dissenting.
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is the primary body of federal law controlling labor-management relations in private industry. 29 USC §§ 151-69. The defining *116principle of the NLRA is found in section 7, which grants to employees the right to form labor organizations, to deal collectively through such organizations regarding terms and conditions of employment and to engage in concerted activities in support of these other rights. That exact same guiding principle is found in Oregon’s ORS chapter 663, which is patterned after the NLRA:
“Employees [shall] have the right to self-organization; to form, join or assist labor organizations; to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing; and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” ORS 663.110. (Bracketed text from federal statute.)
Before the enactment of the NLRA, however, employees who engaged in concerted activities in support of demands for higher wages and better conditions were without any legal protections or avenues of recourse in the event they were discharged. See generally Robert A. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law 1-2 (1976). What the NLRA and its Oregon companion, ORS chapter 663, did, was provide remedies for workers who were subject to what were defined under the statute as “unfair labor practices.”1 Under the statute, an employee who suffered an unfair labor practice could obtain redress through the Employment Relations Board (ERB), the administrative agency the legislature created to administer the act. Coverage under the statute, however, is only provided for individuals who are considered “employees,” and individuals who are employed in “agricultural labor” are expressly excluded from that definition. ORS 663.005(3)(a).
Nonetheless, the majority explains, agricultural workers are only excluded from the benefits and protections of the NLRA and chapter 663 in the interests of administrative efficiency. 147 Or App at 114. The majority simply misses the point: the legislature has expressed, by necessary implication, a specific policy in its choice to exclude agricultural workers from coverage under chapter 663. That expression of legislative policy directly conflicts with the cause of *117action that the majority creates for agricultural workers here. It seems to me incongruous to expressly provide that it is not an unlawful labor practice to fire an agricultural worker for engaging in union activity and then, in the same breath, to say that we may nonetheless hold you liable under the common law if you do.
In this case, the majority has undertaken the task of fixing what it believes is bad law. We are not, however, in the position of second-guessing legislative policies. In an analogous situation, the Supreme Court in Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 298 Or 76, 689 P2d 1292 (1984), stated:
“The responsibility of this court is to apply and interpret the law, not to assume the role of a legislature chamber. As we said in Burnette v. Wahl, 284 Or 705, 712, 588 P2d 1105 (1978):
“ ‘* * * If there is any chance that invasion into the field by the court’s establishment of a civil cause of action might interfere with the total legislative scheme, courts should err on the side of non-intrusion because it is always possible for the legislature to establish such a civil cause of action if it desires. Courts have no omnipotence in the field of planning, particularly social planning of the kind involved here. Courts should exercise restraint in the fields in which the legislature has attempted fairly comprehensive social regulations.’ ” Id. at 95-96.
Whether the statutes that the legislature promulgates embody the best or proper policy considerations is not for us to decide. And that is the majority’s failing here.
For these reasons I dissent.
For example, chapter 663 makes it an “unfair labor practice” for an employer to discharge an employee for organizing with other employees. See, e.g., ORS 663.125.