dissenting:
I cannot join in the majority opinion. If viewed at the time of inception, instead of with hindsight, the contracts under analysis here should withstand any constitutional attack the petitioners could muster. It is only because, through hindsight, the majority can see what a “bad deal” the cities have made that they now attempt to extricate these cities from their precarious position through a unique interpretation of our constitution as applied to the facts of this case. Clearly, the contracts under consideration comply with any constitutional requirement. Analysis under Art. 8, § 3, reveals that (1) the obligation under the agreements is not the type of obligation contemplated under Art. 8, § 3; and (2) that even if the above reason fails, the agreements should still be upheld under the “ordinary *444and necessary” exception to the requirement of a citizens’ election. Analysis under Art. 8, § 4, and Art. 12, § 4, leads to the same conclusion. Those sections do not invalidate these agreements because (1) the agency with whom the cities contracted is a public agency, and those sections merely prohibit contracts with private entities; and (2) there can be no lending of the credit of a public entity if the general fund of that entity is not liable on the obligation. Because these agreements withstand scrutiny under all of these constitutional provisions, the agreements should be upheld.
This is not to say that the cities are liable on these contracts. Our only concern in this case is the constitutionality of the cities’ actions in entering into these contracts. This opinion would not preclude the cities from asserting any defenses to formation of these contracts that they might bring in another forum. In fact, it appears from the record that these cities have been discharged by a Washington trial court because of the action of the Washington Supreme Court in invalidating the contracts as to the Washington defendants. We should not bend our own Constitution in an effort to release from liability public entities who have improvidently, but constitutionally, entered into contracts from which they may also be relieved because of contractual defenses.
I
A
The obligation “incurred” by the cities under these agreements is not the type of “indebtedness or liability” contemplated by Art. 8, § 3. That section contemplates the type of liability or indebtedness that will be repaid by the collection of an annual tax. Thus, the section provides some protection for the taxpayers who will be required to pay such annual tax. It requires cities to go to those taxpayers and obtain their assent to the liability or indebtedness incurred by submitting the matter to an election. However, under these agreements, no tax will ever be required. The liability in question is not payable from the general funds of the city. By the terms of the contract itself, it is payable only from revenues obtained from the sale by the cities of electric power. The sole source of revenue from which the cities are obligated to make payment to WPPSS is the electric utility rates charged only to customers of the electric utilities operated by the cities, most but not all of whom are located within the cities. No tax funds are ever involved under this contract. Because this obligation can never be a liability on the general city fund, it is not the type of liability contemplated under Art. 8, § 3; thus, Art. 8, § 3, should not render the agreement void.
B
Another reason exists that should validate the Participants’ Agreements under Art. 8, § 3. That section provides for an exception to the requirement of a citizens’ election where the liabilities are “ordinary and necessary expenses authorized by the general laws of the state.” The agreements were contracts for the acquisition of electricity. These participant cities were lawfully in the business of providing electricity to their residents and surrounding areas, and faced with a future shortage of electricity, the entering into of these agreements to provide a future source of electricity was an “ordinary and necessary” function of a city’s business of providing such electrical power.
This Court has recognized that the “ordinary and necessary” exception shall be applied on a case by case basis. The cases considered by this Court have defined “ordinary and necessary” in various ways.
“ ‘Ordinary’ means ‘regular; usual; normal; common; often recurring ... ‘Necessary’ means ‘indispensable.’ ... An expenditure, although not of a frequently recurring nature, may nonetheless be ‘ordinary and necessary.’ ” City of Pocatello v. Peterson, 93 Idaho 774, 778, 473 P.2d 644, 648 (1970).
This Court later defined “ordinary and necessary” as follows:
*445“An expense is ordinary if in the ordinary course of the transaction of municipal business, or the maintenance of municipal property, it may be and is likely to become necessary.” (Emphasis added.) Thomas v. Glindeman, 33 Idaho 394, 195 P. 92 (1921).
In City of Pocatello v. Peterson, 93 Idaho 774, 473 P.2d 644 (1970), we considered the question of whether a contract for the expansion of an airport facility was a contract for “ordinary and necessary” expenses within the exception to Art. 8, § 3. This Court considered several factors in the peculiar factual circumstances and concluded that the city’s lease of the airport facility was ordinary and necessary. Several of the factors considered were: (1) the fact that the city was authorized by law to operate an airport; (2) that the city had in fact been operating an airport for a considerable period of time; and (3) that the existing facilities were inadequate and would in the future become obsolete and unsafe. The Court then concluded that for all of these reasons the repair and improvement of Pocatello’s airport facility constituted an ordinary and necessary expense, thus falling within the exception to Art. 8, § 3. In its conclusion, the Court noted the following:
“Furthermore the repair and improvement of the Pocatello airport facility is essential for the proper growth and development of the area. This is especially so since the railroads, upon which public travel and communication were heavily dependent in yesteryear, are discontinuing passenger service to many cities.” 93 Idaho at 779, 473 P.2d 644.
The factors noted in City of Pocatello in finding those expenses to be ordinary and necessary are also applicable in the contextual framework involved here. The cities here are authorized by law to operate electrical power plants and purchase electrical power for distribution to residents of the city. See I.C. §§ 50-325 and -342. All of these cities are in the business of distributing electrical power to their residents. Their residents are thus dependent upon these cities for their supply of electrical power. The source of power previously used by the cities was in effect becoming “obsolete,” in that the BPA, from whom the cities had previously purchased their electrical power, had notified them that it would no longer be able to meet their electrical power needs by the early 1980’s. The cities therefore were required to seek alternative sources of electrical power in order to continue service to their residents. All of these factors considered together indicate that this case is substantially similar to the question considered in City of Pocatello v. Peterson, supra. The liability incurred by the city was thus an ordinary and necessary expense, and the agreements do not violate Art. 8, § 3, of the Idaho Constitution and should not be struck down.
II
A
The majority opinion does not discuss Art. 8, § 4, and Art. 12, § 4, of the Idaho Constitution, but the agreements also withstand scrutiny under those sections. Those provisions read:
“[Art. 8] § 4. County, etc., not to loan or give its credit. — No county, city, town, township, board of education, or school district, or other subdivision, shall lend, or pledge the credit or faith thereof directly or indirectly, in any manner, to, or in aid of any individual association or corporation, for any amount or for any purpose whatever, or become responsible for any debt, contract or liability of any individual, association or corporation in or out of this state.” (Emphasis added.)
“[Art. 12] § 4. Municipal corporations not to loan credit. — No county, town, city or other municipal corporation, by vote of its citizens or otherwise, shall ever become a stockholder in any joint stock company, corporation or association whatever, or raise money for, or make donation or loan its credit to, or in aid of, any such company or association: provided, that cities and towns may contract indebtedness for school, water sanitary and illuminating purposes: provided, that any city or town contracting such indebted*446ness shall own its just proportion of the property thus created and receive from any income arising therefrom its proportion to the whole amount so invested.” (Emphasis added.)
Art. 8, § 4, and Art. 12, § 4, of the Idaho Constitution, are both sections intended to limit the power of municipal corporations to lend or pledge their credit to outside entities. Art. 12, § 4, prohibits the lending of credit, but makes a specific exception for indebtedness for “school, water, sanitary and illuminating purposes." Art. 8, § 4, “goes further and is more restrictive” than Art. 12, § 4, Village of Moyie Springs v. Aurora Mfg. Co., 82 Idaho 337, 353 P.2d 767 (1960). It absolutely prohibits the lending or pledging of credit directly or indirectly for any purpose whatever.
These two constitutional provisions have been interpreted in numerous Idaho cases. This Court has interpreted these provisions as prohibitions upon the lending of credit in aid of “private” associations or corporations. See Board of County Comm’rs v. Idaho Health Facilities Authority, 96 Idaho 498, 531 P.2d 588 (1975); Village of Moyie Springs v. Aurora Mfg. Co., supra; School Dist. No. 8 v. Twin Falls County Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 30 Idaho 400, 164 P. 1174 (1917). As we stated in Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong, 94 Idaho 876, 499 P.2d 575 (1972):
“The purpose of such a prohibition is clear. Favored status should not be given any private enterprise or individual in the application of public funds. The proceedings and debates of the Idaho Constitutional Convention indicate a consistent theme running through the consideration of the constitutional sections in question. It was feared that private interests would gain advantages at the expense of the taxpayers. This fear appeared to relate particularly to railroads and a few other large businesses who had succeeded in gaining the ability to impose taxes, at least indirectly, upon municipal residents in western states at the time of the drafting of our constitution. We are led to the firm conviction that only private interests were intended to fall within the strictures of those sections relating to ‘association,’ ‘corporation’ and ‘joint stock company.’ ” Id. at 883-84, 499 P.2d 575.
In Yick Kong we were considering the constitutionality of the creation of a redevelopment agency intended to rehabilitate the downtown area of the City of Boise. We held that the redevelopment agency, being a public and not a private enterprise, did not fall within the strictures of Art. 8, § 4, and Art. 12, § 4. We recently reaffirmed Yick Kong in Idaho Falls Consolidated Hospitals v. Bingham County Board, 102 Idaho 838, 642 P.2d 553 (1982). There we said:
“A review of the proceedings at the constitutional convention, the history of the west, and a similar statute that was in effect at the time the constitution was adopted, show that the delegates only sought to prevent private interests from gaining advantage at the expense of the taxpayer.” 102 Idaho at 842, 642 P.2d 553.
In the present case WPPSS is not a private entity. Rather, it is a public corporation established by nineteen public utility districts in the State of Washington and the cities of Seattle, Tacoma, Richland and Ellensburg, and incorporated under the laws of the State of Washington. Thus, the evil sought to be avoided in Art. 8, § 4, and Art. 12, § 4, the lending of public credit to private enterprise, is not present here. Significantly, even if an incidental benefit to a profit-making enterprise is present, that in itself will not invalidate a program that has a public purpose. “Only if private interests are primarily benefited, must such programs with public goals be invalidated.” Board of County Comm’rs v. Idaho Health Facilities Authority, supra. Here, although the argument may be made that certain private entities are benefited by the participation of the cities in the WPPSS agreement, the primary benefit of the agreements inures to the public users of electrical power. Thus, in the present case, and under these facts, there is no violation of Art. 8, § 4, or Art. 12, § 4.
*447A final reason for upholding these contracts lies in the arguments already presented. Art. 8, § 4, and Art. 12, § 4, both require a lending or pledging of the credit of the municipality. There can be no lending or pledging of that credit of the general fund itself is not liable on the obligation. As shown before, this obligation is payable only out of revenue from the utilities operated by the cities; thus, no general fund is liable. This is not the type of situation envisioned in these two articles of our Constitution.
Thus, under any analysis of these agreements and our Constitution, they should withstand scrutiny and should be enforced.