The parties were separated in 1975 and at the time of the divorce in March of 1976, they entered into a property settlement agreement. Following the divorce, the wife, Dorothy Bodine, brought this suit as an independent action. She contends that in the course of their negotiations her husband, Loren Bodine, misrepresented the value of their property.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the husband. In the district court’s written opinion and order granting the summary judgment, the court stated that while there was no genuine issue as to the identity and disclosure of the property owned by the parties at the time of the negotiations, an issue did exist as to whether the property values given by the husband were fair and accurate. While discussing the possibility of fraud the trial judge found that “a claim by the wife under circumstances existing in the instant case that the property values provided by *478the husband were not accurate does not justify setting aside the property-settlement agreement.... I conclude, therefore, that on the present record there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the Defendant is entitled to Summary Judgment.” The plaintiff-wife appealed this decision.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial judge’s decision and remanded the case in light of the recent Idaho Supreme Court case of Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 612 P.2d 1175 (1980), which was released two months after the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the husband-defendant. The Court of Appeals held that the district court was too restrictive when it concluded that relief from a property settlement agreement must be denied by summary judgment when parties occupy adversary positions and are represented by legal counsel. The Court of Appeals then directed the trial court to consider other factors that were addressed in Compton in order to determine whether summary judgment should be granted.
The parties in this action have treated the property settlement agreement as though it were merged into the divorce decree. Therefore, in order for the wife to attack the judgment, since the time limitations have run for other avenues of review, she must show an extreme degree of fraud. Compton, supra. As stated in Compton, “[t]here is no expressed time limit ... with respect to the independent action to relieve a party from judgment.” 101 Idaho at 334, 612 P.2d at 1181. This Court in Compton also stated, however, that an independent action “will lie only in the presence of an extreme degree of fraud,” 101 Idaho at 335, 612 P.2d at 1182, and that “to survive husband’s motion for summary judgment the burden rests with wife, as challenging party in this case, to allege such fraud as to support an independent action for relief from judgment.” 101 Idaho at 336, 612 P.2d at 1183.
On a motion for summary judgment the trial court and an appellate court must construe all facts and inferences most favorably toward the party opposing the motion. If a genuine issue of material fact remains unsolved, summary judgment is improper. Taylor v. Choules, 102 Idaho 222, 628 P.2d 1056 (1981). Neither the district nor an appellate court can weigh the facts to determine the issues.
As stated, the trial judge found that “a claim ... that the property values provided by the husband were not accurate does not justify setting aside the property-settlement agreement.” However, an examination of the evidence in a light most favorable towards the wife shows that she did more than claim that the value the husband attached to the property was inaccurate. Rather, she stated in an affidavit that she discovered the fair market value of the property at the time the agreement was entered into was $1,650,000.00 and that her husband, Mr. Bodine, had represented to her attorney that the community property was valued at $446,000.00 and that the representation of $446,000.00 “was totally false and made by the Defendant with the intent to deceive and defraud me.” Also, at the time of the divorce she allegedly was under the care of a psychiatrist and, with her husband’s knowledge, she was taking medication prescribed by her psychiatrist to sedate her. This evidence is all relevant to the fraud issue.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for the trial court to reconsider the motion for summary judgment in light of Compton. However, an examination of this evidence in a light most favorable to the wife indicates that as a matter of law a genuine issue of material fact does exist, thus precluding the granting of a summary judgment motion. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s decision and remand for a trial on the issue.
Costs to appellant Dorothy Bodine.
No attorney fees on appeal.
BISTLINE and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur.