specially concurring.
Under the rationale adopted by the majority today, a district court can conduct an unconscionability review of all provisions of a marital agreement. Yet the legislature has permitted such review “insofar, but only insofar, as the provisions of such agreement ... relate to” the determination of spousal maintenance. § 14-2-307(2), C.R.S. (2006) (emphasis added). In my view, the attorney’s fees waiver provision at issue in this case can be reviewed for unconscionability not because all provisions in a marital agreement can be subjected to such review, as the majority effectively holds, but because it “relates to” the determination of spousal maintenance. On this ground, I specially concur with the judgment.
*672A.
The Colorado Marital Agreement Act, sections 14-2-301 to -310, C.R.S. (2006) (the “CMAA”), permits parties to contract about a broad array of subjects in a marital agreement. Indeed, subsection 14 — 2—304(1)(i) allows parties to contract as to “[a]ny ... matter, including the personal rights or obligations of either party,” so long as it is “not in violation of public policy or any statute imposing a criminal penalty.” (emphasis added). We have never held, and the majority does not hold today, that marital agreements providing for the waiver of attorney’s fees are per se against public policy at the time of contracting.
The CMAA does provide, however, for a limitation on the enforcement of a marital agreement. Subsection 14-2-307(2) states that an “otherwise enforceable” agreement “is nevertheless unenforceable insofar, but only insofar, as the provisions of such agreement ... relate to the determination, modification, or elimination of spousal maintenance and such provisions are unconscionable at the time of enforcement of such provisions.” (emphasis added). Thus a provision in a marital agreement might be consistent with public policy at the time the agreement is made, but might later become unconscionable at the time the agreement is enforced. Subsection 14-2-307(2) specifically limits this latter form of review to marital provisions “relating] to” the determination of spousal maintenance.
Sections 14-2-304 and 14-2-307 can be read harmoniously because they focus on different periods in the life of the marital agreement. Section 14-2-304 allows parties to contract about any matter as long as it is not in violation of public policy at the time of contracting. Section 14-2-307 allows uncon-scionability review only of those provisions that “relate to” the determination of spousal maintenance when those provisions have become unconscionable at the time of enforcement.
The majority mixes apples with oranges when it holds that “a waiver of attorney’s fees in a marital agreement that is unconscionable at the time of the dissolution violates public policy and therefore may not be enforced under subsection 14-2-304(1)©.” Maj. op. at 668. An attorney’s fee provision such as the one at issue in this case does not violate public policy, because if it did, then it would be void from the beginning, ab initio. See Otte v. Pierce, 118 Colo. 123, 129, 194 P.2d 331, 333 (1948); see also Benham v. Heyde, 122 Colo. 233, 241, 221 P.2d 1078, 1082 (1950) (holding that contracts forbidden by state statute are “absolutely void ab ini-tio”). It would not depend, as the majority suggests, on the unconscionability of the agreement “at the time of enforcement.” Maj. op. at 668. Because the majority views the public policy inquiry as the equivalent of unconscionability review, it concludes — mistakenly in my view — that subsections 14-2-304(l)(i) and 14-2-307(2) are in irreconcilable conflict. See id. at 667. By choosing to enforce subsection 14-2-304(l)(i)’s public policy language, the majority invalidates subsection 14-2-307(2) and its limitations on unconscion-ability review. See id. at 671.
The result of the majority’s decision is that Colorado courts now have the authority to review all aspects of marital agreements for unconscionability. While the majority states that its holding is limited to waivers of attorney’s fees in marital agreements, see id. at 671, its rationale applies equally to all subjects that could be included in a marital agreement. Subsection 14 — 2—304(1)(i)’s reference to “public policy” applies to “[a]ny matter,” not simply attorney’s fees. By equating unconscionability review with public policy, the majority opens up any matter in a marital agreement to such after-the-fact un-conscionability review. This result is problematic not only because it contravenes subsection 14-2-307(2)’s specific limitation on such review, but also because it frustrates the legislature’s objective, captured in the language of subsection 14-2-304(1)©, to permit parties to a marital agreement to contract about a broad array of matters not in violation of public policy. Thus, in my view, the majority fails to give effect to either subsection of the CMAA at issue in this case.
B.
Despite my disagreement with the majority on the question of whether the statutory *673provisions conflict, I nevertheless agree with the result it reaches on the ground that the attorney’s fees waiver provision in this ease “relate[s] to” the determination of spousal maintenance under subsection 14-2-307(2).
“Relate to” is a broad statutory term meaning “to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection with.” Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992) (quoting Black’s Law Diet. 1158 (5th ed.1979)). Thus terms like “relating” or “relate to” have been repeatedly interpreted by this court and others as encompassing all issues surrounding the underlying subject matter. See, e.g., City & County of Denver v. Dist. Court, 939 P.2d 1353, 1366 (Colo.1997) (giving broad definition to the phrase “relating to” in an arbitration agreement); Morales, 504 U.S. at 383, 112 S.Ct. 2031 (holding that federal air traffic law’s use of the phrase “relating to” reveals its broad scope); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983) (explaining that “[a] law ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan [under ERISA], in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan”). Giving the same broad scope to subsection 14^-2-307(2), the waiver provision “relates to” the determination of spousal maintenance because the attorney’s fees were expended in the pursuit of wife’s claim to spousal maintenance.
We have previously noted the close connection between spousal maintenance and attorney’s fees expended on seeking an award of spousal maintenance. See Allison v. Allison, 150 Colo. 377, 379, 372 P.2d 946, 947 (1962). The court of appeals has followed suit, holding that an award of attorney’s fees “is based upon the same underlying premise as an award of maintenance, i.e., financial need.” In re Marriage of Dechant, 867 P.2d 193, 196 (Colo.App.1993); see also In re Marriage of Lee, 781 P.2d 102 (Colo.App.1989). As we explained in Allison, attorney’s fees are awarded “for the benefit of [a spouse] to put [him or] her in a position to litigate on the same footing as the [other spouse],” and thus they are awarded “on the same basis as” spousal maintenance. 150 Colo. at 379, 372 P.2d at 947. In other words, long before the enactment of the CMAA, Colorado law recognized that attorney’s fees expended in pursuit of spousal maintenance relate to the ultimate determination of spousal maintenance.1
Husband argues that the waiver provision does not relate to spousal maintenance based on the plain language of the statute, but he makes that argument without offering a definition of “relate to.” He seems to be arguing that the waiver provision does not “relate to” spousal maintenance because it does not specifically mention attorney’s fees expended pursuant to a claim for spousal maintenance. But the statute does not require such specificity in the provision; in other words, it does not state that a provision is unenforceable if it “specifically relate[s] to the determination, modification, or elimination of spousal maintenance.” Cf. Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 37, 116 S.Ct. 1103, 134 L.Ed.2d 237 (1996) (contrasting the broad statutory phrase “relates to” with the more narrow statutory phrase “specifically relates to”). Husband wants to add the term “specifically” to the statute, and it simply is not there. See Turbyne v. People, 151 P.3d 563, 567 (Colo.2007) (“We do not add words to the statute or subtract words from it.” (citations omitted)).
In its permanent orders, the trial court awarded attorney’s fees only in connection with its determination of spousal maintenance. See Permanent Orders at 1 (section entitled “Maintenance and Attorney’s Fees”). Because those fees were expended in connection with the determination of spousal main-*674tenanee, the waiver provision “relates to” the determination of spousal maintenance. I therefore agree with the majority that the provision can be reviewed for uneonscionability and would reverse the court of appeals. Accordingly, I concur in the majority’s judgment.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE MARTINEZ and JUSTICE BENDER join ⅛ this special concurrence,
. By contrast, Colorado law has recognized a sharp distinction between spousal maintenance and property division, as the majority itself recognizes. See maj. op. at 669 n. 8 (citing Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 734-35 (Colo.1982)). The majority invokes this distinction as a limitation on its interpretation of "public policy." See id. at 671. Similarly, such a distinction would come into play when interpreting the "relate to” language of subsection 14-2-307(2), the majority’s suggestion to the contrary notwithstanding. See id. at 671 n. 11.