concurring:
4 28 We concur with the majority's opinion in Parts I, II, and IV. We write separately because the four-part Marakis test must be modified in light of our holding today.
{ 29 The majority opinion imposes a mandate on district courts evaluating the legislative/administrative distinction to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law on all four elements of the Marakis test before handing down a decision. Supra Part III. We fully agree with this holding and the reasoning articulated by the majority. We believe, however, our holding today coupled with this court's previous mandate that this test follow a strict sequential analysis requires us to rearticulate the nature and purpose of the final three parts of this test.
(80 In Citizen's Awareness Now v. Marakis, this court set up a four-step sequential test aimed at distinguishing between legislative and administrative decisions made by local governments. See 873 P.2d 1117, 11283-25 (Utah 1994) (directing district courts to "address[ ] each policy element in the order and manner identified in this opinion"). We further refined the test by breaking it into two distinct inquiries. First, the district court is required to determine if the enacting authority "provided the community with adequate notice." Id. at 1125. Second, the district court is charged with determining if the enacting authority's action was legislative or administrative. Id. The resulting legislative/administrative analysis is to be determined pursuant to the last three elements of the Marakis test. Id.; see also Citizens for Responsible Transp. v. Draper City, 2008 UT 48, ¶ 11, 190 P.3d 1245 ("[Wle look at the general purpose and policy of the original law, the material variance between the new provisions and the original law, and the general appropriateness of voter participation."). *1246Each of these elements under the legislative-administrative analysis could be dispositive on the issue, thereby halting the district court's analysis. Marakis, 873 P.2d at 1125-26.
181 We believe the Marakis test should continue to rely on a distinction between an analysis of adequate notice on the one hand and the inquiry into the legislative/administrative question on the other. As to these two inquiries, the Marakis test is sequential and demands that the district court first determine if the enacting authority provided adequate notice and then turn to consider if the decision was legislative or administrative.
1832 Our mandate today, which requires the district court consider all four steps of the Marakis test before rendering a decision, requires us to rearticulate the analysis of this legislative/administrative distinction. In our view, the last three elements of the Marakis test should now be treated as a three-part balancing test that the district court must consider in evaluating whether a political subdivision has enacted a new zone through its legislative power or administrative authority. Under this modification to the test, the district court would continue to engage in the same policy-based inquiry by asking (1) whether the action fits within the general purpose and policy of the existing ordinance, (2) whether the change constitutes a material variance, and (8) whether the action is appropriate for voter participation. Id. at 1124-25. Rather than treating these three questions as elements that must be answered in the affirmative or negative in a sequential order, the district courts should treat this analysis as involving three prongs that are balanced against each other. The district court must consider each of these prongs in context to determine if the disputed action was legislative-thereby amenable to referendum-or administrative.
1 83 A balancing test for this legislative/administrative analysis gives effect to our original holding in Marakis, as each element of it continues to have the potential to be determinative on the entire analysis. See id. at 1125-26 (holding that a decision that the enacting authority's action was administrative on any of the three elements will eliminate the possibility of a referendum). Such a test would remain true to the "policy-based line of reasoning" that this court first identified in Marakis. Id. at 1123. At the same time, by articulating this as a balancing test we avoid the ensuing advisory opinions that would result if we were to leave the test as sequential while requiring the district court to complete all elements of the test before rendering a decision. Moreover, a balancing test is appropriate given that the three elements of the legislative/administrative question often require an overlapping analysis. The district court would be required to look at each of these elements independently as well as how they relate to each other in the overall analysis.
1 34 In sum, we agree that the demands of appellate review, the expense of litigation, and judicial economy require that the district court enter findings of fact and conclusions of law on all four components of the Marakis test. In light of this holding, we modify our previous articulation of this test by requiring the district court to engage in a balancing test of the elements that comprise the inquiry into the legislative/administrative distinction.
1 35 Associate Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice PARRISH, and Justice NEHRING concur in Chief Justice DURHAM's concurring opinion.