I dissent.
I am concerned with the damage the majority are inflicting on the venerable doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. True, they inject a few qualifying words here and there, but the bottom line is that “the thing speaks for itself’ may hereafter be heard as a mere whisper.
It must be kept in mind that the Court of Appeal did not decide the merits of the complaint, it held only that the issue was one of fact and could not be decided on summary judgment. In this the Court of Appeal was correct; its decision should not be reversed.
I cite, in particular, the following excerpts from the thoughtful Court of Appeal opinion of Justice Froehlich, concurred in by Justices Wiener and Huffman:1
“[T]he ‘doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable where the accident is of such a nature that it can be said, in the light of past experience, that it *839probably was the result of negligence by someone and that the defendant is probably the one responsible.’ ” (Newing v. Cheatham (1975) 15 Cal.3d 351, 359 [124 Cal.Rptr. 193, 540 P.2d 33], quoting Di Mare v. Cresci (1962) 58 Cal.2d 292, 298-299 [23 Cal.Rptr. 772, 373 P.2d 860].) Three conditions are necessary to apply the doctrine:
“ ‘(1) the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.’ ” (Ybarra v. Spangard (1944) 25 Cal.2d 486, 489 [154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258].)
The evidence need not show that the accident must have happened because of someone’s negligence, but that in the light of past experience the accident probably was caused by the negligence of someone. (Di Mare v. Cresci, supra, 58 Cal.2d at pp. 298-299.)
We turn to the first condition—whether the accident is one which would not ordinarily occur in the absence of someone’s negligence. In deciding if this condition is satisfied, courts generally consider common knowledge and experience, the testimony of expert witnesses and the circumstances relevant to the particular accident in the case. (Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co [sic] (1952) 39 Cal.2d 436, 446 [247 P.2d 344].) 2 Common experience indicates Brown probably would not have slipped on lunch meat in the hallway in the absence of someone’s negligence. Someone must have dropped the lunch meat on the hallway floor.
The second condition, exclusivity of control, is a flexible concept. (Zentz, supra, 39 Cal.2d at pp. 443-444.) “[R]es ipsa loquitur applies where the accident is of such a nature that it can be said, in the light of past experience, that it probably was the result of negligence by someone and that the defendant is probably the person who is responsible.” (Id. at p. 446.) *840“Although... the doctrine will not ordinarily apply if it is equally probable that the negligence was that of someone other than the defendant, the plaintiff need not exclude all other persons who might possibly have been responsible where the defendant’s negligence appears to be the more probable explanation of the accident.” (Id. at pp. 443-444.)
The third requirement of res ipsa loquitur is that the accident must not be due to action by the plaintiff. Although Brown obviously “participated” in the accident by stepping on the lunch meat, such conduct does not automatically constitute him a voluntary contributor to the negligence. This third requisite for res ipsa loquitur is not congruent with the concept of contributory negligence, but looks instead to find conduct so participatory in damage causation as to preclude the inference that the defendant’s negligence caused the accident. (McFarland v. Booker, supra, 250 Cal.App.2d 402, 412.) “The plaintiff need not show that he was entirely inactive at the time of the accident in order to satisfy this requirement, so long as the evidence is such as to eliminate his conduct as a factor contributing to the occurrence.” (Newing v. Cheatham, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 363.) He may rely on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine even if he participated in the events leading to the accident, as long as his action was not the primary cause. (Hercules etc. Co. v. Automatic etc. Corp. (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d 387, 396 [311 P.2d 907].) The requirement that the defendant be in exclusive control of the instrumentality which caused the injury means only that the plaintiffs use of the instrumentality must not have been the primary cause of the accident. (Emerick v. Raleigh Hills Hospital (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 575, 585-586 [184 Cal.Rptr. 92]; 57B Am.Jur.2d, Negligence, § 1213, p. 127.) []
Where there is a question of fact as to any of the conditions required for application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, the issues are properly determined by a finder of fact. (Newing v. Cheatham, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 359; Keena Scales (1964) 61 Cal.2d 779, 783 [40 Cal.Rptr. 65, 394 P.2d 809]; Hansen v. Matich Corporation (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 129, 133 [44 Cal.Rptr. 149].) Here, each of the three elements necessary to application of the doctrine was established at least to a degree sufficient to create a factual question for trial determination. Thus, the granting of summary judgment was improper. []
The district nevertheless presses its argument that the concept of res ipsa loquitur is somehow inappropriate in an action against a public entity. As the district contends, the logical steps of circumstantial evidence utilized by res ipsa loquitur to infer negligence do not seem appropriate for production of an inference of notice. (See Van Alstyne, [Cal. Government Tort Liability *841Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1980) Dangerous Condition of Public Property] § 3.80, p. 308: “. . . the carefully prescribed statutory standards for determining when actual or constructive notice exists ... do not appear to leave room for application of the doctrine [of res ipsa loquitur].”) (See also Van Dorn v. City & County of S. F. (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 714, 716 [230 P.2d 393], in which the court stated, without citation of authority, that “res ipsa does not apply” to proof of notice to the city of the defective condition.) There seems no reason, however, why res ipsa loquitur cannot be used to raise an inference of simple negligence as set forth in alternative subdivision (a) of Government Code section 835.
We note that Government Code section 830.5 states: “[T]he happening of the accident which results in the injury is not in and of itself evidence that public property was in a dangerous condition.” However, this statutory statement of a legal truism is preceded by the caveat “Except where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable.” The Senate Legislative Committee’s Comment to this legislation, which was adopted in 1963, states: . . the section does not prevent the use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in appropriate cases.” (See Sen. committee com., 32 West’s Ann. Gov. Code (1980 ed.) § 830.5, p. 281.) []
To summarize: There is no reason why Brown could not rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to establish a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the school district. Brown was required only to establish those traditional requisites for the doctrine—in terms of evidence from which a finder of fact could conclude the requisites established. We believe Brown did this. The meat was on the floor of the hallway, and appeared fresh when removed from the heel of Brown’s boot. Access to the hallway was through a door usually locked by keys controlled by district employees. Vendors or visitors could enter only after an employee had unlocked the door. An employees’ lounge and a picnic table were provided at the building. Brown stated he had seen people eating lunch in the area. He further stated he did not bring the meat into the hallway. An inference can be made it was unlikely that Brown, at the building for the purpose of delivering computers, or Bailes, there to pick up saw blades, would have had any reason to carry lunch meat into the hallway. This was not an area frequented by students or people other than district employees. A jury could have found it more probable than not that a district employee was responsible. Here, the evidence presents a question of fact as to whether the conditions required for application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present. In that this is an *842issue properly decided by a finder of fact, we should hold the court erred in granting summary judgment. (Cf. Moreno v. Sayre (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 116, 125 [208 Cal.Rptr. 444].)
Brackets together, in this manner [], without enclosing material, are used to indicate deletions from the opinion of the Court of Appeal; brackets enclosing material (other than editor’s added parallel citations) are, unless otherwise indicated, used to denote insertions or *839additions. All footnotes in the Court Appeal opinion have been deleted with the exception of footnote 2.
Courts have found this condition satisfied in a variety of factual situations. (See, e.g., Zentz, supra, 39 Cal.2d at p. 447 [exploding bottle of carbonated beverage]; Raber v. Tumin (1951) 36 Cal.2d 654, 659 [226 P.2d 574] [falling ladder]; Baker v. B. F. Goodrich Co. (1953) 115 Cal.App.2d 221, 223 [252 P.2d 24] [bursting automobile tire]; Owens v. White Memorial Hospital (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 634, 639 [292 P.2d 288] [rail of hospital bed fell on plaintiff]; McFarland v. Booker (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 402, 412 [58 Cal.Rptr. 417] [rear-end collision]; Pappas v. Carson (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 261, 269 [123 Cal.Rptr. 343] [fire from overloading electrical circuits or from defective wiring].)