OPINION
THORNE, Judge.¶ 1 Brigham City appeals from an interlocutory order granting Defendants’ joint Motion to Suppress .Evidence collected after Brigham City police officers entered a private residence without first obtaining a warrant. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶ 2 On July 23, 2000, at approximately 3:00 a.m., four Brigham City police officers responded to a loud party complaint. After arriving at the house, the officers proceeded to the back of the house to investigate the noise. From the driveway, through a slat fence, the officers saw two young men, who appeared to be under age, consuming alcohol. The officers entered the backyard through a gate, thereby obtaining a clear view into the back of the house.
¶3 Looking into the house through a screen door and two windows, the officers observed four adults restraining one juvenile. The juvenile, who was struggling to break free, managed to swing his fist and strike one of the adults in the face. Two of the officers then opened the screen door and stepped into the house. Only after entering the house did one of the officers shout to identify and call attention to himself. One by one, each person in the kitchen became aware of and acknowledged the officers’ presence, then become angry that the officers had entered the house without permission.
¶ 4 The officers subsequently arrested each of the adults and charged them with: contributing to the delinquency of a minor, disorderly conduct, and intoxication. Defendants filed a joint Motion to Suppress Evidence. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted Defendants’ motion. Brigham City submitted a proposed order to the trial court that contained the trial court’s findings of fact. That order was signed as proposed and it is from this order that Brigham City now appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 5 We review the factual findings underlying a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence for clear error, and the legal conclusions for correctness, “with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge’s application of the legal standard to the facts.” State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah Ct.App.1996).
¶ 6 In the present case, neither party disputes the written factual findings that support the trial court’s legal conclusion that no exigent circumstances justified the officers’ warrantless entry into the private residence. We accordingly review the trial court’s application of Fourth Amendment principles to the undisputed facts of this case. See id.
ANALYSIS
¶ 7 Brigham City argues the trial court erred in determining that there were no exigent circumstances to justify the war-rantless entry into a private residence. “A warrantless search of a residence is constitutionally permissible where probable cause and exigent circumstances are proven.” *1113State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah Ct. App.1997). When a private residence is involved, the State’s burden in proving the existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances is “particularly heavy.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). This elevated burden is a result of the “heightened expectation of privacy” that citizens enjoy in their homes. State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 13 (Utah Ct.App.1993).
¶ 8 Exigent circumstances exist where a reasonable person in the officers’ position would “ ‘believe that entry was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, [to prevent] the destruction of relevant evidence, [to prevent] the escape of the suspect,’ ” or to prevent the improper frustration of legitimate law enforcement efforts. Beavers, 859 P.2d at 18 (citation and ellipsis omitted). In addition, the need for immediate entry must be apparent to police at the time of entry, and so strong as to outweigh the important protection of individual rights provided under the Fourth Amendment. See id.
¶ 9 Our determination of exigency is based upon an examination of the totality of the circumstances. See State v. Wells, 928 P.2d 386, 389 (Utah Ct.App.1996), aff'd, 939 P.2d 1204. We grant the trial court a degree of discretion in determining the ultimate disposition because “ ‘the facts to which the legal rule is to be applied are so complex and varying that no rule adequately addressing the relevance of all these facts can be spelled out_’ ” State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 929 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (ellipsis in original) (quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994)).
¶ 10 We first address Brigham City’s request, made during oral argument, that this court make any additional findings of fact that might be necessary to find exigent circumstances in this case. However, an “ ‘appellate court is entrusted with ensuring legal accuracy and uniformity and should defer to the trial court on factual matters.’ ” Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,¶ 19, 52 P.3d 1158 (quoting Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230-31 (Utah 1997)). The supreme court has further determined:
It is inappropriate for an appellate court to disregard the trial court’s findings of fact and to assume the role of weighing evidence and making its own findings of fact.
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The court of appeals is limited to the findings of fact made by the trial court and may not find new facts or reweigh the evidence....
Id. at ¶¶ 19-20.
¶ 11 In addition, Brigham City has previously forsaken an opportunity to shape the trial court’s findings of fact.1 Brigham City has not, however, challenged the trial court’s factual findings. We therefore accept the findings as adopted and are in no position to supplement these findings. Thus, based upon the factual findings set forth in the trial court’s order, we review the trial court’s legal conclusion that no exigent circumstances existed in this case.
¶ 12 Brigham City next argues that the circumstances, as found by the court, clearly establish exigent circumstances supporting the officers’ warrantless entxy into the private residence. The trial court made the following findings of fact:
1. On July 23, 2001, at approximately 3:00 a.m., four Brigham City Policy officers were dispatched ... as a result of a call concerning a loud party.
2. After arrival at the residence, the officers, from their obsexwations from the front of the residence, determined that it was obvious that knocking on the front door would have done no good. It was appropriate that they proceed down the driveway alongside the house to further investigate.
3. After going down the driveway on the side of the house, the officers could see, through a slat fence, two juveniles consuming alcoholic beverages. At that point, because of the juveniles, there was proba*1114ble cause for the officers to enter into the backyard.
4. Upon entering the backyard, the officers observed, through windows and a screen door an altercation taking place, wherein it appeared that four adults were trying to control a juvenile. At one point, the juvenile got a hand loose and smacked one of the occupants of the residence in the nose.
5. At that point in time, the court finds no exigent circumstances to justify the officer’s entry into the residence. What he should have done, as required under the 4th amendment, was knock on the door. The evidence is that there was a loud, tumultuous thing going on, and the evidence is that the occupants probably would not have heard, but under the 4th amendment he has an obligation to at least attempt before entering.
¶ 13 After reviewing the trial court’s ruling, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that the officers’ warrantless entry into the private residence was not justified by the circumstances. . The trial court found that some sort of altercation had occurred in the house, but made no findings from which we could reasonably conclude that the altercation posed an immediate serious threat or created a threat of escalating-violence. Furthermore, the officers did not immediately physically intervene in the situation, draw weapons, or otherwise act in a manner suggesting an emergency. Neither do the trial court’s findings support a conclusion that the destruction of evidence would have occurred, that the escape of any suspect was imminent, or that any legitimate law enforcement effort would have been frustrated had the officers not been granted immediate entry into the home. On these limited facts, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that exigent circumstances did not exist.2
¶ 14 Brigham City next argues that the officers were justified in entering this private residence because the officers observed, first-hand, the commission of a crime. Generally, absent exceptional circumstances or plain error, a party who fails to bring an issue to the trial court’s attention is barred from asserting it on appeal. See State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah Ct.App.1991). Brigham City neither raised this argument to the trial court, nor argued plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. We therefore decline to address this argument.
CONCLUSION
¶ 15 Because we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact and, to a limited extent, to the trial court’s application of those facts to the law, we conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding that no exigent circumstances existed under these facts. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s grant of Defendants’ Motion to Suppress all evidence resulting from the officer’s entry into the private residence.
¶ 16 I CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Judge.
. The trial court first directed Defendants to draft and submit an appropriate order. Brigham City, however, objected to the findings as drafted and proffered a substitution. Over Defendant’s objections, the trial court adopted Brigham City’s version of the order and findings. Therefore, any findings Brigham City considered necessary to support a conclusion of exigent circumstances should have been included in this order.
. In reaching its conclusion, the dissent relies upon State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219, 51 P.3d 55, where police entered a home without a warrant in response to a domestic violence complaint. Id. at ¶ 23. In Comer, “admittedly a close case,” we stated that “the officers had probable cause to believe a domestic violence offense had been, or was being, committed.” Id. at ¶ 25. We noted that a " ‘domestic violence complaint’ is 'one of the most potentially dangerous, volatile arrest situations confronting police.' " Id. (citations omitted). We identified the specific facts that would prompt the police to believe "there was no time to get a warrant and/or that [their] presence was necessary to prevent physical harm to persons or the destruction of evidence.” Id. at ¶ 26. The combination of these factors warranted a finding of exigent circumstances. See id. The holding in Comer, however, should be narrowly construed, see id. at n. 11 (characterizing the Comer opinion as adopting approach "for analyzing warrantless police entry into a private residence after receipt of a report of domestic violence at that residence”) and only applies when the threat of continued domestic violence is present.
The case at har is distinguishable from Comer, for this is not a "domestic violence” situation. Additionally, the trial court found that the juvenile who seemed to be causing the commotion was restrained when the police arrived. Thus, except for the fact that the juvenile's hand broke loose and "smacked one of the occupants of the residence in the nose,” all violence had ceased by the time the officers arrived. Also, unlike Comer, the police in the case at bar had a clear view of the interior of the home and could have intervened had further violence ensued.