dissenting.
[T42] I respectfully dissent. I would reverse Martin's conviction because there were just too many errors below for us to know that Martin received a fair trial. Briefly stated, my concerns are as follows:
[¶ 48] First, the majority states that Martin presented two defense theories: (1) that he was mentally ill at the time of the offense; and (2) that methamphetamine-induced psychosis prevented him from forming the specific intent to kill. Two problems arise from that duality: Wyoming does not recognize diminished capacity defenses-which is what the second theory must be-and expert witnesses should not be allowed to testify as to the state of mind of the defendant outside the parameters of a mental illness defense. Keats v. State, 2005 WY 81, ¶ 22, 115 P.3d 1110, 1119 (Wyo.2005); Price v. State, 807 P.2d 909, 915 (Wyo.1991).
[¥ 44] Second, the district court's limiting instruction concerning the uncharged misconduct evidence simply ignored the whole point of Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, ¶ 16-18, 31-32, 57 P.3d 332, 339-40, 343-44 (Wyo.2002) and its progeny. There is no point in requiring the State to identify and substantiate the relevancy of the uncharged misconduct evidence if one is then going to instruct the jury that the evidence may be considered as proof of everything under the sun.
[T 45] Third, Officer West's hearsay testimony was admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted, that being that Martin specifically intended to kill his wife. It was also uncharged misconduct evidence apparently offered to prove character to prove con-duet-he did it once, so he must have done it again. I cannot accept the majority's presumption of no prejudice resulting from this testimony, given that the case revolved solely around the question of intent to kill.
[¶ 46] Fourth, although covered somewhat in the first issue discussed above, I would emphasize again that Dr. Buckwell's *933testimony that Martin acted with the specific intent to kill was simply inadmissible. She had a right to testify that he was not suffering from a mental illness or defect at the time of the offense, but she invaded the province of the jury when she opined as to his specific intent.
[¶ 47] Admittedly, many of these problems were self-induced by Martin's counsel, but I think we should expect our criminal jury trials to come closer than this one did in following fundamental rules. We are never going to get adherence to the principles that underlie the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence, or hearsay testimony, or expert opinion testimony as to guilt if we don't enforce those principles.