dissenting.
I must dissent from the disposition of the issues in this case. The majority decision does not fit my view in Texas West Oil and Gas Corporation v. Fitzgerald, Wyo., 726 P.2d 1056 (1986); it does not fit the parties in this litigation; it does not fit the usual rules with respect to issue preclusion under the doctrine of collateral estoppel; and it does not fit our Wyoming cases. I would reverse the judgment of the district court granting the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
While it was clear to me in Texas West Oil and Gas Corporation v. Fitzgerald, supra, that the approved result of the arbitration proceeding made it impossible for Fitzgerald to have committed the tort of intentional interference with the contract between Texas West Oil and Gas Corpora*867tion and Oil Patch Sales and Rentals of Wyoming, Inc., I could conclude, and did, that Fitzgerald still might be liable for damages for intentional interference with a contractual expectancy. I concurred in the finding that Fitzgerald had committed the tort of wrongful interference with that contractual expectancy.
The Amended Complaint in this case asserts wrongful interference with the contract between Texas West Oil and Gas Corporation and Oil Patch Sales and Rentals of Wyoming, Inc., but the Amended Complaint also alleges:
“11. That the taking of the lien in the drilling rig prevented the consummation of prospective contractual relations, in that the parties, after the loss of the draw works, considered options which included selling the rig to third parties, and that proposed sales were in the process of being completed, which had every likelihood of success, and they were frustrated by the imposition of the lien.
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“16. That First Interstate Bank also knew that Texas West and Oil Patch were negotiating for the sale of the rig to third parties, and that the placing of the lien upon the rig would have the substantial likelihood of frustrating those prospective contractual relations, because they were altered to require cash payment of a $500,000.00 lien, which payment did not contribute to finishing the incomplete drilling rig, and which non-productive cost the bank knew would frustrate the ability of the parties to dispose of the rig to a third party under existing market conditions.”
I am satisfied that the complaint adequately alleges facts to assert a claim against First Interstate Bank of Casper, N.A., and Gordon Gibson for wrongful interference with a contractual expectancy.
In my judgment, the sufficiency of the Amended Complaint cannot be abrogated by the application of the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel. The majority focuses upon relationships which are not significant without considering the critical relationship in this case. It is true that the Amended Complaint alleges that Oil Patch Sales and Rentals of Wyoming, acting through its directors, Fitzgerald and Gibson, gave a lien to the First Interstate Bank of Casper, N.A., on the uncompleted rig. Gibson’s and Fitzgerald’s respective roles as corporate directors, however, simply afforded opportunity to commit the alleged tort of wrongful interference. We do know from the record in the prior case that Gordon Gibson also was a guarantor of the indebtedness of Oil Patch Sales and Rentals of Wyoming, Inc., and he had the same self interest that D.N. Fitzgerald had in furnishing additional security to the First Interstate Bank of Casper, N.A., on the corporate indebtedness. The bank had a separate interest of its own which was served by increasing its security for its loan. Consequently, the fallacy of the majority position is its reliance upon the relationship of Gibson to Oil Patch Sales and Rentals of Wyoming, Inc. as a director and the relationship of First Interstate Bank of Casper, N.A., to Fitzgerald as an assignor of the security interest to Fitzgerald in concluding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel relieves them from liability because Texas West Oil and Gas Corporation v. Fitzgerald, supra, demonstrated no breach of the contract by Oil Patch.
Gordon Gibson was acting for himself and advancing his individual interests. In obtaining an additional lien on the uncompleted rig, the First Interstate Bank of Casper, N.A., was enhancing its own interests. In the context of the alleged tort, the critical relationship could only be that of joint tortfeasors as it might exist between Gibson, Fitzgerald and the bank. Concepts of principal and agent as between a corporation and one of its directors, or assignor and assignee as between a bank and a guarantor, have nothing to do with this case. The relationship of one joint tort-feasor to another, without more, does not involve privity in any way that should invoke the concepts of issue or claim preclusion relied upon by the majority opinion.
This is demonstrated best by noting that one of the policy justifications for the doctrines of issue preclusion is that they lead *868to consistent litigative results. The result in this case is inconsistent with the result in Texas West Oil and Gas Corporation v. Fitzgerald, supra. To be consistent, the doctrine of collateral estopped should have been applied in aid of the plaintiffs’ case which would result in a judgment against Gibson as a matter of law since his status is identical to that of Fitzgerald.
Instead of alleging that Gibson’s liability would flow from a principal and agency relationship or alleging that the First Interstate Bank of Casper, N.A., was liable as an assignor, the Amended Complaint alleges:
“18. That the actions of the Defendants, in taking a security interest to advance their own interests at the express expense of an innocent party, constitute egregious misconduct sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages, and these actions were taken for the improper motive of injuring an innocent third party, Texas West, by interfering with these pre-existing contractual relations.”
This is not a particularly artful way of alleging that Gibson and the bank wrongfully interfered with a contractual expectancy, but it is apparent that the plaintiffs’ theory was that Gibson’s action was taken for himself not on behalf of Oil Patch Sales and Rentals of Wyoming, Inc.
Given the circumstances and the law, as I understand both, it is a mystery to me how the doctrine of issue preclusion may have the effect of justifying the dismissal of this Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. We have classified wrongful interference with a contractual expectancy as a tort. If several persons commit that tort, each may become liable for the same loss. The applicable rule from Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 49 (1982) reads as follows:
“Judgment Against One of Several Persons Liable for the Same Loss “A judgment against one person liable for a loss does not terminate a claim that the injured party may have against another person who may be liable therefor.”
The thrust of this rule is that the judgment against D.N. Fitzgerald does not terminate a claim that Texas West Oil and Gas Corporation may have against Gordon Gibson or the First Interstate Bank of Casper, N.A., for the same loss.
While I have no quarrel with the right of this court to judicially notice the prior litigation for purposes of the doctrines of issue preclusion, the rules of issue preclusion invoked by the majority opinion are inapposite. The First Interstate Bank of Casper, N.A., is not sued as an assignor. It is sued for its own wrongful conduct in participating in the alleged interference with the contractual expectancy. Similarly, Gibson is not sued as an agent of Oil Patch Sales and Rentals of Wyoming, Inc., he is sued because, in his situation as a director, he acted contrary to the interests of Oil Patch and in accord with his individual interest in providing additional security for a debt which he had guaranteed. If that conduct resulted in wrongful interference with the contractual expectancy, both Gordon Gibson and First Interstate Bank of Casper, N.A., are subject to independent liability. Neither is protected from liability by the doctrine of res judicata or the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In this instance, the rule articulated in Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., Wyo., 540 P.2d 535 (1975), simply does not apply.
We must keep in mind that:
“According to our standard of review we will sustain a dismissal of a complaint only if it shows on its face that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief under any set of facts. Johnson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of Hartford, Wyo., 608 P.2d 1299 (1980). In considering such a motion, the ‘facts alleged in the complaint are admitted and the allegations must be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs.’ Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., Wyo., 600 P.2d 733, 734 (1979). Dismissal is a drastic remedy, and is sparingly granted. Harris v. Grizzle, Wyo., 599 P.2d 580 (1979).” Mostert v. CBL & Associates, et al., Wyo., 741 P.2d 1090, 1092 (1987).
The correct disposition of this appeal would be to reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.