Concur in Result.
€ 1 I concur in the results reached by the Court in this opinion. However, I have concern regarding some of the analysis.
12 It is undeniable that science and medicine have progressed greatly since the institution of most of the preambles to our erimi-nal statutes. See Nealis v. Baird, 996 P.2d 438 (Okl.1999); Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730 (Okl.Or.1994). As the Court's opinion recognizes, this evolution is continuous and cannot be tethered to a finite standard of review as to the protection of life within our society. We recognized in Hughes that 21 O.S.1981, § 691, "was enacted in an effort to protect human life". Id. at 784. In addition, the Court stated
Our decision that this protection extends to viable human fetuses is clearly in accord with legislative intent. Moreover, in light of the civil liability which can be imposed under Oklahoma law for the wrongful death of a viable human fetus, it would be most unjust to refuse to extend protection to a viable human fetus under Oklahoma's general homicide statute. (internal cites omitted)
Id.
1 3 We recognized in Hughes that "a viable human fetus is nothing less than human life". Id. Citing to the Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (1984), we adopted the language *986that "(aln offspring of human parents cannot reasonably be considered to be other than a human being ... first within, and then in normal course outside, the womb". Id. at 1325. The decision in Hughes overrules pri- or caselaw that held a viable fetus is not a "person" within the meaning of 21 O.S.1981, § 652.
4 Too often Courts, and sometimes individuals, use the word "fetus" as some type of generic reference to a non-entity. Etymology of the word reveals "middle English, from Latin, act of bearing young, offspring; akin to Latin fetus newlyd fruitful." And, in further application, "an unborn or unhatched vertebrate, especially after obtaining the basic structural plan of its kind; developing human from usually three months after conception to birth." See Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary.
5 While I concur in the results this Court reaches in this case based on application of statutory language, at the same time I recognize the Court has created three stages in the progression from conception to birth. The first stage is itself the act of conception, which is not addressed or discussed as a part of the resolution of the issues raised in this case. The second phase is the one created by the Court's opinion in its resolution of the issues before the Court at this time. That is, the status of a child being "quick" under the provisions of the legislative language contained in 21 0.S$.1991, § 718. And, the third phase is that of the viable child who, on attaining the status of viability, is considered under the law at this time as a "human being".
T6 Under the Court's action today in creating the second phase pursuant to the correct interpretation of the statutory language in Section 718, we have a "quick" child. And, the evidence presented in this case could lead a finder of fact to determine either that the child was or was not viable. Thus, under Oklahoma law, a "quick" nonviable child is still a human being for purposes of the application of the provisions of Section 713, pursuant to the statutory language.
1 7 I find the Court's almost hypnotic focus on the provisions of 63 0.S.Supp.1998, § 1-732(B), as it relates to the twenty-four-week period described in the statute, as giving that statute more meaning than it deserves. That statute only creates a rebuttable presumption that "(aln unborn child shall be presumed to be viable if more than twenty-four (24) weeks have elapsed since the probable beginning of the last menstrual period of a pregnant woman...." A rebuttable presumption is one that can be rebutted both for and against viability at a lesser period of weeks.1 As stated previously, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Nealis v. Baird and this Court in Hughes v. State, have recognized the almost daily progressions in medical science, which continues to move back the time when an unborn child is viable outside the womb. As our decision in Hughes stated, "an unborn fetus that was viable at the time of injury is a 'human being' which may be the subject of a homicide under 21 O.S.1981, § 691 (homicide is the killing of one human being by another')." Therefore, if medical science tomorrow stated that an eighteen-week, or sixteen-week, or fourteen-week unborn child was viable inside the womb, and died as a result of actions by a defendant which constituted the elements of any level of homicide, then that defendant could be prosecuted and a conviction sustained upon the evidence for the level of homicide warranted by the elements proved. Thus, the law is determining that in our society, there is liability for the taking of the life of an unborn child and that lability arises upon a determination of the viability of that unborn child. As medical science continues to improve and viability comes at earlier and earlier stages of the birth process, individuals should be, and will be, put on notice that their acts which lead to the death of that unborn child, once the child has attained that level of viability as determined by the medical evidence, can, and will, make them liable for the taking of the life of that unborn child.
T8 In addition to that liability for the death of an unborn viable child, the Court in this opinion correctly finds that the Okla*987homa Legislature has also carved out the additional liability of a defendant who causes the death of an unborn child who may not have reached the state of medical viability but, under the statute is a "quick" child. That is well within the prerogative of the Legislature and it is appropriate this Court should enforce that prerogative through this decision. As our Legislature has stated in 21 ©.S.1991, § 691, "homicide is the killing of one human being by another". Therefore, in each of these instances, we are talking about the taking of the life of a human being as defined by the Legislature. Whether that individual be a child just born, a mature adult, a viable unborn child, or a quick unborn child, our statutes were enacted in an effort to protect human life as defined by the Oklahoma Legislature. Due to that fact, I propose it is more appropriate to refer to the stages of protected human life with the appropriate words, i.e., unborn viable child, unborn quick child, rather than the generic term which seems to dehumanize the issue before us, i.e., fetus.
T9 Under the facts of this case, I find the jury, as trier of fact in this case, could have interpreted and applied the evidence to find this was a viable unborn child and believe the evidence supports affirming the conviction for murder, first degree, in Count III. However, due to the Court's adoption of the interpretation of the statutory language in 21 0.8.8upp.2000, § 713, relating to the liability of an individual for the taking of the life of a nonviable, but quick child, I join in the results reached by this Court.
. - It is not necessary to render further discussion at this time, however, any presumption in the application to criminal liability must meet the requirements of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979)