, it had the authority to do so to the exclusion of other states that might also have jurisdiction on other grounds.
The PKPA and the UCCJA often worked well together, resulting in a disincentive to remove children from their custodial parent in their home state. However, there were conflicts when a nonhome state tried to assume jurisdiction under the UCCJA but did not have jurisdiction under the PKPA. Accordingly, the Uniform Law Commission drafted and approved the UCCJEA in 1997 and began pushing for its uniform acceptance in 1998. The UCCJEA was a replacement only for the UCCJA. Its manifest, stated purpose is to resolve the conflicts created between the PKPA and the UCCJA. It did so in two ways.
First, the UCCJEA was designed to adopt the PKPA’s home state preference.5 Thus, in cases where the home state is known, and has expressed an interest in having jurisdiction, any nonhome state must defer to the home state. In a “clean slate” case, where no prior determination of custody has been made, the home state will win under both *656the PKPA and the UCCJEA. That is the first of the two overarching policy goals that the UCCJEA was intended to effectuate.
Second, and more importantly for this case, the UCCJEA conferred “exclusive, continuing jurisdiction” on the state that exercised initial jurisdiction. According to the legislative history, the phrase “exclusive, continuing jurisdiction” has a particular meaning. As explained by NCCUSL the phrase means:
“[i]/’a state once takes jurisdiction over a child custody dispute, it retains jurisdiction so long as that state, by its own determination, maintains a significant connection with the disputants or until all disputants have moved away from that state. In contrast, the UCCJA allows jurisdiction to shift if the initial ground for taking jurisdiction ceases to exist. Thus, if a state takes jurisdiction over a child custody dispute because that state is the home state of the child, and the child subsequently establishes a new home state, jurisdiction can shift to the new home state, even if one parent remains in the child’s original home state. The UCCJEA would not allow the jurisdiction to shift in this fashion, keeping it in the original home state so long as the parent remains there.” Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act § 202 Comment, 9 ULA 649, 674 (1997) (emphasis added).6
Thus, “exclusive continuing, jurisdiction” as used in the UCCJEA, is a term of art that operates to confer exclusivity of jurisdiction on the state that first exercises jurisdiction on a valid basis. That state continues to have exclusive jurisdiction over competing jurisdictional claims under the UCCJEA, subject to the discretion to defer to another state. That means jurisdiction continues even if another state later gains home state status. The continuity of jurisdiction as a goal is intended by the UCCJEA to trump home state priority.7
*657As the above history makes clear, the changes to the UCCJA made by the UCCJEA were not intended to divest a state of jurisdiction if it had validly exercised its original jurisdiction. Instead, the legislature intended the antithesis: a state that validly exercised jurisdiction in a child custody dispute continues to have jurisdiction until one of the statutory criteria in ORS 109.744 for loss of jurisdiction is met. That understanding of the policy underlying the UCCJEA makes the answer in this case clear. The trial court has exclusive continuing jurisdiction under ORS 109.744 because its 1998 child custody determination was “consistent with” the goals of ORS 109.741. Germany’s authority to exercise “home state” jurisdiction under ORS 109.741 does not deprive the trial court of the grant of “exclusive, continuing jurisdiction.” Rather, ORS 109.744 is intended to honor that jurisdiction so long as the ground for initial jurisdiction is consistent with its purposes. As the commentary to the UCCJEA makes clear:
“Even if the child has acquired a new home State, the original decree State retains exclusive continuing jurisdiction, so long as the general requisites of the ‘substantial connection’ jurisdiction provisions * * * are met.” Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act § 202 Comment, 9 ULA 649, 674 (1997).
Because the trial court has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction consistent with ORS 109.741, it could lose jurisdiction under ORS 109.744 only if it determined that neither the child, nor the child and one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have any significant connection with the State of Oregon and that substantial evidence concerning the child’s care, protection training and personal relationships is no longer available.8
*658The majority also makes a factual determination under ORS 109.744 with which I disagree. The majority says:
“In its order of dismissal, the trial court found that the children have never resided in Oregon and that all of the witnesses with information concerning the children’s welfare resided in Germany. Further, in its order denying reconsideration, the trial court stated that it did not have exclusive continuing jurisdiction under ORS 109.744(1)(a), a conclusion that depended on the court having found that the children did not have a significant connection to this state and that substantial evidence concerning their welfare was not available here. Father does not challenge those findings, and our review of the record discloses that they are beyond reasonable dispute.” 179 Or App at 639.
The trial court’s findings that mother is a citizen and resident of Germany, that Germany is the children’s home state, and that many of the potential witnesses reside in Germany are not determinative of whether jurisdiction has been lost under ORS 109.744(1)(a). Father correctly urges that it does not follow from the fact that Germany is the home state of mother and the children and that potential witnesses also reside there that the children have no significant connection to Oregon. The majority’s view of the evidence that is available to the trial court is myopic and contrary to the intent of the drafters of the UCCJEA.
The commentary to the UCCJEA states:
“The determination of significant connections has been changed [from the UCCJA] to eliminate the language of ‘present or future care.’ The jurisdictional determination [of whether a state has significant connection/substantial evidence jurisdiction] should be made by determining whether there is sufficient evidence in the State for the court to make an informed custody determination. That evidence might relate to the past as well as to the ‘present or future.’ ” Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act § 202 Comment, 9 ULA 649, 674 (1997) (emphasis added).
*659The record shows that the children lived in Oregon with father for four months while the parties were litigating their disputes. During that time, they were enrolled in school, creating the probability that records and contacts exist that comment on their welfare while residing with father. The record also shows that the children underwent psychological evaluations in August 1998 with Dr. Richard Lazere, an Oregon psychologist at the time. Those evaluations revealed significant information about their circumstances while under their mother’s care. His report also contains relevant information about the children’s expressed wishes regarding custody. Apparently, the children made drawings during the evaluations that demonstrate their perception of their custodial circumstances. In addition, there is evidence that the children were evaluated by another psychologist while in Oregon, when Dr. Lazere became unavailable.
The record also refers to a court-ordered custody evaluation regarding mother and father done in Oregon in 1998 by Jean Furchner. Furchner’s testimony presumably has ongoing significance because it affords the court a more complete understanding of the history of the parties and their relationship in context with their subsequent conduct. The record also contains evidence showing that father’s parents, who live in Oregon, have had multiple contacts with the children, both in Germany and during the children’s stay in the United States. They wish to offer evidence regarding mother’s deceptive conduct and attempts to prevent them from having contact with the children, as well as the parties’ son’s wishes regarding custody.
Father’s current wife, a resident of Oregon, is the godmother of the parties’ daughter and also has had substantial contacts with the children, including talking with them for lengthy periods of time by telephone. She has also known the entire family for a long time and appears to have been mother’s best friend. Finally, there exists in this state the court record of an initial custody determination and a subsequent modification of that determination that are relevant to the determination of father’s motion to modify. In sum, the majority is wrong when it argues that insufficient evidence *660exists outside Germany relating to the parents and the children. There is a great deal of evidence available, and while an Oregon court could permissibly decline jurisdiction on this record, it cannot be held as a matter of law to have lost the jurisdiction that it acquired under ORS chapter 107.
The majority reasons from several non-UCCJEA cases that address the amount of evidence that should be present in order to conclude that “substantial evidence” exists. 179 Or App at 641-42. However, the commentary to the UCCJEA shows that jurisdiction is intended to continue until “the relationship between the child and the State with exclusive, continuing jurisdiction becomes so attenuated that the court could no longer find a significant connection or substantial evidence.” Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act § 202 Comment, 9 ULA 649, 674 (1997) (emphasis added). Also, the commentary states that “the jurisdictional determination should be made by determining whether there is sufficient evidence in the state for the court to make an informed custody determination.” Id. (emphasis added).
I agree with the majority that the “physical presence” of the children for a three or four month period in Oregon is not enough by itself to establish a significant connection under ORS 109.744(1)(a). See ORS 109.741(3). However, the cases cited by the majority in support of its argument that jurisdiction was lost for lack of a significant connection are readily distinguishable from this case, where there are more connections to Oregon than the mere physical presence of one parent. In Stubbs v. Weathersby, 320 Or 620, 627 n 4, 892 P2d 991 (1995), the adoptive mother went to Washington from Oregon and brought an infant who had been born in Washington back to Oregon in November 1989. Then, she and her husband filed a petition for adoption on January 30,1990, in Oregon. The birth mother was not a resident of Oregon, nor did she ever consent to the adoption proceedings in Oregon. In comparison, both father and mother consented to Oregon’s jurisdiction in this case, there have been prior adjudications in the trial court, and there is available in Oregon substantial psychological information about the parents and the children. In State ex rel State of Washington v. Bue, 117 Or App 477, 480-81, 844 P2d 278 *661(1992), the issue was whether the children had a significant connection to the state for purposes of adjudicating visitation rights. The children, ages 9 and 12, lived their entire lives in Washington and had no connection with the state. Their father was an Oregon resident, but the children had had no contact with their father before the proceeding began, aside from a four-month relationship when the youngest child had been conceived.
Moreover, as a matter of statutory construction, the fact that the children have never resided in Oregon cannot be treated as a finding that they have no significant connection to the state. The “home state” statute, and the “significant connection” statute are separate grounds for jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, the UCCJA, and the PKPA. Compare ORS 109.741(1)(a) with (1)(b)(A): See also former ORS 109.730(1)(a) and (1)(b). Clearly, under either the UCCJEA or the UCCJA, a court can have jurisdiction over a child even when the court is not a court of the home state. It follows that the majority is in error when it conflates a finding that Germany is the children’s home state with the statutory requisite that they have no significant connection to Oregon. In summary, ORS 109.744(1) confers exclusive, continuing jurisdiction on the trial court, and there is no basis from which to conclude that it has been lost.
The other alternative for loss of jurisdiction under ORS 109.744(1) is expressed in subsection (b) of the statute. It provides for a loss of jurisdiction when the child and the child’s parents do not presently reside in the state. The short answer to an inquiry under ORS 109.744(1)(b) is that father presently resides in this state. Because of that fact and the significant connection of the children to this state and the substantial evidence available here, continuing jurisdiction has not been lost under either ORS 109.744(1)(a) or (1)(b). We have to go no further than ORS 109.744(1) to reach the conclusion that the trial court has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, because its exercise of jurisdiction in 1998 was consistent with the goals of ORS 109.741.
Even if the analysis somehow reaches subsection (2) of ORS 109.744, it leads to a different result from the majority’s conclusion. Subsection (2) requires the making of a new *662jurisdictional determination under ORS 109.741 when there is no exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. The majority says that the only subsections of ORS 109.741 that could apply are sections (1)(b) or (1)(c), and that neither would give Oregon jurisdiction. It explains that
“[because] Germany is the children’s ‘home state,’ * * * the trial court could not have asserted jurisdiction under either subsection (1)(b) or (c) unless the German court had declined jurisdiction on the ground that it was an inconvenient forum, ORS 109.761, or because mother had engaged in unjustifiable conduct, ORS 109.764. Neither reason was cited here.” 179 Or App at 644.
I disagree with the above conclusion because jurisdiction exists under ORS 109.741(1)(b). The German court order gave the following reasons for declining jurisdiction:
“[I]n view of the previous proceeding regarding parental custody in the USA and in view of the pending custody proceeding in the Oregon Circuit Court, which can be recognized under German law, the [German Court] considers a custody decision to be impermissible.”
The German court order constitutes, in substance, a decision to defer jurisdiction for the reason that ORS 109.761 envisions and that ORS 109.741(1)(b) contemplates. See also ORS 109.741(1)(c). The order, in the language of the statute, is a declaration that Germany “is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum.”9 Because Germany, the children’s home state, has declined jurisdiction on inconvenient forum grounds, and there exists a significant connection with this *663state and there is substantial evidence available here, jurisdiction also exists under ORS 109.741(1)(b). See also ORS 109.741(1)(c). It necessarily follows that the trial court also had jurisdiction to modify its original judgment under ORS 109.744(2), which authorizes a court to modify a judgment if “the court has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under ORS 109.741.” (Emphasis added.)
There is one more policy factor that weighs in favor of interpreting ORS 109.744 to authorize jurisdiction in this case. The legislature was aware of ORS 107.135 when it enacted ORS 109.744(1). ORS 107.135 gives a court continuing jurisdiction once it has initially acted in a child custody case, and ORS 109.744 is intended to supplement the authority existing under ORS 107.135. Where there are several statutes that address the same subject, we are instructed by the legislature to construe them so as to give effect to all, if possible. ORS 174.010. The majority’s interpretation of ORS 109.744(1) in this case trumps the continuation of jurisdiction that ORS 107.135 contemplates. However, if the words “continuing and exclusive jurisdiction consistent with ORS 107.741” in ORS 109.744 are understood to express an intention that an exercise of jurisdiction is valid if it honors the goals of ORS chapter 109, effect is given to ORS 107.135 as well as ORS 109.744(1).
The difference between my and the majority’s interpretation of ORS 109.744 is significant to the outcome of this case. The practical effect of the majority’s holding is that the trial court is precluded as a matter of law from exercising jurisdiction. That result violates the policy of the UCCJEA, which emphasizes the cooperative exercise of discretion by multiple state courts. As the statutes make clear, the courts are to be guided by the UCCJEA but are to exercise discretion based on the enumerated factors and to reach jurisdictional conclusions that are in the best interests of children. The trial court’s decision not to exercise jurisdiction in this case is error because: (1) the trial court did not, and could not, on this record, make the findings that ORS 109.744(1) requires to divest itself of continuing jurisdiction; and (2) even if resort to ORS 109.744(2) occurs, two grounds for exercising initial child custody jurisdiction under ORS 109.741 existed in *664November 2000, thus authorizing the court to modify the judgment even in the absence of continuing jurisdiction.10
The question becomes what should happen in light of our de novo standard of review. The German court has declined jurisdiction, and father correctly asserts that jurisdiction continues in the trial court. At this time, Oregon is the only state that has exercised initial jurisdiction, and it continues to have jurisdiction. Ultimately, what is at stake here is the best interests of the children. The overall purpose of the UCCJEA to afford one appropriate, available forum is contravened by majority’s holding. The parties chose to litigate the issues in the dissolution of their marriage in the State of Oregon, whose laws afford continuing jurisdiction over custody and visitation issues. What an unfortunate result the majority offers to the parties because of their choice of Oregon as their initial forum, they are left in “legal limbo,” without any available forum to litigate their current disputes. Courts exist to resolve disputes. The concept of jurisdiction is intended to facilitate the resolution of disputes by directing where they should be resolved. A ruling that results in no available forum for the parties frustrates the very purpose for which courts exist.
For all of the above reasons, I dissent.
Linder, J., joins in this dissent.ORS 109.701 through ORS 109.874 constitute the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (the UCCJEA). They are a replacement for former statutes governing interstate child custody disputes. Those former statutes, found in former ORS 109.700 through ORS 109.930, repealed by Or Laws 1999, ch 649, § 55, were referred to as the UCCJA. The other relevant statutory scheme referred to in this opinion is the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USC § 1738A (1994), which is federal legislation governing the unlawful removal of children from their custodial parents.
ORCP 71 B provides, in part:
“On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or such party’s legal representative from a judgment for the following reasons: (b) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 64 F; * * * (e) * * * it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.”
The trial court also speculated that, while the German court might have declined jurisdiction over the claim in light of father’s protests against Germany’s assumption of jurisdiction, the German court would probably hear the matter if father asked it to do so. There is nothing in the German court’s ruling to support that bald assertion. As is evident from the content of its ruling, the German court based its decision on principles of comity and the desire to have jurisdiction continue in the court of initial jurisdiction. See 179 Or App at 662-63 (Edmonds, J., dissenting).
Former ORS 109.730(1)(b) provided:
“(1) A Court of this state which is competent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree if:
“(b) It is in the best interests of the child that a court of this state assume jurisdiction because the child and the parents of the child, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with this state, and there is available in this state substantial evidence concerning the child’s present or future care, protection, training and personal relationship.”
Nothing in the commentary to the UCCJEA shows an intent to substantively alter the overall goals of the UCCJA by changing the definition of “state” to include foreign nations.
This explanation was before the Oregon Legislature when it adopted the UCCJEA. See Testimony, Senate Judiciary Committee, SB 789, April 8, 1999, Ex F (statement of Senator Kate Brown); Testimony, House Judiciary Committee, SB 789A, May 27, 1999, Ex 6.
The majority says, “Oregon’s jurisdiction simply could not be ‘sole’ if Germany could exercise ‘home state’ jurisdiction!.]” 179 Or App at 640. What the majority ignores, however, is that ORS 109.744 operates as a conferral of exclusive *657jurisdiction on a court that validly exercises initial jurisdiction. Under the statute, the court does not reach its conclusion about the exclusivity of jurisdiction by determining whether another state might have jurisdiction. As the commentary states:
“The continuing jurisdiction of the original decree state is exclusive. * * * This section makes the continuing jurisdiction of the original decree State exclusive so long as the child, a parent, or person acting as a parent remains in the State and there is substantial evidence concerning the child’s care, protection, training and personal relations.” Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act § 202 Comment, 9 ULA 649, 674 (1997). (Emphasis added.)
The majority says, “the UCCJEA expressly prefers jurisdiction to be exercised in a child’s ‘home state.’ ” 179 Or App at 640. Also, it says that our *658understanding would “necessarily contravene! ] that preference.” Id. As between the competing policies of continuity or home state jurisdiction, the UCCJEA chooses continuity as the higher priority. See Commentary quoted at 179 Or App at 656 (Edmonds, J., dissenting).
The majority says “the record does not support” the view that “the German court considered the factors relevant to an inconvenient forum determination.” 179 Or App at 645 n 10. Those factors are found in ORS 109.761. The German court’s deferral of jurisdiction shows that it considered: (1) the existence of the divorce decision in Clackamas County courts; (2) the children’s visitations to the United States for longer than 2 weeks; (3) mother’s travel to the United States in the past to participate in court decisions; (4) the pending proceedings in Oregon; (5) the fact that mother was given an opportunity to participate in the modification in the trial court; (6) the children’s dual citizenship as both German and American citizens; (7) the breadth of the jurisdiction of the trial court; (8) principles of public policy; and (9) mother’s agreement to have the divorce and prior modification done in Oregon. In my view, those considerations, listed by the German court in its written order, show the consideration of the very factors listed in ORS 109.761(2)(b), (e), (f), (g), and (h).
The UCCJEA commentary makes clear that, if a court declines jurisdiction because it believes it is more properly vested in another court:
“The court may not simply dismiss the action. To do so would leave the case in limbo. Rather the court shall stay the case and direct the parties to file in the State that has been found to be the more convenient forum. The court is also authorized to impose any other conditions it considers appropriate. This might include the issuance of temporary custody orders during the time necessary to commence a proceeding in the designated State; dismissing the case if the custody proceeding is not commenced in the other State; resuming jurisdiction if a court of the other State refuses to take the case.” Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act § 207 Comment, 9 ULA 649, 683 (1997).