This proceeding stems from a dispute regarding the terms of a real estate development agreement. At trial, after the court directed a verdict in favor of defendants1 on plaintiffs’2 fraud claim, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs on their claim for negligent misrepresentation. The trial court thereafter granted defendants’ motion for a new trial on the ground that the jury instruction on damages was erroneous. Plaintiffs appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in granting a new trial, in awarding attorney fees, and in dismissing plaintiffs’ other claims for relief. The Court of Appeals reversed. It upheld the verdict on the claim for negligent misrepresentation, vacated the trial court’s order granting a new trial, and reinstated the jury’s verdict on the ground that the objection to the jury instruction had not been preserved and thus that the trial court erred in granting a new trial. Onita Pacific Corp. v. Trustees of Bronson, 104 Or App 696, 709, 711-12, 803 P2d 756 (1990).
On defendants’ petitions for review, although we agree that damages may be recoverable for some negligent misrepresentations, a claim for negligent misrepresentation is not made out under the facts present here. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision reinstating the verdict for plaintiffs on their claim for negligent misrepresentation.3 Because the Court of Appeals did not address plaintiffs’ contentions that the trial court erred in directing a verdict on their fraud claim and in dismissing their claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith, we remand the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of those issues. The Court *153of Appeals also should reconsider its decision concerning attorney fees in the light of its ultimate disposition of the appeal.
In 1973, Betty Camomile entered into a land sale contract (Camomile contract) with defendants to sell three large tracts of real property. The Camomile contract provided for a stream of payments over time to Camomile as the real property was developed and sold. In 1979, defendants sold their rights in two of the three parcels to Robert Hatch by a land sale contract (Hatch contract), which provided that a deed for each lot would be placed in an escrow with instructions for its release on resale. Hatch then assigned his interest to John Compton, with defendants’ and Camomile’s consent. Subsequently, Compton decided to sell his interest in the two parcels under the Hatch contract.
Plaintiffs were interested in purchasing Compton’s interest. Camomile refused to consent to Compton’s delegation of his obligations to her under the Hatch and Camomile contracts. In order to eliminate the need for Camomile’s consent, plaintiffs agreed to make a payment of $200,000 that would be used by defendants to pay the balance owing to Camomile. Plaintiffs transferred property worth approximately $850,000 to Compton for his interest in the Hatch contract and borrowed $200,000 in cash from Compton to make the $200,000 payment to defendants. Plaintiffs gave Compton a promissory note for $200,000 and security interests in their interest as assignees of the Hatch contract and in other property that they owned.
Defendants, plaintiffs, and Compton negotiated a “Modification of Agreement,” pursuant to which the parties agreed to change some of the restrictions on the development of the lots for resale. After setting forth the modifications to the development plan, the Modification of Agreement provided:
“In all other respects the contract between CHARLES D. BRONSON, CLYDE PURCELL, L.A. SWARENS and WARDE H. ERWIN, a joint venture, and ROBERT HATCH and JOHN COMPTON shall remain in full force and effect.
“Vendors-sellers [defendants] hereby consent to sale-assignment by JOHN COMPTON to DOUGLAS K. SIEBERT, and his WIFE, and to DR. and MRS. JOHN *154‘JACK’ A. DANTE, and to the DOUGLAS CASCADE CORPORATION and ONITA PACIFIC CORPORATION, as tenants in common, each to be jointly and severally liable and responsible for performance of the contract above referenced and herein modified.”
The Hatch contract, to which the Modification of Agreement referred, included a clause that provided that “[t]here are no representations or warranties made by either party except as contained in this document.” There is no written memorandum in the record that reflects the details of the sale-assignment by Compton to plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs contend that they agreed to make the $200,000 payment because defendants told them that lots worth $200,000 would be released to them. Specifically, Douglas Siebert testified that Lawrence Erwin, defendants’ attorney, had assured him that the $200,000 payment would be processed through the escrow that held the deeds and that the escrow would release lots worth $200,000 to plaintiffs.4 Siebert testified that he relied on Lawrence Erwin’s representations, because defendant Warde Erwin had told him that Lawrence Erwin would handle the negotiations on defendants’ behalf. Just before the transaction was to close, Lawrence Erwin informed Siebert that defendants wanted to use a different escrow to avoid a processing fee and that they proposed that plaintiffs’ payment be processed through Lawrence Erwin’s client trust account. Lawrence Erwin assured Siebert that the payment would be treated just as it would have been if processed through the original escrow and that the new escrow would have the same instructions as the previous one. Siebert, who believed that the existing escrow instructions permitted releases of lots without resale, agreed to this procedure on behalf of plaintiffs.
After making the $200,000 payment and executing the Modification of Agreement, plaintiffs requested the release of 16 lots worth $192,000. Defendants refused to release the 16 lots on the ground that the Hatch contract required releases of lots only upon resale. Lawrence Erwin then drafted instructions for the new escrow that clearly *155limited releases of lots to third-party resales. Further, in his cover letter accompanying the proposed new escrow instructions, Lawrence Erwin acknowledged that Douglas Siebert may have been confused about the availability of releases of lots without a resale. Without the released lots, plaintiffs had no collateral and were unable to obtain financing to develop the lots for resale, and they defaulted on their obligation to Compton. Compton foreclosed on the security, i.e., plaintiffs’ interests as assignees of the Hatch contract and plaintiffs’ other property that had been pledged as security for the $200,000 loan.
Plaintiffs brought suit against defendants seeking reformation of the Hatch contract and the Modification of Agreement to provide for the release of lots upon the payment of $200,000 by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also sought damages for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of the implied covenant of good faith, and intentional interference with contractual relations. The reformation claim was tried to the court first. The trial court denied reformation, stating that plaintiffs had failed to prove that defendants intentionally deceived plaintiffs regarding the release of lots and that Lawrence Erwin was not shown to have authority to bind defendants by his representations. The trial court also dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and for intentional interference with contract.
Plaintiffs’ fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims were then tried to the jury. At the close of plaintiffs’ evidence, the trial court granted defendants’ motion for directed verdict on the fraud claim. The jury thereafter returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs on their negligent misrepresentation claim. Defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that Oregon law does not recognize the tort of negligent misrepresentation and, even if it did, that it would not arise in these circumstances. Defendants also moved for a new trial, arguing that, assuming the legal sufficiency of plaintiffs’ claim for negligent misrepresentation, the trial court’s instruction on damages was incorrect. The trial court denied the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and granted the motion for a new trial, stating that its instruction on damages was incorrect.
*156Plaintiffs appealed, assigning as error the trial court’s granting of the new trial based on the damages instruction, the trial court’s award of attorney fees to defendants, the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith, and the granting of defendants’ motions for directed verdict on plaintiffs’ fraud claim. Defendants Purcell and Swarens cross-assigned as error the trial court’s denial of their motion for directed verdict on plaintiffs’ claim for negligent misrepresentation. Defendants Warde Erwin and Trustees of Charles D. Bronson cross-appealed, assigning as error the trial court’s denial of their motion for directed verdict, the trial court’s ruling on their issue preclusion defense to the fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims based on the court’s findings in the bench trial on the reformation claim, and the denial of their motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs were not real parties in interest.
The Court of Appeals reversed. Concerning the tort of negligent misrepresentation, the Court of Appeals held that defendants’ conduct was actionable and that the jury’s verdict was supported by evidence in the record. Onita Pacific Corp. v. Trustees of Bronson, supra, 104 Or App at 710. Concerning the order granting a new trial, the Court of Appeals held that defendants “did not preserve the alleged error [in the instructions] on which the [trial] court based its decision to grant a new trial. ’ ’ Id. at 711. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed that order. The Court of Appeals also reversed the trial court’s award of attorney fees to defendants on the ground that, despite the fact that they had prevailed on the contract claim, defendants were not the prevailing parties in the action. Id. at 712. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court on defendants’ assignments of error in the cross-appeal. Ibid.
Plaintiffs’ claim for negligent misrepresentation is based on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977).5 They *157assert that ‘ ‘ a party who supplies false information should be liable for misrepresentations that are made negligently.” Defendants contend that, as between parties to an arm’s-length transaction, one party should not be held liable to another party for economic losses caused by the latter’s reliance on the former’s negligent misrepresentations.
In Duyck v. Tualatin Valley Irrigation Dist., 304 Or 151, 157-58, 742 P2d 1176 (1987), this court traced the history of the tort of negligent misrepresentation.
“In England, though the English courts had long recognized the forms of action of deceit and negligence, the House of Lords, in 1889, held that an action for deceit could not be maintained by a plaintiff who had been induced to enter into a disfavorable commercial or financial venture unless the false statement upon which the plaintiff relied was made ‘(1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. ’ Derry v. Peek, 14 App Cas 337, 374 (1889). According to Prosser, the English rule was that, ‘in the absence of some fiduciary relation between the parties, there was no remedy for merely negligent misrepresentation, honestly believed, where the harm that resulted to the plaintiff was only pecuniary loss,’ Prosser, Misrepresentations and Third Parties, 19 Vand L Rev 231, 234 (1966) (footnote omitted).
“The best known statement for not recognizing liability for economic loss arising from a negligent misrepresentation causing only economic loss appears in Ultramares v. Touche, 225 NY 170, 174 NE 441, 74 ALR 1139 (1931). In that case the New York Court of Appeals, fearing limitless liability, refused to hold an accounting firm liable for negligently certifying a firm’s balance sheet. The claimants were third persons who had suffered economic losses in reliance thereon. Judge Cardozo, for the court, stated:
*158“ ‘If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to these consequences. ’
“Id. at 179-80 (emphasis added).
“The Ultramares court distinguished an earlier New York case, Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 NY 236, 135 NE 275, 23 ALR 1425 (1922), in which apublic weigher ofbeans was held liable to a buyer for an erroneous weight statement — even though the weighing was at the seller’s request — because the weigher knew that the buyer would rely on the weight statement. The Ultramares court distinguished Glanzer on the ground that the weight statement was ‘primarily’ for the benefit of the buyer, while the ¿udit statement in Ultramares was ‘incidently’ for the use of third parties.
“Today many American courts recognize the tort of negligent misrepresentation, but the scope of recovery for economic loss varies widely. The New York courts limit recovery to cases in which the nexus between the parties is direct or close. Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 65 NY2d 536, 551, 493 NYS2d 435, 483 NE2d 110 (1985) (‘there must have been some conduct on the part of the accountants linking them to that party or parties, which evinces the accountants’ understanding of that party or party’s reliance’). At the other extreme is the view that liability is only limited by the principle of reasonable foresight. See Craig, Negligent Misstatements, Negligent Acts and Economic Loss, 92 Law Q Rev 213 (1976). The Restatement (Second) appears to take an intermediate position.”
Because the Duyck court held that the statute of limitations had run, it was not necessary to decide whether the tort of negligent misrepresentation existed in Oregon; the court simply assumed the existence of the tort. Id. at 156, 164. The court concluded that an action for negligent misrepresentation was an action for negligence rather than deceit and, thus, that the plaintiffs’ action accrued on the date that they knew or should have known that their reliance on the defendant’s representations had caused them a pecuniary loss rather than on the date on which they learned of the defendant’s culpability for causing that loss. Id. at 160-64.
*159We now state that, under some circumstances, one may be hable for economic loss sustained by others who rely on one’s representations negligently made. In Duyck, id. at 158, this court observed that “many American courts recognize the tort of negligent misrepresentation, but the scope of recovery for economic loss varies widely.” The rule stated in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (see note 5, ante) is close to the mark. But, for the reasons that follow, rather than adopting a black letter “rule,” we opt to develop the scope of the duty and the scope of recovery on a case-by-case basis, in the light of related decisions of this court.
Our precedents establish that a negligence claim for the recovery of economic losses6 caused by another must be predicated on some duty of the negligent actor to the injured party beyond the common law duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm. Hale v. Groce, 304 Or 281, 284, 744 P2d 1289 (1987), states:
“[0]ne ordinarily is not liable for negligently causing a stranger’s purely economic loss without injuring his person or property. It does not suffice that the harm is a foreseeable consequence of negligent conduct that may make one liable to someone else, for instance to a client. Some source of a duty outside the common law of negligence is required.” (Citations omitted.)
Hence, where the recovery of economic losses is sought on a theory of negligence, the concept of duty as a limiting principle takes on a greater importance than it does with regard to the recovery of damages for personal injury or property damage.7
*160Having recognized the existence of the tort, the central question in the present case becomes whether, during the parties’ arm’s-length negotiations, in addition to a duty of honesty, defendants owed plaintiffs a duty to exercise reasonable care in communicating factual information to prevent economic losses to plaintiffs. To resolve this, we examine the nature of the parties’ relationship and compare that relationship to other relationships in which the law imposes a duty on parties to conduct themselves reasonably, so as to protect the other parties to the relationship.
The law imposes a duty of care in the attorney-client relationship. Chocktoot v. Smith, 280 Or 567, 570, 571 P2d 1255 (1977); Harding v. Bell, 265 Or 202, 204-05, 508 P2d 216 (1973). That duty — to act as a reasonably competent attorney in protecting and defending the interests of the client — is owed not only to the client but, as well, to those who may be considered intended beneficiaries of the duty to the client. See, e.g., Hale v. Groce, supra, 304 Or at 284, 287 (extending attorney’s duty to intended beneficiary of attorney’s promise to the client). If the professional breaches that duty, the client and the intended beneficiary can recover economic losses. Unlike parties who are negotiating at arm’s length, the attorney is engaged by the client to use his or her expertise for the benefit and protection of the client’s interests. The attorney generally does not and should not have any pecuniary interest that is adverse to the client. Schroeder v. Schaefer, 258 Or 444, 450-51, 477 P2d 720 (1970), modified 258 Or 444, 483 P2d 818 (1971); see also Oregon State Bar, Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 5-101 (Conflict of Interest: Lawyer’s Self-Interest). The tort duty to exercise reasonable care in protecting the client’s economic interests is implied by law when the attorney contracts with the client to provide legal services. Georgetown Realty v. The Home Ins. Co., 313 Or 97, 106, 831 P2d 7 (1992).
Other professional or contractual relationships may also give rise to a tort duty to exercise reasonable care on behalf of another’s interests. Cf. Securities-Intermountain v. Sunset Fuel, 289 Or 243, 259, 611 P2d 1158 (1980) (in “an *161action for damages against one engaged to provide professional or other independent services,” the statute of limitations for negligence rather than for contract actions applies “[i]f the alleged contract merely incorporates by reference or by implication a general standard of skill and care independent of the contract, and the alleged breach would also be a breach of this noncontractual duty”).8 Engineers and architects are among those who may be subject to liability to those who employ (or are the intended beneficiaries of) their services and who suffer losses caused by professional negligence. Ashley v. Fletcher, 275 Or 405, 550 P2d 1385 (1976) (architect); Bales for Food v. Poole, 246 Or 253, 256, 424 P2d 892 (1967) (engineer).
Other examples may be cited. An agent owes duties of care and loyalty to his or her principal. Lindland v. United Business Investments, 298 Or 318, 324, 693 P2d 20 (1984) (distinguishing between the duties of loyalty and care owed by an agent to a principal); Becker v. Capwell, 270 Or 200, 203, 527 P2d 120 (1974) (real estate broker owes duty to principal such that he must not make secret profit at principal’s expense). A primary insurer has a duty to excess insurers and to the insured to exercise reasonable care in attempting to settle third-party claims within policy limits. Maine Bonding v. Centennial Ins. Co., 298 Or 514, 518-19, 523, 693 P2d 1296 (1985).
In the above relationships, the professional who owes a duty of care is, at least in part, acting to further the economic interests of the “client,” the person owed the duty of care. In contrast, the present case involves two adversarial parties negotiating at arm’s length to further their own economic interests.
The foregoing authorities are the most analogous ones that we can find to the present case. From them, we conclude that, in arm’s-length negotiations, economic losses *162arising from a negligent misrepresentation are not actionable. This conclusion is in accord with the opinions of some commentators. Professors Harper, James, and Gray have noted the desirability of limiting the class of persons to whom the duty of care is owed in the context of negligent misrepresentations causing economic losses.
“On the whole, as indicated above, courts have provided a remedy for negligent misrepresentation principally against those who advise in an essentially nonadversarial capacity. As against sellers and other presumed antagonists, on the other hand, the tendency of most courts has instead been either to rely on deceit with the requirement of scienter, however expanded, or to shift (by analogy to restitution or warranty) to strict liability * * 2 Harper, James & Gray, The Law of Torts 412-13, § 7.6 (2d ed 1986).
Similarly, Professor Alfred Hill distinguishes between misrepresentations made by an adversary in a sales transaction and by one who holds out to the general public that he or she supplies information and has noted:
“The situation is different in the case of ‘antagonists.’ When the aggrieved per son is a buyer, who does not complain of the negligent performance of a service but rather of misrepresentation by a seller inducing the making of a contract, the conceptual mold has been different from the inception of modern contract law: the options have been to sue on the contract or to sue in deceit, without a middle ground consisting of actionable negligence.” Hill, Damages for Innocent Misrepresentation, 73 Colum L Rev 679, 688 (1973).
Hill also states that allowing recovery for negligent misrepresentations made in the bargaining process would undermine the law of contracts, especially rules of law concerning written contracts. Id. at 717-18.
Other rules of law suggest the same result. The parol evidence rule, ORS 41.740, and the statute of frauds, ORS 41.580, are substantive rules of contract law that promote commercial certainty by allowing contracting parties to rely on the ultimate written expression of their agreement as embodying the terms of their agreement. Hatley v. Stafford, 284 Or 523, 530, 588 P2d 603 (1978). Plaintiffs could have avoided the problems that gave rise to this case by insisting that the lot-release provisions be included in the written *163agreements. Arguably, permitting damages for negligent misrepresentation in arm’s-length transactions would encourage contracting parties not to draft complete, integrated contracts. See First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Standard and Poor’s Corp., 869 F2d 175, 180 (2d Cir 1989) (Company in business of providing securities information to others held not liable for negligently misrepresenting security information. “[A] user is in the best position to weigh the danger of inaccuracy and potential loss arising from a particular use of a summary against the cost of verifying the summary by examination of the original documents or [federally required] prospectus.”) Recognition of the tort of negligent misrepresentation in a case such as this, in which parties in a bargaining transaction contemplate a later written agreement, would undermine fundamental principles of contract law.
On the other hand, Prosser and Keeton argue that “there would seem to be very little justification for not extending liability to all parties and agents to a bargaining transaction for making misrepresentations negligently.” Prosser & Keeton, Torts 745, § 107 (5th ed 1984).9 However, they do not explain or support that assertion; they merely state it.10 Prosser and Keeton do acknowledge that most courts have restricted liability for negligent misrepresentations causing pecuniary losses by “limit[ing] the group of persons to whom the defendant may be liable, short of the foreseeability of possible harm.” Ibid. Further, the situations *164that they describe involve suppliers of information, as distinct from parties in bargaining transactions, and the liability of the information suppliers is premised on the existence of a special relationship or by application of third-party beneficiary principles. Id. at 746-47.
Our conclusion also is consistent with Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552. The text of section 552 and the comments and illustrations thereto suggest that the editors, in using the words “[o]ne who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions,” had in mind relationships other than the relationship between persons negotiating at arm’s length. The comments provide no illustrations dealing with business adversaries in the commercial sense. This was also the conclusion of the Oregon Court of Appeals in Western Energy, Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific, 55 Or App 138, 637 P2d 223 (1981). There, in applying Louisiana law, the Court of Appeals stated that section 552 did not encompass claims between parties to arm’s-length business transactions. The court stated:
“The extensive comments to § 552 and the illustrations deal with those acting in a professional capacity or those with some special expertise upon which the recipient of the information is specially relying. We find no illustrations dealing with business ‘adversaries’ in the commercial sense. Some commentators, notably Hill, Damages for Innocent Misrepresentation, 73 Colum L Rev 679 (1973), and James and Gray, Misrepresentation - Pari I, 37 Md L Rev 286 (1977), indicate that § 552 limits liability to situations involving a fiduciary duty or where one gives special or professional advice and does not ordinarily apply to situations involving business adversaries. Hill, supra, at 686-88[,] and James and Gray, supra, at 313. * * *
“Plaintiff cites Prosser, Law of Torts, 706-07 (4th ed 1971), to support the argument that negligent misrepresentation should be actionable between adversaries in a commercial setting. Prosser’s example concerns a professional dispensing advice and not a business adversary in contract negotiations. See Hill, supra, at 686-87, n 24, which points *165out the flaw in the Prosser reasoning. ”1155 Or App at 144 n 6 (emphasis in original).
' We read Restatement section 552 as consistent with the rule that this court has adopted for negligence actions for the recovery of economic losses, viz., nongratuitous suppliers of information owe a duty to their clients or employers or to intended third-party beneficiaries of their contractual, professional, or employment relationship to exercise reasonable care to avoid misrepresenting facts. See cases discussed ante at 160-61. In the case at bar, defendants and their representative did not owe any duty to plaintiffs during the negotiations by virtue of a contractual, professional, or employment relationship or as a result of any fiduciary or similar relationship implied in the law. Here, the relationship was adversarial. In an arm’s-length negotiation, a negligent misrepresentation is not actionable. Hence, plaintiffs cannot maintain their claim for negligent misrepresentation against defendants.
We recognize that some jurisdictions allow damages for negligent misrepresentation in contexts similar to the case at bar.12 However, those jurisdictions either treat the tort as a specie of fraud or are more willing to imply a “duty” than our precedents permit. Foreseeability alone is not a sufficient basis to permit the recovery of economic losses on a theory of negligence. Hale v. Groce, supra, 304 Or at 284.13
*166Plaintiffs cannot maintain their action for defendants’ allegedly negligent nonfraudulent misrepresentations, and the Court of Appeals’ decision reinstating the verdict is reversed. Because the Court of Appeals did not address plaintiffs’ contentions on appeal that the trial court improperly directed a verdict on their fraud claim and improperly dismissed their claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of those unresolved issues and for reconsideration of its decision concerning attorney fees in the light of its ultimate disposition of the appeal.
The decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating the verdict is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration consistent with this opinion.
In this opinion, unless otherwise noted, when we refer to “defendants,” we are referring to defendants Trustees of Charles D. Bronson, and Warde H. Erwin, Clyde Purcell, and L.A. Swarens. There were other defendants in the trial court, but only these four remain in the case on appeal.
In this opinion, unless otherwise noted, when we refer to “plaintiffs,” we are also referring to nominal defendants Douglas K. Siebert, Dorothy L. Siebert, and Douglas Cascade Corporation. The Sieberts and Douglas Cascade Corporation were joint venturers with plaintiffs John A. Dante, Jeanine Dante, and Onita Pacific Corporation and were plaintiffs in this action until they assigned their interests in the joint venture to the Dantes and Onita Pacific Corporation.
Our holding that plaintiffs have no actionable claim for negligent misrepresentation renders it unnecessary for us to address whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that defendants failed to preserve their claim of error regarding the instruction given.
The escrow instructions provided for the release of a deed for a lot upon the escrow’s receipt of the lot price. The escrow instructions did not explicitly require a resale before a lot would be released.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 provides:
“(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniaiy interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
*157“(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered
‘ ‘ (a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and
“(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar transaction.
“(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty is created, in any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect them.”
In this opinion we use the term “economic losses” to describe financial losses such as indebtedness incurred and return of monies paid, as distinguished from damages for injury to person or property. See Ore-Ida Foods v. Indian Head, 290 Or 909, 627 P2d 469 (1981) (denying employer’s economic loss claim against third person who caused employer to become liable for workers’ compensation benefits).
Hale v. Groce, 304 Or 281, 283, 744 P2d 1989 (1987), held that an omitted intended beneficiary of a deceased testator could assert a negligence claim against an attorney who negligently failed to include an intended bequest when drafting the decedent’s will. The plaintiff was both an intended beneficiary of the decedent in his will and “a classic ‘intended’ third-pariy beneficiary of the lawyer’s promise to his client.” Id. at 286. Thus, the lawyer’s duty extended to the plaintiff as well as to his client. Ibid. That duty — to exercise reasonable care in implementing the decedent’s testamentary directions — arose from his contractual/professional relationship with the decedent. Id. at 284, 286-88. The court also stated that “[o]ne ordinarily is not *160liable for negligently causing a stranger’s purely economic loss without injuring his person or property.” Id. at 284.
In Securities-Intermountain v. Sunset Fuel, 289 Or 243, 258-59, 611 P2d 1158 (1980), this court distinguished between claims premised on breach of a general standard of care and claims alleging specific breach of contractually adopted standards. Because the claims against the defendants, an architect and an engineer, were of the latter type, the applicable statute of limitations was that for contract actions. Id. at 262, 263-64.
See also Carpenter, Responsibility For Intentional, Negligent and Innocent Misrepresentation, 9 Or L Rev 413 (1930). Carpenter argues that an action for negligent misrepresentation should be allowed on the analogy of negligent turning over of a chattel. Id. at 421-23, 436. He asserts that a defendant who provided information in the course of his or her business or for profit should be liable for negligent misrepresentation of facts upon which the plaintiff relied, just as a defendant who provided a chattel in the course of his or her business or for profit would be liable for negligent failure to discover defects in the chattel causing injury to the plaintiff. Id. at 422. Under Carpenter’s proposed rule, no distinction would be made between tangible personal injury and property damage on the one hand and intangible economic losses on the other.
Prosser and Keeton assert that many courts have extended liability to innocent and negligent misrepresenters by inferring dishonesty from the fact that a reasonable person would have known better and, “[tjhus, there may not be so very much practical difference between those jurisdictions where dishonesty is required and those where negligence as well as dishonesty will suffice for recovery. ” Prosser & Keeton, Torts 746, § 107 (5th ed 1984). That may be true elsewhere, but it is not the law in Oregon. See Duyck v. Tualatin Valley Irrigation Dist., 304 Or 151, 158, 742 P2d 1176 (1987) (distinguishing between deceit and negligence).
Professor Hill argues that the fourth edition of Prosser’s treatise on torts is somewhat misleading in characterizing the state of the law with regard to negligent misrepresentation. Hill, Damages for Innocent Misrepresentation, 73 Colum L Rev 679, 688-87 n 24 (1973). Specifically, Professor Hill notes that Prosser did not distinguish between negligence as a basis for liability against business adversaries as opposed to suppliers of information and that only one case cited by Prosser, a 1925 New Hampshire case, supported a negligence theory by a buyer against a seller. Ibid.
See, e.g., Martens Chevrolet v. Seney, 292 Md 328, 439 A2d 534 (1982) (finding duty to avoid negligent misrepresentations in arm’s-length negotiations); Wagner v. Cutler, 757 P2d 779 (Mont 1988) (seller may be liable for reasonably discoverable, but unknown, latent defects when seller represents that item is free of defects); Formento v. Encanto Business Park, 744 P2d 22 (Ariz App 1987) (rejecting parol evidence rule rationale as overridden by policy of fostering honesty and fair dealing in transactions; treating negligent misrepresentation like fraud). Unlike those jurisdictions, we believe that the essence of the claim is negligence rather than deceit. Duyck v. Tualatin Valley Irrigation Dist., 304 Or 151, 160, 742 P2d 1176 (1987).
Fazzolari v. Portland School Dist. No. 1J, 303 Or 1, 10, 17, 734 P2d 1326 (1987), does not dictate a different result. True, the court there noted that,
“unless the parties invoke a status, a relationship, or a particular standard of conduct that creates, defines, or limits the defendant’s duty, the issue of liability *166for harm actually resulting from defendant’s conduct properly depends on whether that conduct unreasonably created a foreseeable risk to a protected interest of the kind of harm that befell the plaintiff.” Id. at 17.
However, Fazzolari recognized that the common law of negligence traditionally has excluded some types of “predictable” harms from its reach, including “solely economic * * * injuries,” id. at 7, which are the essence of plaintiffs’ claims herein. See also Hale v. Groce, supra note 6, 304 Or at 284 (decided after Fazzolari-, distinguishing between negligence claims for economic losses and those for personal injury or property damage); Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 293 Or 543, 561, 652 P2d 318 (1982) (denying recovery to child for foreseeable damages sustained as a result of mother’s bodily injury, in part because general negligence law in Oregon does not recognize the recovery of damages for psychic injuries suffered by one not directly injured by the negligent conduct).