(dissenting)—This case concerns the liability of a self-service grocery store for a puddle near a dairy case caused by a leak in the roof. The majority holds that not only the hazard itself, but also the specific cause must be foreseeable, and concludes the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that the plaintiff had the burden of proving actual or constructive notice of the puddle in defendant's store. Because the majority confuses the law and usurps the role of the jury, I dissent.
The unsafe condition in this case is a puddle of water on a smooth, rugless floor in defendant's self-service grocery store. The issue as to whether this puddle is an inherently foreseeable hazard within the meaning of Pimentel v. Roundup Co., 100 Wn.2d 39, 666 P.2d 888 (1983), should be left to the jury. In Pimentel, we held that plaintiffs need not establish either actual or constructive notice of reasonably foreseeable hazards in self-service establishments. 100 Wn.2d at 40. We explained that plaintiffs wishing to prove negligence without notice must show that the "nature of the proprietor's business and his methods of operation are such that the existence of unsafe conditions on the premises is reasonably foreseeable." Pimentel, 100 Wn.2d at 49. The specific cause of the hazard is not itself determinative. It is quite conceivable that a jury could find that a puddle caused by a leaking roof and located near a dairy display case is a reasonably foreseeable hazard within the definition of Pimentel. The trial court erred in failing to provide a Pimentel instruction.
The majority states there is no evidence that the leak in the roof resulted from defendant’s negligence. Majority, at 454. However, the record contains no information at all as to what caused the leak. The majority correctly states the rule in Pimentel, but states that it is not applicable to this case because "the conditions which led up to the plaintiff's accident were neither continuous, reasonably foreseeable, nor . . . associated with the store's self-service mode of operation." Majority, at 454. In making such a finding, the majority unnecessarily limits the rule established in *464Pimentel and usurps the role of the jury. Contrary to the majority's assertion, the hazard in this case can be labeled "inherent". The following facts reveal that a jury could find that the conditions which led to plaintiff's accident were associated with Albertson's self-service mode of operation.
As part of its method of operation, Albertson's creates displays that are designed to attract the customer's attention to specific sales or products. Partial Report of Proceedings, vol. I, at 48-49. The puddle was located about a ; foot and a half away from the corner of a display at the end of an aisle near the dairy case. Partial Report of Proceedings, vol. II, at 13-14. Plaintiff testified he thought his cart went down the produce aisle when he fell. Partial Report of Proceedings, vol. I, at 13. One of defendant's employees testified that there are times when there is some sort of water or liquid on the floor. Partial Report of Proceedings, vol. II, at 8. It is not difficult to imagine a shopper, distracted by displays, pushing a shopping cart in front of him, rounding a corner of an aisle, and slipping in unseen water. The specific cause of the puddle should not be determinative. Where the hazard is likely and the store makes every effort to direct the customer's attention away from the floor, the Pimentel exception applies.
The majority concludes that defendant had no notice of the puddle because two of its employees happened to walk by the area about 10 minutes or so before the accident, and neither one noticed any water on the floor. However, neither of these employees inspected the area, nor were they looking for any unsafe conditions. One was on her way to clock out at the end of her shift, the other was on his way to pick up some transmittals. The majority's analysis confuses the duty and causation elements. The majority states that the plaintiff traditionally has the burden to establish a proprietor's negligence as a cause in fact of an injury by showing constructive notice. Majority, at 458. Constructive notice relates to duty, not to causation: it triggers the duty to remove the hazard. See Presnell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., *46560 Wn.2d 671, 673, 374 P.2d 939 (1962); see also W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 60, at 417 (5th ed. 1984). Regardless of the cause, the proprietor's duty—to respond to all reasonably foreseeable hazards—is not eliminated. Pimentel eliminates the notice requirement in a case such as this, and allows a jury to consider the nature of the defendant's business, the methods of operation, and whether the unsafe condition is reasonably foreseeable. This exception does not shift the burden and the plaintiff must still prove that defendant failed to take reasonable care to prevent the injury. Pimentel, 100 Wn.2d at 49. As the majority properly notes, "'[liability extends to foreseeable results from unforeseeable causes'". Majority, at 461 (quoting King v. Seattle, 84 Wn.2d 239, 248, 525 P.2d 228 (1974)).
The majority claims that the Ninth Circuit has recognized that application of Pimentel to slip and fall cases would place "an intolerable burden on businesses". This can only be construed as a confused argument that Pimentel should be overruled. The Ninth Circuit did not discuss the Pimentel "inherently foreseeable" exception in Kangley v. United States, 788 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1986), the case cited by the majority in support of this proposition. Neither Kangley nor the facts of this case can be cited as authority for overruling Pimentel. The facts of the present case show that the condition which caused the plaintiff's injury could be found to be inherently foreseeable.
The Brant case cited by the majority does not preclude use of a Pimentel instruction in this case. Brant v. Market Basket Stores, 72 Wn.2d 446, 433 P.2d 863 (1967). In Brant, there was no testimony that the water had made the floor slippery, therefore the court found the defendant had not permitted a dangerous condition to exist in the store. 72 Wn.2d at 448, 452. The majority finds the plaintiff in the present case failed to prove that the defendant " 'permitted a situation dangerous to its invitees to exist", just like the plaintiff in Brant. Majority, at 459. The majority forgets that we are not the jury in this case. The parties have asked *466us to determine whether the trial court properly refused a jury instruction which would have allowed the plaintiff to prove his case by showing that this particular hazard was reasonably foreseeable given the nature of defendant's business and its mode of operation. Our unanimous decision in Pimentel requires such an instruction in this case.
Dore, C.J., Brachtenbach, J., and Pearson, J. Pro Tem., concur with Utter, J.