with whom MATTHEWS, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion holding that a reversal is required because O’Dell was denied the assistance of counsel. Although there was not a lengthy discussion of the matter, O’Dell, *109along with all other defendants, was clearly advised of his various rights at the time of his arraignment. Included was the advice that he was entitled to counsel and that, if unable to afford an attorney, the Public Defender would be appointed to represent him. Later, when asked individually if he understood those rights, he stated: “Yes.” Unlike Gregory v. State, 550 P.2d 374 (Alaska 1976), where the record demonstrated obvious confusion on the part of the defendant concerning his rights, due to a severe language barrier there is simply no indication here that O’Dell was not fully aware of what he was doing. Absent some real indication that O’Dell failed to understand his rights, I see no reason to set aside his conviction. He said that he understood those rights. I would take him at his word.1
O’Dell’s reply, when asked if he wanted an attorney, to the effect that the ease only involved a “matter of clipped bumpers,” only indicates to me that at that time he considered the matter to be too trivial to require the assistance of counsel.
. Significant also, is the fact that O’Dell was accused of a relatively minor infraction of the law. Thus, it is my belief that it was unnecessary to make the same probing inquiry that might be required if the defendant had been accused of a more serious offense. The issues in traffic misdemeanor cases are usually readily understood by lay persons and the consequences of a finding of guilt are typically not particularly serious.