(concurring in the result):
129 I concur in the result on the ground that the notice published by the State Engineer did not substantially comply with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-12(2)(F)(ii) (Supp.1999). The court of appeals found that the notice was deficient but held that because Longley's property interest was not affected, the deficiencies in the published notice did not render Leucadia's extension application void. With that conclusion, I do not agree. While Longley's constitutional right to due process may not have been *769violated, the above mentioned statute clearly gives him the right to a published notice that will inform the public of the diligence claimed and the reason for the request. Thus it is a statutory right, not a constitutional right, which has been violated. The notice was especially important in this case since the State Engineer had determined two years earlier that Leucadia's change application had lapsed.
1380 Reference is made in the majority opinion that certain forms filed with the State Engineer by Leucadia were not "notarized." I find no mention in our water code that any form is required to be "notarized." Section 78-8-12(2)(d) provides that "all requests for extension of time shall be made by affidavit." Subsection 2(e) provides that "extensions not exceeding fourteen years after the date of approval may be granted by the state engineer upon a sufficient showing by affidavit." Section 78-38-16 provides for the filing of proof of appropriation or permanent change and requires in subsection (5) that "the proof on all applications shall be sworn to by the applicant or the applicant's appointed representative and proof engineer."
31 Thus it is not "notarization" that the statute requires. "Notarization" can simply refer to an acknowledgment of the signing of an instrument such as a deed of real property. See Utah Code Ann., title 57, ch. 2a. On the other hand, when statements in an application with the state engineer are required to be "sworn to" (verified) or made by affidavit, the applicant swears to the truthfulness of the representations made in the application. This is an important distinction. For example, in First Security Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919 (Utah 1981), a corporate acknowledgment was used instead of a sworn statement that the contents of a lien notice were true. In that case, this court held that the lien notice was not properly verified as required by statute and was therefore invalid. See id. at 922.
"[ 32 Associate Chief Justice RUSSON concurs in Chief Justice HOWE's opinion concurring in the result opinion. 1 383 Having disqualified himself, Justice DURRANT does not participate herein; District Judge L.A. DEVER sat.